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Abstract
Scientists often construct simplified and idealized models in order to study complex phenomena. Yet they do
not model a phenomenon in its entirety but target only the aspects of the phenomenon which they consider
relevant. Hence, the model is said to describe the target system and not the whole phenomenon. The term
`target system' has become popular in the philosophy of science, yet most authors do not provide a definition
or analysis of the concept. The result is that the term is used ambiguously, which has undermined its potential
value and usefulness for scientific practice. The aim of this dissertation is to provide a cogent account of target
systems and their importance in science, with examples taken from case studies in ecology. The central issue I
explore in my dissertation concerns the nature of target systems. What are target systems? How are they
specified? How can they be evaluated? In my dissertation I give an account of target systems as real parts of
systems in the world, which are specified through a process of partitioning and abstraction. I also provide a
tentative theory of target system evaluation based on the notion of aptness for a particular scientific purpose.
A deep understanding of nature and function of targets can resolve problems in science. I use the term `target
system analysis', to denote the specification of target systems of one enquiry and the comparison of targets
across enquiries. The last part of the dissertation is devoted to the application of the theory of target system
specification and evaluation to a case study from actual scientific practice, invasion biology. Target system
reveals that a scientist constructing a unificatory framework in invasion biology faces a tradeoff between
generality and predictability. A truly unified framework must incorporate a multitude of different causes of
invasion, yet the causes of each invasion are unique. Hence, invasion biology can have a unified theory, based
on the process of invasion, yet this theory will be of little use to predicting particular invasions.
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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF TARGET SYSTEMS IN SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
Alkistis Elliott-Graves
Michael Weisberg
Scientists often construct simplified and idealized models in order to study complex phenomena. Yet they 
do not model a phenomenon in its entirety but target only the aspects of the phenomenon which they 
consider relevant. Hence, the model is said to describe the target system and not the whole phenomenon. 
The term ‘target system’ has become popular in the philosophy of science, yet most authors do not provide 
a definition or analysis of the concept.  The result is that the term is used ambiguously, which has 
undermined its potential value and usefulness for scientific practice. The aim of this dissertation is to 
provide a cogent account of target systems and their importance in science, with examples taken from case 
studies in ecology. The central issue I explore in my dissertation concerns the nature of target systems. 
What are target systems? How are they specified? How can they be evaluated? In my dissertation I give an 
account of target systems as real parts of systems in the world, which are specified through a process of 
partitioning and abstraction. I also provide a tentative theory of target system evaluation based on the 
notion of aptness for a particular scientific purpose. 
A deep understanding of nature and function of targets can resolve problems in science.  I use the term 
‘target system analysis’, to denote the specification of target systems of one enquiry and the comparison of 
targets across enquiries. The last part of the dissertation is devoted to the application of the theory of target 
system specification and evaluation to a case study from actual scientific practice, invasion biology.  Target 
system reveals that a scientist constructing a unificatory framework in invasion biology faces a tradeoff 
between generality and predictability. A truly unified framework must incorporate a multitude of different 
causes of invasion, yet the causes of each invasion are unique. Hence, invasion biology can have a unified 
theory, based on the process of invasion, yet this theory will be of little use to predicting particular 
invasions.
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1. Introduction 
Marmots, Models and Targets
1.1 The Case of the Vancouver Island Marmots
 The marmots of Vancouver Island (Marmota vancouverensis) are classified as critically 
endangered. It is estimated that their population has dropped 80%-90% since the 1980’s and currently 
consists of roughly 200 individuals (Brashares et al. 2010). These rodents,  which are closely related to 
squirrels, are quite special, as they are highly social.  They live in groups of 5-15 individuals, have an 
intricate pattern of social interactions and a variety of alarm calls. One of these alarm calls has given rise to 
their nickname ‘whistle pigs’ by locals of Vancouver Island.  They spend most of their time socializing, as 
they forage communally, taking it in turns to look out for predators, and share in the upkeep of their 
burrows. When a marmot out foraging encounters another marmot, they greet each other by touching their 
noses together,  while the youngsters, who stay on with the family until they are around 2 years old, spend 
most of their time play-fighting. 
 Usually, the cause of a population’s dramatic drop in size,  is human activity. This can include 
disturbance of the habitat, active extermination of the population or other indirect effects, such as the 
introduction of invaders (predators or competitors). In this case, the situation seems more complicated. 
While there is some disturbance of their habitat,  through logging, this actually led to a temporary increase 
in the growth of the population, as clearings are favored by marmots. This is because the absence of thick 
roots makes it easier to build their burrows, and also there is less vegetation which provides cover for 
predators. However, it seems that after this temporary increase, the population dropped drastically and kept 
on dropping. 
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 Another reason why populations can go into decline is an increase in predators,  or a drop in 
reproductive rate. In the case of the Vancouver Island marmots, there has been a small increase in predation 
rate and a small decrease in the rate of reproduction. This is quite strange, since a population is expected to 
grow when there are abundant resources for it to consume. Thus, the increase in rate of predation should be 
counteracted by an increase in the rate of reproduction, something has not taken place. Yet there is also 
something else.  The population of marmots has not been decreasing steadily, but the rate of decline itself 
has grown over the years. This shows that there is probably another factor which is compounding the effect 
of the increase in predation, which itself leads to the decrease in reproduction rate. 
 The task of the scientists studying these marmots, is two-fold. First,  they must determine the cause 
of this increase in the rate of decline, and second they must find a way to reverse it. In 2010, a group of 
scientists published a paper based on a study which involved observing the marmots over a period of three 
years (2002-2005) and a comparison of these observations with data from an earlier study, which took place 
between 1973 and 1975 (Brashares, Werner, & Sinclair, 2010). 
 The scientists hypothesized that the Vancouver Island marmots (VIM) were exhibiting an Allee 
effect,  a positive correlation between the density of the population and its growth rate. Populations typically 
have a negative correlation between density and growth rate. As an environment becomes more densely 
populated, the growth rate of the population drops, as there are not enough resources to sustain an 
exponentially growing population. However,  with an Allee effect,  a population will decline despite an 
abundance of resources. This is because resources are not the limiting factor on a population but another 
factor is causing the a negative growth rate in the population.  Allee effects are extremely dangerous for 
small populations as they have an increased chance of extinction (Courchamp, Clutton-Brock, & Grenfell, 
1999). Allee effects can have many different causes, such as mate limitation and diminishing of cooperation 
or inbreeding depression (Courchamp et al., 1999; Stephens & Sutherland, 1999). 
 The Allee effect can be shows through particular deviation from a general model of population 
growth: the logistic growth model.  This model describes the growth of a population which inhabits an 
environment with a limited supply of resources. Given this limitation, as the population size increases, the 
population’s rate of growth decreases. In the case of an Allee effect, the growth rate of the population will 
decline even when the population size is also declining. Figure 1.1 shows the difference between simple 
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logistic growth, a weak allee effect (dotted line) and a strong allee effect (dashed line), in the case of 
growth per capita.1 
Figure 1.1 Per capita population growth rate (logistic, weak Allee effect, strong Allee effect)
 This hypothesis rested on the idea that social interactions are essential to the VIM survival, as 
socializing gives the marmots increased vigilance against predators, and also makes their foraging and 
resting time more efficient, as they can rely on others to be vigilant while they are foraging or resting. It 
also could affect the establishment and distribution of colonies, as a certain proportion of the teenagers in 
each generation leave their own family, meet teenagers from a different family and found a new colony in a 
in large groups with few reproductive
individuals can respond to population
declines in one of two ways: they can
either form fewer optimal sized groups
(and hence fewer reproductive units), or
they can form higher numbers of subopti-
mal, smaller groups. In either case, popu-
lation growth will be reduced. Such a
process could account for the slow recov-
ery of the Ethiopian wolf (Canis simensis),
following disease epidemics a decade
ago, as described by Sillero-Zubiri et al.33
Exploitation
Sustainable harvesting is possible only
because of compensation – the increase
in population growth as a population is
reduced. However, when populations are
subject to an Allee effect, the population
growth rate is depressed at reduced
sizes and harvesting could have unfore-
seen consequences (Box 3). The most
important impact of harvesting is to
reduce the interval between the two equi-
librium population sizes, with the result
that natural fluctuations will be more
likely to reduce the population to critical
numbers and the harvested species will
be more vulnerable to extinction34. Some
species might be subject to increasing
exploitation as the population becomes
rarer, resulting in a particularly strong
Allee effect. This is precisely the process
that results when the value of a plant or
animal specimen is strongly correlated
with its rarity35.
Allee-type dynamics are thought to
have been responsible for the collapse of
many fisheries operating under a system
of maximum sustainable yields36. Data
from a range of fisheries have been exam-
ined to test this assertion. Myers et al.
assessed data from 128 fish stocks to
compare the fit of a standard Beverton–
Holt recruitment model (predicting com-
pensating per capita recruitment at
lower spawner densities) with a model
modified to allow for either hypercom-
pensation (greatly increased per capita
recruitment at lower spawner densities),
or depensation (reduced per capita recruit-
ment at lower spawner densities, essen-
tially analogous to the Allee effect)37. Of
26 stocks where data allowed for suffi-
cient statistical power, a model indicat-
ing depensatory dynamics gave the sig-
nificantly better fit in only three cases,
with a further two stocks showing some
nonsignificant evidence of depensation.
However, a more recent examination of
the data has indicated that the possibility
of depensation cannot be rejected with
confidence in most cases38. Many exploited
fish species are strong schoolers and
therefore might be expected to show
Allee effects. It is possible that for those
species subject to Allee effects, data are
PERSPECTIVES
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Box 2. The Allee effect and population dynamics
At low population sizes or densities, Allee effects lead to reduced reproduction or survival. Simple math-
ematical models can reveal much about the dynamics and, therefore, the important implications of this
phenomenon. Courchamp et al.2 show that simply by adding one extra parameter (K_, the lower unstable
equilibrium point) to the classic logistic equation of population growth, it is possible to introduce inverse
density dependence at low population sizes. The effect of this is to produce a relationship between per
capita growth rate and population size, where negative density dependence at an upper threshold (K, the
‘carrying capacity’) is mirrored by inverse density dependence at the lower threshold.
For increased control over the shape of this relationship; for example, to modify the slope of the rela-
tionship around the lower equilibrium, it is necessary to add a further parameter. Dennis24 showed that
empirical data on mating frequencies of azuki bean weevils with increasing population density could be
modelled using either a negative exponential or a rectangular hyperbola function. Both of these functions
use a single parameter to regulate the speed of approach to the asymptote. For example, the rectangular
hyperbola model takes the form:
where p is the relative fitness due to an Allee effect and n is the population size. ! is the population size
at which fitness is half its maximum value, hence the greater the value of !, the greater the reduction in
fitness owing to the Allee effect. This is shown below for a range of values of ! (! = 2, unbroken line; 
! = 15, dashed line; and ! = 50, dotted line):
The relative fitness, p, is on a scale from zero to one. When p = 0, the Allee effect being considered will
have its maximal effect on individual fitness; as p " 1, the reduction in fitness owing to the Allee effect
becomes insignificant. Whilst ! will scale the Allee effect, a further term of proportionality, #, will allow
the severity of the Allee effect to be modelled. Logistic growth subject to an Allee effect will thus be given
by:
where t is time, r is the intrinsic growth rate of the species, and k is the ‘carrying capacity’. The difference
between standard, logistic growth (unbroken line), and population growth incorporating Allee effects, is
illustrated below. The dotted line shows growth with an Allee effect that is evident over a large range of
population sizes, but is relatively weak (high !, low #; this can be seen, for example, in a flock of birds,
where collective vigilance is maximized only when large numbers of individuals are present, but small
groups or individuals still suffer relatively low rates of predation). The dash d line shows growth with an
Allee effect which is evident over a smaller range of population sizes but is much more severe (low !, high #;
a situation that might arise in a flock of another species, where collective vigilance shows little increase
above a small number of birds, but in flocks below that size, mortality due to predation is almost 100%).
The per capita (or ‘specific’) rate of population growth indicates whether the population is likely to
increase, decrease, or remain constant. When this is zero, the population is stable, and thus where the
growth curves cross the abscissa, the population is at an equilibrium point. When the specific growth rate
is positive, the population will increase, and when it is negative, the population will decrease.
Two crucial observations arise from these models. First, per capita growth of populations experiencing
Allee effects is lower than would be expected from the logistic model, with the most marked reductions
at small population sizes. Second, although all of the models retain the stable, upper equilibrium char-
acteristic of logistic growth (illustrated by the convergent arrows in all three instances), where the Allee
effect is strong, there is also a lower, unstable equilibrium (illustrated by the divergent arrows). The lower
equilibrium is critical: below this, populations are highly likely to become extinct.
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The difference between standard, logistic growth (unbroken line), and population growth incorporating Allee effects. The per capita 
(or ‘specific’) rate f population growth indicates whether the populat on is likely to increase, decrease, or remain constant. When this 
is zero, the population is stable, and thus where the growth curves cross the abscissa, the population is at an equilibrium point. When 
the specific growth rate is positive, the population will increase, and when it is negative, the population will decrease. The dotted line 
shows growth with an Allee effect that is evident over a large range of population sizes, but is relatively weak. The dashed line shows 
growth with an Allee effect which is evident over a smaller range of population sizes but is much more severe. 
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1 The per capita growth rate is simply the population growth rate divided by the number of individuals in the population. It is not usual 
to represent logistic growth in the per capita form, and most people are more familiar with the sigmoid curve graph. However, the per 
capita growth curve is typically used in cases where there is an Allee effect, so I am keeping with tradition and illustrating with the per 
capita growth curves. 
different place on the island. Thus the scientists named the situation leading to the VIM decline a ‘social 
meltdown’ (Brashares et al., 2010).
  Yet in the actual study, Brashares and colleagues had to determine whether the VIM population 
was exhibiting an Allee effect, before they could investigate the causes of this Allee effect. That is, they had 
to determine whether there really was a positive relationship between density dependence and growth. As it 
turned out, the VIM were exhibiting an Allee effect, and the first part of the hypothesis was corroborated. 
Figure 2 shows the Allee effect in the VIM population (again the graph shows per capita population 
growth), with a very clear positive relationship between density and growth, which means that the VIM 
population is dropping despite the abundance of resources on Vancouver Island.
Figure 1.2 Demonstration of the Allee effect in the VIM
 When philosophers of science describe a particular scientific study in detail, it is usually because 
they want to investigate the model or experimental setup which is being used, or because they think that the 
1995; Stephens et al. 2002; Courchamp, Berec & Gascoigne
2008).
With the exception of biological control and large-scale
reintroduction studies, opportunities to investigate the effect
of population size on components of fitness in wild popula-
tions are limited. Studies of experimentally manipulated
populations under a range of ecological scenarios generally
support theoretical predictions on the scale and impact of
Allee effects (e.g. Hutchings &Reynolds 2004; Berec, Angulo
& Courchamp 2007). Yet, attempts to experimentally stimu-
late Allee effects in natural populations, particularly those of
vertebrates, are usually impractical and unethical. Thus,
some of the best opportunities to study Allee effects in nature
come from ‘natural experiments’, such as those caused by
catastrophic events, or through the intensive study of popula-
tions fluctuating greatly in size (Courchamp, Clutton-Brock
& Grenfell 1999). Although it is now widely accepted that
population density and group size affect population dynam-
ics across a range of taxonomic groups, body sizes and mat-
ing systems (Kokko& Sutherland 2001; Gascoigne &Lipcius
2004), few empirical studies have demonstrated the mecha-
nisms that create inverse density dependence in wild popula-
tions (Stephens et al. 2002; Kramer et al. 2009).
Here, we test for empirical evidence of Allee effects in the
decline and impaired recovery of the Vancouver Island mar-
mot (Marmota vancouverensis; Swarth 1911; hereafter VIM),
and attempt to identify the mechanisms that may drive such
effects. Like other highly social squirrels, VIM historically
occurr d in dens lonie where m mbers b nefited from
group vigilance, anti-predator alarm calls, communal burrow
maintenance, and access to mates in neighbouring colonies
(Blumstein, Daniel & Bryant 2001). Between 1973 and 2006,
the estimated wild population of VIM declined from at least
300 individuals to fewer than 35 (Janz et al. 2000), with con-
current declines in col ny siz from an average of 8Æ3 animals
per colony in 1973 to 3Æ6 in 2006 (Heard 1977). The 90%
decline in population size also drove increased isolation of
colonies from a mean inter-colony distance of roughly
3Æ5 km in the early 1980s to more than 20 km in 2006. In
sharp contrast to predictions of density-dependent popula-
tion growth, per capita growth of VIM from 1970 to 2007
was positively correlated with population size (Fig. 1). Fur-
thermore, intensive study of more than 400 known animals
from 1986 to 2007 showed per capita reproduction also
declined at smaller population sizes while mortality due to
predation increased significantly (Bryant & Page 2005). As
group sizes and proximity to neighbouring colonies declined,
possible mechanisms for Allee effects and observed inverse
density dependence in this species (and others) include (i)
increased ranging behaviour associated with impaired mate-
finding, (ii) reduced predator detection ⁄ avoidance, and (iii)
reduced foraging resulting from increases in vigilance or
selection of safer, but less productive habitats (Sutherland
1998; Stephens & Sutherland 2000).
We hypothesized that observed reductions in colony size
and proximity would affect the time allocation, and move-
ment and social behaviour of individual VIM and, through
these changes, contribute to recorded declines in survival and
reproduction (Table 1). Specifically, we predicted that rela-
tive to congeners and historic VIM, current VIMwould exhi-
bit: (i) greater ranging behaviour, presumably as a result of
impaired mate-finding, with un-paired adults and males
showing the greatest movement; (ii) lower rates of social
interaction and cooperative behaviour – even when control-
ling for differences in group sizes; and (iii) a shift in time allo-
cation towards increased vigilance and reduced foraging and
resting time.
Materials andmethods
STUDY POPULATION
The V.I. marmot is a large (4–6 kg), fossorial rodent endemic to Van-
couver Island, British Columbia, Canada. The species historically
occurred widely across the 31 000-km2 island (Nagorsen, Keddie &
Luszcz 1996), but as of 2006 was represented in the wild by only 32
adult animals divided among six colonies. Approximately 170 ani-
mals are held in four captive-breeding facilities. The species is distinct
from other marmots in skull morphology and pelage (Nagorsen,
Keddie & Luszcz 1996; Cardini, Thorington & Polly 2007), behav-
iour (Heard 1977), and vocalizations (Blumstein 1999). VIM are
diurnal, consume a wide variety of grasses and forbs (Martell &
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Fig. 1. Annual counts of free-living V. I. marmots reveal strong
inverse density dependence in per capita population growth from
1970 to 2007. Trend line represents least-squares quadratic fit
(R2 = 0Æ55). Data exclud nimals introdu ed from c pt v ty.
Table 1. Predicted trends in the behaviour and ecology of
contemporary Vancouver Island marmots relative to historical
colonies and congeners assumingAllee effects
Category Predicted trend (› or fl)
Movement ⁄ home
range size
›Most pronounced in singles andmales
Sociality fl Social and cooperative interactions
Time spent in cover ›Time underground
Vigilance ›Time scanning for threats
Foraging efficiency flTime spent feeding (proportion of
total time), › vigilance while foraging
966 J. S. Brashares et al.
! 2010 TheAuthors. Journal compilation! 2010British Ecological Society, Journal of Animal Ecology, 79, 965–973
Annual counts of free-living V. I. marmots reveal strong inverse density dependence in per capita population growth from 
1970 to 2007. Trend line represents least-squares quadratic fit (R2 = 0Æ55). Data exclude animals introduced from captivity. 
(Reprinted from Brashares et al 2010). 
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model, experiment or the their results can be used to support a theoretical point. My interest in this case is 
rather different.  Instead of focusing on the model itself (in this case the modified logistic growth model), I 
want to investigate the relationship between the model and the marmots that it represents. In doing so, I 
will look at the preliminary work carried out by the scientists work which was necessary for the application 
of the model to the actual population.  In other words, I want to understand the process by which a scientist 
goes from the observation of a living breathing marmot, to a model which shows that the population of 
marmots exhibits this positive relationship with density. 
 The relationship between the organisms and the model is not entirely straightforward. The model 
contains idealizations and simplifications. For example, the upper bound of resources, known as the 
carrying capacity is assumed to be set, yet in nature it varies with environmental conditions. Also, the 
model does not consider effects of biotic interactions with other species, such as competition or predation. 
Finally, the model includes variables which do not have a direct correlate or analog in the real population. 
 One of the most important of these is r the intrinsic growth rate of the population. This is the 
growth rate of the population independent of resource limitations, competition, or predation. In other 
words, it is the average number of offspring that an individual has, when the population is at low density. 
In the graph, this is depicted as the slope of the curve,  yet it role can be seen more clearly in the logistic 
growth equation (Equation 1.3). Here, the growth rate of the population (rN) is limited by the density of the 
population itself, given the total number of resources, or carrying capacity (K) contained in the system. 
The Logistic Growth Equation
 The interesting point for my purposes,  is the relationship between r and the actual VIM 
population. Strictly speaking,  a growth rate r is not a part of the real-world system, as it is not a property of 
actual marmots,  but a statistical variable, derived from data collected from parts of the system in the world. 
Marmots are born, have offspring and die, they do not have growth rates.  How then do scientists calculate 
variables such as r from the marmot individuals and the events in their lives (i.e. births and deaths)?
dN
dt
= rN(1− N
K
) 1.3
5
 The standard procedure for calculating a growth rate in ecology, is the construction of a life table,  
a tabular summary of the birth rates, fecundity and death rates of a population, divided into age groups 
(Ricklefs & Miller, 2000). These rates are calculated from the observation of the birth and death events of 
the actual organisms. Then, the values from the life table are then used to calculate the intrinsic growth rate 
of the population. 
 The construction of a life table might be conceptually straightforward, yet it is quite laborious and 
time consuming. A very interesting point is that this work is considered ‘preliminary’ work for the purposes 
of the model, even though it takes up most of the time of the entire study. To illustrate, the observations by 
Brashares and colleagues, were conducted between 2002 and 2005, while the paper was not published until 
2010. Even allowing for the time it took to  work on the model, and any mishaps which could have delayed 
the publication, the gap shows that a lot of time must have been spent on this preliminary work. Yet very 
little of this preliminary work appears in the actual publication (in the form of explaining the the methods 
of observation). Importantly, there is no mention of the intermediary steps between the observations and the 
input of the variables into the model.  
Figure 1.4 Demographic composition of historical and recent VIM study populations 
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 Fortunately, in this case,  there is some mention of this preliminary work in the supplementary 
materials of the paper, which can be accessed online. In particular they show a graph of the demographic 
composition of the VIM populations at two different times: 1973-75 and 2002-4 (see Figure 1.4). 
 Yet there are other aspects to this preliminary work, which are usually mentioned even less 
explicitly, even though are are integral parts of the study itself.  In general terms, these aspects are the way 
in which the problem itself is conceptualized,  the designation of the exact spatio-temporal location in which 
the phenomenon takes place and the determination of the factors which are relevant for the investigation of 
the phenomenon. This cases is rather exceptional, as some of these aspects are mentioned,  even explained 
in the paper. First, the authors provide a figure which shows the domain in which the phenomenon in 
situated, shown here in Figure 1.5. 
Figure 1.5. Map of Vancouver Island from Brashares et al. (2010)
 Second, the authors mention some of the phenotypic and behavioral traits which are important for 
the study of the phenomenon, within the domain. The explicit mention of some of the traits of the VIM 
Milko 1986) and use underground burrow systems for rest and
escape during the 5-month active season (May–September) prior to
hibernation (October–April). They are relatively long-lived, up to
14 years in captivity and 8 years in the wild. There is a single breeding
season shortly after emergence from hibernation in early May and
one to seven pups (mean 3Æ4) are born after a gestation of 30–32 days.
Young males face reproductive suppression and aggression from
adult males and typically disperse to new colonies at c. 2–3 years of
age (Janz et al. 2000).
From April 2002 to May 2005, excluding periods of hibernation,
we conducted daily focal observations and radiotelemetry tracking
of 38 adult (2+ years) and juvenile marmots (1–2 years) at four colo-
nies (Fig. 2). Our sample size varied from 12 to 18 individuals among
years and accounted each year for 50–75% of the total, known wild
population. Our research took place at two sites: (i) the largest extant
colony,Mt.Washington and (ii) at three adjacent colonies character-
ized together as the ‘Nanaimo Lakes group’ [Green Mt., Mt. Mori-
arty and Heather Mt. (Fig. 2; the relative contribution of data from
the two sites is detailed in Table S1)]. These colonies have been con-
tinuously inhabited for at least 50 years (Nagorsen, Keddie & Luszcz
1996), and habitat in the area is characterized by steep forested slopes
at elevations of 700–1300 m surrounding isolated patches of rock
talus and subalpine meadow.
FIELD METHODS
Data on ranging, sociality and activity budgets were first collected on
VIM in the Nanaimo Lakes area by He rd (1977) in 1973, 1974 d
1975 when populations appeared to be stable (N ! 350). To test for
change in ecology of VIM that might indicat an Allee effect, we
used the same focal sampling methods (Altman 1974) employed by
Heard (1977) to gather comparable data on time budgets, social
interactions and ranging activity during 2002–2005, a period far into
the species’ decline (N ! 30). To further minimize bias in compari-
sons between historic and contemporary data, we used Heard’s
(1977) ethogram and behavioural categories during our sampling.
Our study was limited to wild marmots individually ear-marked
and implanted with radiotransmitters to allow telemetric tracking.
Bryant (1998) described the transmitters, and capture and implant
techniques. All marmots studied were of known sex and age.
Monthly monitoring of implanted individuals has occurred from
1986 through today in a basic effort to document annual mortality,
reproduction and distribution of VIM (Janz et al. 2000). From 2002
to 2005, 38 individuals were observed on a more intensive schedule
from emergence (May 1) to the onset of hibernation (mid-October).
This sample represented 70% of the known surviving wild popula-
tion at the time of the study.
HOME RANGE ESTIMATION
For both the historic (Heard 1977) and current period, home ranges
were estimated using locations collected daily on known individuals
across the 5-month active seasons. For 2002–2004, when a marmot
was first located each day, the observer recorded its GPS position;
measurements were considered accurate to within ±6 m. Data
points were plotted using Home Range, Movement and X-tools
extensions in ArcView 3.2 (ESRI 1996; Hooge 1999) and the Home
Ranger program (Hovey 1998). We used a minimum of 35 distinct
locations distributed evenly from May to October (mean = 88,
range 35–129) to estimate annual ranges over an active season (Sea-
man et al. 1999). A maximum of one location was gathered per day
during 2002 and 2003. In 2004, collection was intensified to charac-
terize range size by month; this entailed a maximum of two measure-
ments per animal per day, each at least 5 h apart (typically in the
morning and afternoon). This sampling produced a minimum of 34
location observations per animal per month. The distribution and
fr quency of our spatial sampling was designed to minimize the
potential for temporal or other biases caused by over- or under-
sampling (de Solla, Bonduriansky & Brooks 1999). Home ranges
were plotted using the fixed nonparametric kernel (density probabil-
ity) meth d with a grid resolution of 255. To allow comparison with
other studies, home range also was estimated using the minimum
convex polygonmethod.
The minimum linear distance between successive independent
locations was used in addition to total range size to assess travel costs
and to determine if patterns in movement differed betweenmales and
females. This was measured using the formula:
d "
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#x2 $ x1%2 & #y2 $ y1%2
q
;
where d is the shortest distance between two successive locations, and
x1, x2 and y1, y2 are the Northing and Easting bearings for each point
inUniversal TransverseMercator. Changes in elevation during travel
were not included in calculating distance moved.
SOCIAL ITY AND TIME ALLOCATION
Behavioural data in both the historic and current period were gath-
ered using a focal sampling approach (Altman 1974), thus allowing
direct comparisons of data collected from 1973 to 1975 with those
from 2002 to 2004. A randomized protocol was used to ensure equal
coverage of animals and sample times, and to minimize observer and
sampling biases related to the duration, onset and termination times
of a sampling event. Instantaneous activity was scored for each ani-
mal at 1-min intervals for 60 consecutive minutes. All behaviours
were observed from a distance of 40–300 m with 10· binoculars and
60· spotting scopes. Study animals were habituated to human pres-
ence and reliably identified from their radiotelemetry frequencies, ear
tags andmoult patterns.
In every month of the active season, each marmot was observed
for >12 h while the animal’s transmitter was active (typically 6 am–
0 100 km50
Fig. 2. Map of Vancouver Island, Canada with stars indicating the
general location of V. I. marmot subpopulations included in this
study.
Allee effects and the decline of the V.I. marmot 967
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gives some indication of which traits the authors think are relevant for the investigation of the phenomenon 
in question. 
The species is distinct from other marmots in skull morphology and pelage … , behaviour 
(Heard 1977), and vocalizations (Blumstein 1999). VIM are diurnal, consume a wide 
variety of grasses and forbs (Martell & Milko 1986) and use underground burrow 
systems for rest and escape during the 5-month active season (May–September) prior to 
hibernation (October–April). … There is a single breeding season … one to seven pups 
(mean 3.4) are born after a gestation of 30–32 days.
 
 The upshot of this example is that the preliminary work involved in setting up a model is both 
laborious and time-consuming, yet neither scientists nor philosophers accord it the importance that it 
merits. The main aim of this dissertation is to provide the conceptual space for the analysis of this 
preliminary work. The secondary aim of the dissertation is to show how the analysis of the preliminary 
work can actually help to solve some of the problems associated with scientific practice. 
 The conceptual tool which encompasses the preliminary work for applying a model to a real-world 
system is a ‘target system’ (Suarez 2003, Giere 2004, Knuuttila 2005,  Frigg 2009, Godfrey-Smith 2009, 
Weisberg 2013). It is called a target because it encompasses those aspects of the real-world phenomenon 
which will appear in the model. That is, it includes the parts of the real-world phenomenon that the modeler 
has targeted as being important for the construction of the model. Thus, models represent target systems, 
not natural systems in their entirety. 
 However, just as scientists often relegate their preliminary work to the background, philosophers 
have spent little time characterizing target systems and their role in the relationship between models and the 
world (called model-world relations).  This dissertation is aimed at providing a full characterization of target 
systems, by showing that specifying a target system involves precisely the preliminary work which 
scientists conduct so that a model can be applied to a real-world system. 
 In a nutshell, my view of target systems is that they are parts of real-world systems. The 
specification of a target system can be divided into four conceptually distinct parts,  the phenomenon of 
interest,  the domain of study, partitioning and abstraction. Identifying the phenomenon of interest is the 
determination of the precise phenomenon under investigation. In the case of the VIM, it is population 
growth, more specifically, a particular instance of population growth, the Allee effect.  Identifying the 
domain of study is the location of the spatiotemporal region in which the phenomenon is taking place, in 
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this case Vancouver Island. Partitioning involves the categorization of the domain of study into units,  given 
the scientific purpose designated by the phenomenon of interest and the contextual framework within 
which the scientist is operating.  In this case, Vancouver Island was partitioned into organism-sized units 
(marmots and other organisms) each of which has a set of properties, such as fur length, fur color, eye 
color, size, sex and metabolic rate. 
 Yet many of the parts and properties of the partitioned system will not be relevant for the study of 
the phenomenon through the particular model, hence they will be abstracted, or omitted from the system. It 
is these parts and properties which are used to calculate variables which are found in the model and which 
have no counterpart in the real world system. Thus, specifying a target system of a scientific investigation 
is an essential aspect of the preliminary work which needs to be conducted so that a model can be applied 
to the real-world system in question.  
 In philosophical terms,  a target system stands in a representational relationship to a model, as the 
model represents the target system. Yet it is also important to understand that it stands in a part-whole 
relationship with the real-world system, as it is part of that system. This means that target systems are real 
parts of the world. This is an important point, as it is essential for a coherent account of target systems, 
which allows the analysis of target systems to reach its full potential as a philosophical and scientific tool. 
In order to explicate this point, I will give an overview of the debate concerning model-world relations, and 
situate the notion of target systems and their role within the debate. 
1.2 Model-world Relations
 Modeling is an indisputably important aspect of scientific practice. Scientists create models of 
phenomena in the natural world when they cannot manipulate them or study them directly. Models can be 
found across many disciplines in the sciences and social sciences, with many diverse phenomena being 
studied through the use of models. In philosophy of science models  and modeling have become 
increasingly important, with the increase in popularity of the semantic view of scientific theories. On this 
view, models are central to scientific theorizing, as theories themselves can be understood as clusters of 
models (Giere, 1988; Weisberg, 2013). 
 The existing literature on models and simulations can be divided roughly into three categories, 
though it should be noted that these categories cannot always be neatly pulled apart. Nonetheless, each 
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category is aimed at answering a distinct question about models and modeling. The first question is ‘what is 
a model?’ and focuses on understanding the nature of models. The second question is ‘what is the 
relationship between models and the world?’ and aims to understand how models relate to natural 
phenomena. The third question is ‘when is a model successful?’  and aims to determine how models should 
be evaluated. 
 These three questions are, of course, related and most accounts of modeling attempt to answer all 
three at once. For example, when a view takes a stand on the nature of a model, this affects what the model-
world relation could be, which in turn affects how models could be evaluated. Still,  pulling apart these three 
questions at least at the conceptual level is important, because doing so reveals there is a major gap in the 
answers given to one of these questions. I am referring to the issue of ‘model-world relations’, where most 
views do not actually give a full account of how models relate to the world. 
 Before I turn to the question of model-world relations, I will give an overview of the literature on 
the nature of models. The class of entities to which the term ‘model’  is usually attributed is quite large and 
heterogeneous, which includes amongst others physical systems, mathematical systems and computational 
systems (Giere, 2004; Weisberg, 2013). Models are often defined as some type of system or structure which 
can potentially represent a system in the world (Giere 1998, Godfrey-Smith 2009, Suarez 2002, Weisberg 
2013). One view of models is that they are interpreted structures (Weisberg 2013), that is, they are systems 
which have some kind of structure and are intended by scientists to represent another system. Another view 
holds that models are fictional entities or imaginary systems, which are analogous to systems in the world 
(Frigg, 2009; Godfrey-Smith, 2008). All these views agree on the fact that models contain idealizations, 
and are therefore distorted analogues of the systems they represent. There are many reasons to idealize and 
many types of idealization, yet all idealizations have something in common. When a representation of a 
system contains idealizations, it will not be identical to the system itself. Models, therefore, are not 
identical to the systems they represent. This mismatch between model and phenomenon complicates the 
task of evaluating the usefulness of the model for representing a particular phenomenon. In order to deal 
with this complication, philosophers of science have tried to give a precise account of the relationship 
between a model and the phenomenon it represents. 
 Most accounts of the practice of modeling define models partly by their function, that is their 
capacity to represent other systems, usually systems in the world (Giere 1998, Godfrey-Smith 2008, Suarez 
10
2003, Weisberg 2013). Understanding the nature of this representational relationship is the subject of 
‘model-world relations’.  This,  in turn determines when a model is considered to be successful. Most of the 
accounts of model-world relations fall in the camp of the semantic view of models and theories. Proponents 
of this view think that all scientific theorizing involves modeling, as theories can be reconstructed as sets of 
models(Weisberg,  2007b). In many of these accounts, models are thought to be isomorphic with respect to 
the real-world phenomena they represent (Van Fraassen, 1980). That is, a model has structures that are 
analogous to the ones in the real-world system and preserves the same relations between those structures 
that appear in the real world system. To take a very simple example, a square table top is isomorphic to a 
Euclidian square because its sides are of equal length and the angles between them are right angles, just as 
in the Euclidian square (van Fraassen, 2008). 
 The problem is that these views of model-world relations do not seem to account for idealization. 
Idealized models do not have exactly the same structures as real-world systems nor do they always preserve 
the relations between those structures. This means that proponents of this view are often forced to reject 
models for the study of particular phenomena, because they are not isomorphic to the system they are 
modeling, even though they may actually be quite useful at explaining and predicting the phenomenon in 
question (Weisberg 2013). For example, a simple harmonic oscillator is not isomorphic to a clock’s 
pendulum, because even though it describes the oscillation observed in the pendulum, it does not take into 
account the effect of friction on the real-world system. 
 In order to deal with this issue, some proponents of the semantic view have relaxed the constraints 
slightly and view model-world relations as partially isomorphic (Costa & French,  2003). Here, some 
aspects of the model are isomorphic with respect to the real-world system but others are not. Thus, the 
idealized features of the model are not problematic, as they do not need to be isomorphic to the real world 
system. The fit between model and real system is preserved by those aspects that are isomorphic. The 
problem with this move is that very often it is precisely those idealized features that are supposed to 
represent aspects of the real-world system (ibid).  This is especially apparent in models from economics and 
the social sciences that explain human behavior through the analysis of idealized agents.  Neither the agents 
nor their behavior are isomorphic with respect to real humans, yet it is precisely that behavior that should 
be isomorphic if the model is to fit the phenomenon. 
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 An alternative account of model-world relations (still within the semantic camp) can be found in 
Giere’s account of scientific explanation (Giere 1988). On Giere’s account, scientific theories are simply 
families of models, while models are idealized structures that stand between scientific statements and real 
systems. Giere thinks that theoretical statements or equations do not describe real systems directly, but 
define models. The models, in turn, represent real world phenomena and stand in a relation of similarity to 
these phenomena. If a model is sufficiently similar to the real world phenomenon, then it is a good 
representation of that phenomenon. For example, a pendulum is a real world system which moves in a 
particularly interesting way (it oscillates). The theoretical model of a simple harmonic oscillator is similar 
to this system, because it is abstract and idealized (it does not take into account friction, for instance). 
Nonetheless, it is a good representation because it captures the oscillatory motion, and we can use the 
model to indirectly study real world systems such as pendulum clocks. 
 I agree with proponents of the semantic tradition that the practice of modeling  is a very important 
aspect of science. I also agree that it is useful to develop a precise account of model-world relations. 
However, I think that these accounts of model-world relations are not entirely satisfactory. More 
specifically, the criticisms leveled against isomorphism and partial isomorphism views are correct and I do 
not think they can be overcome. Also, while Giere’s view of similarity is promising, he does not have a 
developed account of how similarity ought to be measured. Without a detailed metric, model-world 
relations will remain rather obscure. After all, everything can be similar to everything else; we need a way 
of measuring relevant points of similarity between models and real systems. 
 There is one view of model-world relations which does get more precise (Weisberg, 2013). 
Drawing on Tversky (1970) Weisberg states that a model is similar to a real-world system when it shares 
certain important features of the system and does not lack many important features contained in the system 
(ibid). Weisberg thinks of systems and models as sets of features Δ, which can be divided into attributes and 
mechanisms. The former are the properties and patterns of a system and the latter are the underlying 
mechanisms that generate those properties. With this distinction in place, we can identify the common 
attributes and the common mechanisms between the model and the real system. We can also identify the 
differences (in terms of attributes and mechanisms) between the model and the system. Thus a model is 
more similar to its system when it shares many attributes and mechanisms and less similar when it contains 
additional or different attributes and mechanisms. Moreover, the various attributes and mechanisms of 
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systems and models will differ in terms of importance. For example, a real pendulum has a certain color, 
which is not present in the model or the model description. However, this is not as important as the fact that 
the model does not take into account friction. Weisberg thinks that we can capture this by differentially 
weighting subsets of features. 
 The details of how the similarity account works are not relevant for my dissertation, as my main 
objective is to provide the final piece in the puzzle of model-world relations. Weisberg does give a full 
account of how similarity can be assessed, along with a non-subjective method for weighting the various 
features of models and systems. 
 There is, however, a residual issue in these accounts of model-world relations. In the previous 
section I suggested that models do not represent entire natural systems but target systems.  Yet in order to 
have a full account of model-world relations it is not sufficient to describe the relationship between models 
and targets, but also to characterize the relationship between targets and the world. While it may seem that 
target systems are conceptually simple notions, there is no real consensus on the nature of targets. I think 
that target systems should be understood as parts of the world, yet they could also be understood as 
fictional entities or models, or even all three. The issue is that each of these views of target systems has 
different implications for the characterization of model-world relations, and the value of target system 
analysis.2 This dissertation is an argument for the conception of target systems as real parts of the world, a 
view which is coherent and which allows target system analysis to reach its full potential, by helping to 
solve genuine conceptual and methodological issues in scientific practice. 
 In chapter 2, I present my view of how target systems are specified, through a process of 
partitioning and abstraction.  Put simply, partitioning is the division of the domain of study into parts. In 
other words, when partitioning the domain of study, a scientist is deciding what sorts of things count as 
objects or units.  Abstraction is the process by which the scientist decides which aspects of the partitioned 
domain of study are relevant for studying the phenomenon of interest and hence, which parts of the entire 
system will be used in the model. Neither partitioning nor abstraction change the ontological status of the 
natural system, hence target systems are real systems in the world, albeit not entire natural systems. 
 In chapter 3, I look more closely at the process of partitioning. On my view, there are many 
potential ways that a natural system can be partitioned. For example, an ecologist can partition a natural 
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2 By target system analysis I mean the precise specification of the target’s partition and abstractions.
system into individual organisms, yet an evolutionary biologist can partition the same system into smaller 
units, alleles. Both partitions are possible in principle and selecting a partition depends on the type of 
phenomenon being investigated.  I will also address a worry which is often associated with pluralistic views 
of partitioning,  namely that if there are no rules that govern partitioning, then the resulting partitions cannot 
be real. I will adopt a version of promiscuous realism, which has hitherto been used to argue that there are 
countless ways of taxonomizing the world into kinds (Dupré 1993). On this view, even though many 
taxonomies of the natural world are possible, this does not mean that taxonomies are artificial. In addition, 
there are principled ways of deciding which of the many possible taxonomies should be used. This view has 
been influential in philosophy of biology as it provides one way of solving the debate concerning the nature 
of biological species. I will also show that a pragmatic conception of natural kinds is compatible with my 
view of partitioning.
 I then turn to the notion of abstraction (chapter 4). There are several accounts of abstraction in 
philosophy of science. The received view, which I call the material view, is that an object is abstract when 
it is not concrete (Cartwright, 1994). If this were the case, then my argument that target systems are real 
parts of the world would break down. If target systems are aspects of the world they must be concrete, yet 
abstraction results in objects that are not so. Nonetheless, there is another notion of abstraction which I call 
the omission view, where abstraction simply means the omission of irrelevant parts and properties of a 
system (Jones, 2005). As it stands, this notion suffers from the criticism that abstraction can be understood 
as a type of idealization. I offer a refined account of the omission view of abstraction which overcomes the 
criticisms leveled against it. On my version of the omission view, abstract systems are merely incomplete 
and can therefore also be concrete.  Target systems are an example of abstract systems that are concrete and 
not idealized.  
 There are a number of reasons which explain why target systems and their relation to natural 
phenomena have been overlooked.  Philosophers and scientists alike seem to think that identifying which 
aspects of the world are actually represented by the model are not that important. In some cases, this is 
because scientists think of this as preliminary work which does not get published. The model itself, along 
with its explanations and predictions, are what are considered important. In other cases, scientists simply do 
not need to worry about which aspects of the system they are studying are relevant for their model, because 
they are determined by pre-existing conventions in a discipline. In the philosophical literature, the 
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overlooking of target-world relations usually occurs because the process of identifying what is relevant for 
the model and what is not,  is subsumed under the notion of idealization, hence it is not thought to merit any 
special treatment.
 In philosophical terms, the main reason why target systems are important is because they are a 
fundamental part of modeling, hence understanding their relationship to natural systems provides a 
complete picture of model-world relations. In addition, establishing the place for target systems in 
modeling provides us with an easy way to distinguish between the world and the model. This division is 
founded on the distinction between abstraction and idealization, which already has support in the 
philosophical literature (Cartwright 1994, Jones 2005). On my view, idealization (and any problems 
pertaining to idealization) should be analyzed at the level of the model,  whereas issues concerning 
partitioning and abstraction should be examined at the level of the target. 
 As targets are not idealized models but real parts of the world, the methods we use for evaluating 
models, such as isomorphism and similarity, will not apply to targets. In chapter 5,  I propose an alternative 
method of evaluation based on the notion of aptness.  What we usually mean when we say that a subject or 
object is apt, is that it is suitable or appropriate given a particular purpose or set of circumstances. In the 
case of target systems, aptness is determined by the appropriate partitioning and level of abstraction. An 
appropriate partition is useful for the construction of a model, while an appropriate abstraction contains all 
and only the relevant factors which give rise to a phenomenon. In this chapter I explicate my notions of 
usefulness and relevance and develop a general method for determining whether or not a factor is relevant. 
To this end, I incorporate aspects of the kairetic account of causal explanation which provides a way of 
identifying the actual causes of an event from a wider web of potential factors (Strevens 2004).
 In chapters 6 and 7, I will examine the use of target systems in scientific practice.  I will consider 
the case of invasive species research, a relatively new field in biology characterized by a multitude of 
approaches. In chapter 6 I will give an overview of the history of invasion biology  highlighting the fact 
that its diversity is problematic because of its failure to predict invasions.   According to invasion biologists 
this problem can be solved by the creation of a more general unified framework for studying invasions 
(Gurevitch, Fox, Wardle, Inderjit, & Taub, 2011). However, I will show that a scientist constructing a 
unificatory framework in invasion biology faces a tradeoff between generality and predictability. A truly 
unified framework must incorporate a multitude of different causes of invasion, yet the causes of each 
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invasion are unique. I will show that it is possible to have a unified theory of invasion based on the process 
of invasion, yet this framework cannot be predictive as it does not focus on the causes of invasion. I will 
then present an alternative conceptual framework which is predictive and integrative but not unificatory as 
it can only achieve mid-level generalizations.  In chapter 7 I will give a deeper analysis of target systems in 
invasion biology. First, I will examine the scientists’ own questioning of the usefulness of the discipline’s 
theoretical framework and show that it can be understood as a case of target system analysis. I will then 
show how this preliminary target system analysis can be extended to determine the extent to which 
integration is possible and useful, as well as the extent to which results can be generalized.  The discussion 
in these chapters demonstrates the importance of target systems in scientific practice. In the first instance 
my accounts shows that target system analysis is already part of the theoretical aspect of scientific inquiry 
albeit in an informal and imprecise way. It then goes on to show that a more precise and philosophically 
grounded target analysis can help to determine which theoretical issues are solvable and can suggest ways 
in which they can be solved. It is then that target system realise their full potential as tools in the scientific 
toolkit. 
 The importance of target systems is not limited to cases of modeling in ecology. In the concluding 
chapter I outline some ways in which target system analysis can be extended to other disciplines and 
methods. For instance, it is quite common in philosophy of science to distinguish between modeling and 
experimentation as two radically different aspects of science. This distinction has sparked a debate 
concerning the relative virtues of the two. However, there has been a recent shift in focus, as some authors 
have started looking for commonalities between modeling and experimentation so that the two aspects of 
science can become more integrated . Paying attention to the specification of target systems can help with 
this integration as experiments also have targets.  Just like a modeler, a successful experimenter must choose 
a particular framework in which to work and identify the factors relevant to the phenomenon being studied. 
 Target system analysis can be instrumental in the apt choice of frameworks.
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2. What is  a Target System? 
1. The Missing Targets
 Many phenomena in the natural world are complex,  so, rather than studying them directly 
scientists construct models. These models are idealized representations of the systems in the world  in 
which the phenomena take place (Giere,  2004), (McMullin, 1985),(Weisberg, 2007a; 2007b). They are 
studied with various goals in mind including generating predictions about how systems will change in 
particular circumstances and explaining why a particular set of circumstances came about in a system. In 
many of these cases the model is aimed at giving knowledge about a real-world system. Yet natural systems 
often cannot be represented by a model in their entirety, so scientists pick out some aspects of a system and 
represent only those in the model. The standard term used by philosophers of science to refer to what a 
model represents is ‘target system’ (Frigg, 2009; Giere, 2004; Godfrey-Smith, 2008; Knuuttila, 2005; 
Suarez, 2003; Weisberg, 2013). 
 There is a substantial literature in philosophy of science on ‘model—world relations’,  which 
investigates the connection between models and natural systems. This literature focuses on the nature of 
scientific representation and on characterizing the relationship between models and the world, such as 
isomorphism (Van Fraassen, 1980), partial isomorphism (Costa & French, 2003), models as fictions (Frigg, 
2009) and similarity (Giere, 1988; Weisberg,  2013). My purpose here is not to take a side in this debate but 
to address an issue which has been relatively neglected.  Despite their differences, proponents of these 
views generally agree that models represent target systems, not natural systems in their entirety. Thus, 
accounts of model—world relations are actually accounts of model—target relations. However, there are 
few extended discussions of the notion of a target. In other words, there is a gap in the characterization of 
model—world relations, namely the relation between the natural system and the target system. The 
principal aim of this chapter is to fill this gap by explaining the nature of target systems and show how they 
are specified.
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2. What is a Target System?
 Philosophers of science agree that a target system is what a model represents,  yet this simple 
definition does not give us much information about the nature of targets. Many authors who make explicit 
mention of target systems do not provide specifics about their nature. For example, Frigg (2010) states that 
a target system is a “particular part or aspect of the world that we are interested in” (2010, 252),  while 
Giere states that “Scientists use models to represent aspects of the world for various purposes” (Giere 2004, 
747). 
 Authors who give more specific definitions of target systems, usually characterize them as having 
a disjunctive set of essential properties. Suarez (2003), for example, distinguishes between a source, or 
vehicle, of a representation and its target, which is the object of the representation. He elaborates on the 
nature of sources and targets stating that both “may be concrete physical objects, systems, models, 
diagrams, images or equations” (Suarez 2003, 226). Another example comes from Weisberg (2013) who 
makes a distinction between target-directed modeling, generalized modeling, hypothetical modeling, and 
targetless modeling. In the case of target-directed modeling a target is a “single real system” (2013, 91) 
which is an abstraction over a phenomenon in the world.  In the case of generalized modeling, the target is 
an abstract generalization over many phenomena.  In hypothetical modeling, the target is an imaginary or 
hypothetical system while in targetless modeling, the target is completely absent. 
 This implies that targets are understood as a disparate group of entities, as they can be concrete or 
immaterial, objects or systems,  aspects of the world or models, images or equations.  Unfortunately, this 
pluralistic conception of the nature of targets obscures their importance in scientific practice and detracts 
from descriptions of model-world relations. If one of the aims of explaining model-world relations is to 
understand how and what models tell us about phenomena in the world, then we must explain not only how 
models represent targets,  but how targets relate to the world.  Yet the relation between targets and the world 
cannot easily be characterized if targets are sometimes understood as models and other times as parts of the 
world. The relationship between a model and the world is very different to the relationship between a part 
of a system in the world and the entire system. 
 In what follows, I will argue that target systems are parts of the world. In other words, target 
systems are real parts of natural systems which have the same ontological status as the natural systems. 
Moreover, even though there are various different types of models, such as mathematical, concrete and 
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computational models (Weisberg 2013), whenever a model represents a real-world phenomenon it only 
represents one kind of target: a real part of the world.
 My account of target systems begins by considering how target systems are specified. I will break 
down target specification into four conceptually distinct stages: (a) identifying the phenomenon of interest, 
(b) locating the domain of study, (c) partitioning the domain and (d) abstracting to reveal the relevant parts 
and properties of the system. I should note that the four elements of target system specification do not 
always occur in this order, nor is target specification a linear process.  Each of these elements can be (and 
often is) extensively revised as new information comes to light. 
 The first element of the specification process is the identification of the phenomenon of interest.  
Phenomena are identified within the framework of disciplines or sub-disciplines. For example,  population 
growth, competition, predation and invasion are phenomena studied in the discipline of (population) 
ecology. In evolutionary biology the phenomenon of interest could be the mutation rate in a population or 
the frequency of a particular allele in a population. Other disciplines will have different phenomena of 
interest.
 Phenomena in the natural world usually occur in specific spatiotemporal locations. Identifying the 
location in which the phenomenon of interest occurs is also part of target system specification. This I call 
the location of the domain of study.  The dimensions and character of a domain depend on the particular 
discipline of the scientist. In the case of ecology, the domain of the real-world phenomenon is often 
geographically determined and can be an ecosystem, an island, an area defined by a particular microclimate 
and so on. Other disciplines have domains of study that look very different. In climate science the domain 
could be the Pacific Ocean, a particular country or even the entire planet, whereas in anthropology domains 
are usually particular groups of people.
 Once the phenomenon and the domain are identified, a scientist partitions the domain. Put simply, 
partitioning is the division of the domain of study into parts. 1 That is, the scientist is deciding what sorts of 
things count as objects or units for the purpose at hand. Partitioning also involves identifying properties that 
correspond to the units. Properties will vary depending on the sort of thing that each unit is, but in most 
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1 I will be using the terms ‘parts’ and ‘properties’ throughout this chapter. By parts, I mean identifiable units of natural systems. I use 
this term because I want to emphasize that these units have the same ontological status as the larger system which they find 
themselves in. The natural system is the whole and the units are some parts of it. The parts have not been altered in any way. I use the 
term ‘properties’ simply to refer to features of these units. A detailed account of the nature of properties is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation Moreover, the nature of this analysis is such that it can remain silent on the fundamental nature of properties. All that is 
needed is a way to refer to features that are predicated or instantiated, universally or not, by the units of the analysis. 
cases each unit will have a very long list of properties. The type of partition is determined by the question a 
scientist is investigating and the disciplinary framework in which the study is taking place. For example, in 
population genetics scientists model the change in frequency of alleles in a population. Hence alleles are 
the main units of study in population genetics. Similarly, in organic chemistry the main units of analysis are 
organic molecules, in physics they may be particles, in psychology they are individuals, in anthropology 
they are groups of individuals and so on.
 Partitions can also cut across levels of specificity. For example, a plant ecologist studying 
competition might group an individual plant and the mycorrhizal fungi in its roots as one unit, and the 
nitrogen which the fungi help the plant to absorb as another unit. Figure 2.1 shows some ways in which a 
natural system can be partitioned. Partitions can vary in terms of fineness of grain, but they can also be 
partitioned at more than one grain by having partitions of different sizes, or even partitions that are 
hierarchical or nested.
Figure 2.1. Partitions
 
 My notion of partitioning is similar to the formalized notion of partitions in set theory. A partition 
of set S is a collection of nonempty, mutually disjoint subsets of S (Lucas, 1990). The union of all subsets 
of S is the set S.  Subsets of a set are also sometimes called parts (ibid).  For example, the set { 1, 2, 3 } has 
five possible partitions: { {1}, {2}, {3} }, { {1, 2}, {3} },  { {1, 3}, {2} }, { {1}, {2, 3} } and { {1, 2, 3} }. 
The power set of a set is defined as the set of all its subsets and is denoted P(S). In the example, P(S) = 
{ {},  {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1,  2, 3} }.  Partitions are generated from combining non-
overlapping subsets given by the power set. 
 Similarly,  in the case of target systems, every domain can be partitioned in a number of different 
ways given by each domain’s power set.  Partitioning amounts to choosing one of the available partitions 
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from this power set. Also, while a partition does not have to have parts which are all the same size, all the 
parts of the set are present when the set is partitioned. For example, a domain {Vancouver Island} might be 
partitioned into a subset of {marmots}, {grass}, {air}, {water}, {nutrients}, {other animals}, {other plants} 
and {everything else}.  These subsets are all different types of things which have different sizes yet all the 
parts of the domain are present somewhere in this partition. We could also partition the same domain into 
{marmots},  {carbon molecules} and {everything else}, even though some of the carbon molecules are 
located within the marmots. This is not a problem, as long as we keep in mind that in this partition, the 
subset of marmots does not include their carbon molecules. 
 The next element in target system specification is to eliminate the subsets which are not relevant 
for our purposes. I call this a process of abstraction.2 Abstraction has come to mean a number of distinct 
things in philosophy of science,  including concept formation (Rosen, 2012), the de-concretization of a 
system (Cartwright, 1994), the simplification of a system (Frigg & Hartmann, 2009; Weisberg, 2007a) and 
the omission of parts from a system (Jones, 2005).  Although the first three notions of abstraction are 
commonly used, I will restrict the notion of abstraction to the omission of irrelevant parts from a 
partitioned system.3  
 In the example of the Vancouver Island Marmots, the ecologist would adopt a partition such as the 
one mentioned above (marmots, grass, air, water, nutrients, other animals, other plants, everything else). 
She would omit the subsets {everything else}, {air} and {water} as irrelevant. The remaining subsets 
{marmots}, {grass} and {nutrients} are the target system. 
 An important feature of my view of abstraction is that the omission of parts does not distort the 
system. The omitted parts are not physically removed from the target, nor is the target itself altered in any 
way. For example, the scientist does not kill off all other organisms in the system, nor does she eliminate 
the air or water from the system. Instead, she simply focuses on some parts and properties that are relevant 
for studying the phenomenon of interest (Figure 2.2, grey squares) and ignores the rest (Figure 2.2,  black 
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2 Weisberg (2013) also argues that most target systems are generated by abstraction, yet his notion of abstraction is more general than 
the one presented in this dissertation. 
3 A full defense of this notion of abstraction is beyond the scope of this chapter but appears in chapter 4. Nonetheless, it should be 
noted that omission forms the core of most notions of abstraction. For Cartwright, who follows the Aristotelian view of abstraction 
(Frigg & Hartmann 2009), de-concretization and generalization rely on the process of omission. Similarly, the Lockean notion of 
abstraction as concept formation relies on the identification of common properties of a group of particulars and the omission of the 
properties that are not shared.
background).  In other words, abstraction does not change the ontological status of any elements in the set, 
nor does it change the relations between any of the elements. 
Figure 2.2 Abstractions 
 
 Just like partitions, abstractions can differ. Omitting many features results in more abstract target 
systems while omitting fewer features results in less abstract systems (see figure 2.3).  However, abstracting 
indiscriminately can have unanticipated consequences. If we abstract too much we are in danger of missing 
important causal factors which can lead to a misinterpretation or distortion of the system we are studying. 
If,  on the other hand, we do not omit enough parts or properties from the system, we can end up with a 
target system that is too complex to experiment on or model.  The key lies in being able to identify the 
relevant aspects of the system for the particular model and omitting the rest.
 To recap, target system specification (Figure 2.3 ) involves the location of a natural system 
situated in the world and its partition depending on the phenomenon we are interested in.  We abstract the 
partitioned system focusing on some parts of the system and ignoring others. The partitioned, abstracted 
system in the world is the target system. In the next section I will present the advantages of my view of 
target systems. I will then consider two alternative views of targets and show that they do not share the 
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advantages of my view. Finally I will present some residual criticisms of my view and show how these 
criticisms can be overcome. 
Figure 2.3 Target System specification 
 
 
4. Questions of Ontology
 With my analysis of target system specification in place, it is now time to turn to the question of 
the nature of target systems. I will provide further arguments that target systems are parts of the world and 
stand in a part-whole relationship to natural systems. Therefore, target systems are concrete and real parts 
of the world. 
 The first advantage of my view is that it is the most straightforward way to understand target 
systems. On my view, target system specification does not distort the system in the world nor does it 
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involve any representation of the system. Partitioning picks out a subset from a list of already available 
subsets, while abstraction involves focusing on some aspects of the subset and not others. The parts 
themselves are neither changed nor removed from the real-world system, hence the target system is a real 
part of a real system. 
 The second advantage of my view is that the process of specifying target systems does not 
generate a new type of entity. As targets are parts of the world, they are the same kind of thing as the world 
itself.  This means that target systems are not ‘intermediaries’ between models and the world, so we do not 
have to give a metaphysical account of how the target relates to the world. In other words, my view of 
targets does not complicate the picture of model world relations by adding a new type of entity. The only 
different ‘kind’ of thing with respect to the world is the model. 
 I will illustrate these points with the help of an analogy. Imagine a student studying for an exam 
using notecards. On each notecard she will write down important information in her own words, which she 
will then memorize. The notecards are the analogue of a model, as they are the student’s representation of 
the information in the textbook, while the relevant information in the textbook is the equivalent of the target 
system. However, in order to generate the notecards she must first determine which parts of the textbook 
contain the information relevant for the exam.  The textbook is analogous to the domain of study, while the 
exam is the analogue of the phenomenon of interest. The student ‘partitions’ the domain into units, which 
are sentences. Her task is to determine which sentences in the textbook are important enough to represent 
on her notecards.  In order to do this, she reads through the textbook and ‘omits’  all the sentences that are 
not relevant to her purposes.  She is left with the analogue of the target system, that is the set of sentences 
which are relevant for her exam.  
 No part of this process involves changing the fundamental nature of the textbook. Partitioning the 
textbook into sentences does not change the textbook itself, nor does it alter the information within the 
textbook. It simply produces the power set of the sentences which could be relevant for the exam. The 
omission of irrelevant sentences reveals one subset of the power set, which is relevant for the exam. The act 
of omitting some parts of the text does not change the text. The student does not cut out the omitted 
sentences, nor does she change the order of the remaining sentences. She simply identifies which subset is 
the relevant set for her exam. Moreover, the student has not yet represented the textbook in any way. The 
sentences are still part of the textbook and hence part of the world. The representation occurs when the 
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student writes out her notecards, as she represents the relevant information from the textbook in her own 
words. 
 The third advantage of my view of target systems, is that it takes us a step closer to a full account 
of model-world relations. On my view, models are idealized representations of targets and targets are parts 
of the world. By analyzing a natural system, a target and its model, we can determine what the model tells 
us about a particular phenomenon in the world. As stated above, philosophers of science started using the 
notion of a target system in the context of model-world relations to denote the system that a model 
represented (Frigg, 2009; Giere, 2004; Godfrey-Smith, 2008; Knuuttila, 2005; Suarez, 2003; Weisberg, 
2013). Most of the literature on model-world relations has focused on the relationship between a model and 
its target,  in terms of isomorphism, partial isomorphism, similarity and so on. Even if my account is not 
fully accepted, I hope to show that a comprehensive analysis of target systems is important, especially 
given their place in model-world relations. 
 In order to provide some context for my view and its advantages, I will present two alternative 
views of target systems where targets are not real parts of the world. I should note that these views are not 
explicitly stated in the literature as views of target systems. Still,  they are viable options of how target 
systems could be understood if they were not parts of the world.  
4.1 Targets as Models
 The first possibility is if the target system is thought of as a type of model, which is itself 
represented by the mathematical model. An example of a system which is represented by a model but 
which is itself a representation of a system in the world, is Suppes’s notion of models of data (Suppes, 
1969). A model of data is an intermediate step between the model of the experiment and the experimental 
design. The experiment yields a set of raw data which the scientist can observe.  She then proceeds to make 
sense of this data by eliminating any errors (outliers) and presents it in a comprehensible way, for example 
by fitting a curve to the set of data points (Frigg & Hartmann, 2009). As models of data involve distorting 
the raw data by presenting it in a ‘neat’ way, they constitute idealized models. 
 Models of data are supposed to circumvent a criticism of the isomorphism view of model-world 
relations. The criticism is that real world phenomena do not have the kind of structures which can be 
isomorphic to mathematical structures in a model (Knuuttila 2005). For example,   the logistic model, a 
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typical model in ecology (which I mentioned in chapter 1), is used to measure how the growth rate of a 
population N is limited by the density of the population itself (see equation 1.1 p.  xx).  The important 
component for this discussion is r, the intrinsic rate of increase. This is the growth rate of the population 
independent of resource limitations, competition,  or predation. In other words, it is the average number of 
offspring that an individual has, when the population is at low density. The question is how can r be 
isomorphic to a structure in the real world system? 
 The short answer is that it cannot,  because there is nothing in a real-world system which is 
structurally similar to r.  A growth rate is not a property of an actual population, but a statistical variable 
derived from data collected from parts of the system in the world. As stated previously,  organisms are born, 
have offspring and die.  Ecologists collect data on the number of births and deaths of the population within a 
specified timeframe. Then they construct a life table,  a tabular summary of the birth rates, fecundity and 
death rates of a population, divided into age groups (Ricklefs & Miller 2000). The values from the life table 
are then used to calculate the intrinsic growth rate of the population.  However, the actual birth and death 
events of the population do not have the same structure (or even a similar structure) to the mathematical 
notion of a growth rate. 
 The model of the data helps to circumvent the criticism because it is an ‘empirical model’ which 
has the necessary structures and can be isomorphic to the mathematical model. However, as it stands, the 
isomorphism account does not give a full picture of model-world relations. It may be true that the model of 
the data is somewhat ‘closer’ to the real-world phenomenon, yet it is still an idealized and manipulated 
model. 
 Suppes’s account includes two additional steps which are meant to show how the model of data 
relates to the phenomenon in the world. Working downwards from the model of data, we arrive at the stage 
that deals with the problems associated with ‘experimental design’.  For example, it involves a formalized 
way of randomly assigning subjects into groups. This is the preliminary step for the experiment which 
yields the raw data. The issues that are ironed out at this level are usually determined by the lowest level, 
that is the determination of ‘ceteris paribus’  conditions, such as “control of loud noises, bad odors, wrong 
times of day or season”(Suppes, 1969). 
 In fact, I think that these other steps are similar to my account of target system specification.  For 
instance, in the determination of ceteris paribus conditions scientists are deciding which of the many factors 
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which give rise to a particular phenomenon are actually relevant for the study. This looks very similar to 
my notion of abstraction, as both processes are aimed at identifying the relevant causes of a phenomenon 
which should be included in the study.  In addition, partitioning is already implicit in the determination of 
the ceteris paribus conditions and the experimental setup, even though Suppes does not identify it as such, 
as the domain must be partitioned in units such as individuals or groups,  whose properties will then be 
tested in the experiment.  Thus, my view of target system specification is compatible with Suppes’s account 
of model hierarchy, as long as the lower aspects of the hierarchy are seen as the analogues of target systems 
instead of the models of data. 
 Of course, it is still possible to designate the model of data as the target system. However, this 
seems rather arbitrary. Suppes’s account identifies a hierarchy of three kinds of models: linear models, 
mathematical models and models of data. Given that target systems are defined as what models represent, 
we would be equally justified in calling the mathematical model a target system (as the linear model 
represents the mathematical model). This is problematic because it is at odds with what most philosophers 
of science have in mind when they are thinking of target systems. 
 An additional issue with this option is that it involves many intermediaries of different kinds. 
Models of data are empirical models, hence a different type of model to mathematical models.  If target 
systems were to be thought of as models of data we would have three distinct entities, real world systems, 
target systems and mathematical models. In contrast, on my view, target systems are just parts of the world, 
hence there are only two entities involved in scientific modeling,  models and the world.  My view of target 
systems provides a much simpler and straightforward way to categorize the entities involved in scientific 
modeling. It also provides a coherent way to distinguish between target systems and models, which can be 
applied across different studies or disciplines,  as target systems are partitioned and abstracted yet models 
are idealized.
4.2 Targets as Fictions
 A second way in which targets could be ontologically different to natural systems is if they are 
thought of as fictions or imaginary systems that are described by idealized models. Scientists sometimes 
construct models of systems that do not exist. In fact, they sometimes construct models of systems that 
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could not possibly exist (Weisberg 2013).4  For example, the exponential growth model (equation 3.1) 
represents how a population would grow if it were not checked by density effects. There is no population 
on Earth which is not subject to density effects, as there is no environment which can support an 
exponentially growing population indefinitely. The main difference between the exponential growth model 
and the logistic growth model is that the latter takes resource scarcity into account and therefore can be said 
to represent actual populations in actual environments. Consequently, its target systems are aspects of the 
world. Then, the question to ask is: what are the targets of the exponential growth model?
 One option is to say that the target systems of the exponential growth model are hypothetical 
systems of populations in environments with unlimited resources, whose populations are infinitely large. Of 
course, it is impossible to have an environment without scarcity or an infinite population in the actual 
world. This means that these hypothetical targets cannot, strictly speaking, be thought of as aspects of the 
world. If this is the case, then we need to have an account for how the imaginary system relates to the 
actual system. In more general terms, models are supposed to tell us about real world phenomena, but if 
they represent imaginary systems, then there is an extra step to account for,  namely how the imaginary 
systems relate to real-world phenomena.
The Exponential Growth Equation
 
 One way to account for this is through the notion idealization (McMullin, 1985; Weisberg, 2007a). 
The exponential growth model is idealized because it represents an environment without resource 
dN
dt
= rN
1.4
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4  Another group of models which can be claimed to have hypothetical targets are generalized models (Weisberg 2013). These are 
hypothetical targets of generalized phenomena. For example, a general model of sexual reproduction “isn’t supposed to be about 
kangaroo sex or fungi sex, but about sex itself” (Weisberg 2013 116). According to Weisberg, the target of a general model of sex will 
also be general, without the particulars associated with any particular population. However, just because the model is general, does not 
mean that it must apply to a single generalized target. In fact, a model can be considered general when it applies to many targets, 
hence the model of sex is about kangaroo sex and fungi sex and tasmanian devil sex etc. In fact, Weisberg agrees that so called 
generalized targets are actually constructed out of actual targets in the world, hence his view is compatible with my own. While I 
would resist referring to the generalized system as a ‘target system’, the important point for my argument is that ultimately these 
general models represent real-world target systems. 
limitations and populations as infinite.  One could argue,  therefore, that the model contains the same 
idealizations as the target it represents, and it is the target which is idealized with respect to the system in 
the world. While this is a possible solution, it makes the target system redundant. In the standard account of 
modeling practice,  idealization occurs in the construction of the model. If the target system is also 
idealized, then it will be identical to the model. This would add an extra step to the process of modeling 
without conferring any benefits. We would still have an incomplete account of model-world relations 
because we would not know how the idealized model and target related to the non-idealized phenomenon in 
the real world. 
 On the other hand, if we restrict idealization to the model, and maintain that the target system is 
part of the world, the inclusion of the target adds something important. Specifying a target system allows us 
to give a full account of model-world relations, given that we now have an account of how the target relates 
to the world. On this view, the targets of the exponential growth model are very similar to the targets of the 
logistic growth model. For example, if the exponential model were to be applied to the population of 
marmots outlined in the introduction, the target would be comprised of the marmots and some of their 
properties. The difference between exponential growth target and the logistic growth target of the marmot 
population, is that the latter includes the maximum number of marmots supported by the ecosystem. Hence, 
both models are idealized, yet both targets are merely abstract when compared to the entire ecosystem. 
Unlike the view of targets as imaginary systems, my view of targets provides a clear distinction between 
model and target, but also reflects the importance of target systems in scientific practice. 
4.3 Targets are Real
 Even though the alternative views of target systems create problems for the viability and 
usefulness of target systems, I anticipate some resistance to the claim that target systems are real.    There 
are three criticisms which I will address in this section. The first is the view that we should adopt a 
pluralistic notion of targets, the second is the the view that nature dictates how a system can be partitioned 
and the third is the view that abstraction necessarily involves distortion. 
 One possible criticism of my view of target systems is that it is too strict. While someone might 
agree that some targets are parts of the world, they might also want to allow for the existence of other kinds 
of targets. I have mentioned examples of generalized models, models of hypothetical phenomena, even 
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models which do not represent anything in the world. Why should we not refer to whatever it is that a 
model represents as a target system? The simple answer is that it is simpler, more consistent and coherent to 
use the notion of a target system in reference to a single kind of entity. By restricting the notion of target 
systems to the partitioned abstracted systems in the world,  we have a clean distinction between models and 
the parts of the world that they represent. The main aim of this chapter is to argue that when models 
represent phenomena in the world,  those target systems are real. Moreover, as I have shown, in many of the 
other cases,  such as highly idealized general models,  closer examination reveals that the models do 
represent real-world target systems. Having said that, however, my view is compatible with a more 
pluralistic conception of targets. I am not, in this paper, referring to cases where scientists intentionally 
construct a model of a truly nonexistent system, though my view does not preclude these special cases.5 
 The other criticisms are stronger, as they deny the possibility that any target systems are real parts 
of the world. The second criticism stems from the view that scientists must either carve nature ‘at it's 
joints’,  or admit that the partition is not real. This is a problem for my view because I stipulate that each 
real-world phenomenon can be partitioned in a number of different ways, while no particular partition is in 
principle privileged or better.  Yet if this criticism is right, only some partitions and by extension, only some 
target systems, can be thought of as parts of real-world phenomena. Alternative partitions might be 
possible, yet they are imposed on the phenomenon by the scientist. If this is the case, then only a small 
minority of target systems can truly be thought of as parts of real world systems.
 I have two responses to this criticism. The first is based on the view that scientists do not carve 
nature ‘at its joints’, but that there are countless ways of taxonomizing the world into kinds, all of which are 
equally legitimate. Following Dupré, one can argue that the structure of the world is very complex and can 
be categorized in many cross-cutting ways (Dupré, 1995).  What determines a classification is not the world 
itself, but the interest a scientist is pursuing (Bird & Tobin, 2008). Dupré argues that within biological 
taxonomy, there are many ways of classifying species, depending on the model of biological systematics 
which a scientist uses, and that every one of these classifications is objective and real. 
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5 I am referring to these cases as special, because I think that most scientists intend that most of their models tell us about systems in 
the world. Even cases which might seem too idealized to apply to real world-systems are, in fact, intended to elucidate real world 
systems. For example, Weisberg (2013) uses the example of 3-sex biology to show that some models have no real-world targets. 
However, as the scientists constructed the model in order to learn about 2-sex biology (ibid), the model can be understood as a very 
idealized model of real 2-sex populations. 
 The same can be said of target systems. Scientists from different disciplines carve up the same 
domain in a multitude of different ways, depending on the particular phenomenon they are studying. For 
example, a population ecologist carves up an ecosystem into organism-sized units, but an ecosystem 
ecologist might think of the entire ecosystem as a unit (Odenbaugh, 2007). A geneticist would carve up the 
same domain into smaller, allele-sized units,  while a climate scientist examining the microclimate of the 
domain would partition the domain in terms of factors that affected precipitation, wind etc.  Are any of these 
partitions illegitimate? Is there a partition which should take priority over the others? More importantly, is 
any of these partitions more real than the others? 
 Dupré’s pluralism stems, in part, from his anti-reductionism (Dupré, 1995). Reductionistic 
approaches to science do prioritize some partitions over others, as they favor fine-grained partitions over 
coarser grained partitions (Rosenberg, 2008; Sterelny & Griffiths, 2012). Dupré, along with many others, 
has criticized reductionistic accounts for ignoring the kinds which occur at higher levels of organization, 
due to emergent properties and the complexity of higher level systems (Brigandt,  2013a; Dupré,  2009; 
Kitcher,  1984; Mitchell, 2003). Different phenomena occur at different levels of organization, hence 
scientists must partition their domains in different ways, in order to identify and study these phenomena. 
Moreover, for Dupré, the issue is not merely epistemic but also ontological. It is not simply that scientists 
find it easier to identify phenomena at different levels of organization, but that these phenomena only exist 
in some levels of organization and not others. In other words, there are many different natural kinds, which 
occur at various levels of organization (Dupré, 1995; Kitcher, 1984), and they can only be studied if 
scientists partition their domains accordingly. 
 Although I accept Dupré’s radical pluralism, not everyone does. Yet there is another, less radical 
response to the criticism. It also starts from the observation that the world is very complex and does not 
give us sufficient reason to privilege a particular type of classification over another. The difference is that 
on this view, does have joints, yet we are not in a position to discover them. Our epistemic limitations as 
human scientists force us to take a pragmatic attitude towards classifications and partitions (Wimsatt, 
1974). This means that we have no way of actually distinguishing between partitions, so, as long as they are 
useful they are legitimate. 
 Does the second response concede the main point of the criticism? If we have no reasons other 
than usefulness to distinguish between partitions, then they should all be thought of as equally unreal. If it 
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is the case that our basic perception of the world does not track the actual structure of the world, then all 
target systems are distorted representations of the world.  This may be a legitimate criticism, yet it is not a 
criticism of my account of target systems. If this criticism holds, then it also applies to pre-partitioned 
systems. If our basic perception distorts a system, by definition, then our perceptions of target systems will 
also be distorted, yet no more than the pre-partitioned systems. Partitioned target systems are as real as pre-
partitioned natural systems. More importantly, target systems are still less distorted than models, as they do 
not contain idealizations.6 
 It is also possible to criticize the view that target systems are real, by focusing on the notion of 
abstraction. There are two ways in which my notion of abstraction can be criticized.  The first is that 
abstract objects are not concrete, hence target systems cannot be real. This criticism comes from a common 
notion of abstraction in philosophy of science which is that an object is abstract when it is not concrete e.g. 
(Cartwright,  1994), the implication being that abstract objects are not physically instantiated. However, this 
is not the only legitimate notion of abstraction. Earlier in this section and in the introduction, I argued that 
at least for the purposes of target system specification, abstraction should be understood as omission of 
irrelevant parts and properties.  Omission does not imply or necessitate de-concretization. Therefore, if the 
criticism is that my notion of abstraction (omission) departs from a commonly-held notion of abstraction 
(de-concretization), then the issue is simply semantic. Those who do not wish to view this process as 
abstraction can simply refer to it as omission.7 The point, for my purposes, is that omitting irrelevant parts 
and properties from a system does not alter its ontological status.  
 Nonetheless, there is another criticism which gets to the heart of the matter. This criticism stems 
from an understanding of abstraction as a kind of idealization, and states that there is no such thing as an 
omission which does not distort the system (Frigg & Hartmann, 2009; Humphreys, 1995; Weisberg, 
2007a). The first version of the criticism was articulated by Humprheys (1995) in direct response to 
Cartwright (1994). According to Cartwright, when we abstract, “we strip away, -in our imagination- all that 
is irrelevant to the concerns of the moment to focus on some single property or set of properties ‘as if they 
were separate’” (ibid 197). An example of a concrete object is a triangle drawn on a blackboard. We can 
abstract a number of properties from the triangle, such as its color and what it is made of, until we get a 
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6 I present a full account of the metaphysics of partitioning and responses to these criticisms in chapter 3.
7  I should note once again that there is significant continuity between my view of abstraction and other views, as most views of 
abstraction incorporate and rely on omission. For a full argument of my view, and its relation to other views see chapter 4. 
triangular shape. This, according to Cartwright, gives an abstract (de-concretized) idea of a triangle. 
According to Cartwright, “even when the chalk and the colour and all the other accidental features are 
subtracted, the shape that is left is never a real triangle. But let us pretend that it is …” (Cartwright in 
Humphreys 158). Humphreys points out, however, that as soon as we start pretending that an abstraction is 
different than it seems, we have blurred the line between abstraction and idealization. 
 This is a strong criticism of Cartwright’s account, yet the problem centers on the extra step of 
‘pretending’. It is true that if we pretend that the triangular shape is a true triangle and not merely 
triangular, then we are distorting the triangle. In fact, this kind of distortion is a true case of idealization, 
much like the idealization which occurs when an biologist ‘pretends’ that a population is infinitely large in 
her model. However,  this is not a problem for my view of abstraction as it does not involve these types of 
distortions. On my view, it is never possible to get a true triangle from omitting its properties, only an 
imperfect triangular shape. Similarly, it is not possible simply by omitting properties from a real population 
to get a population which is infinitely large. 
 The second version of the criticism starts from the idea that systems in the world are dynamic, so 
each factor can be inextricably linked to other factors in the system with intricate feedback loops. If this is 
the case,  then omitting a factor will result in a series of changes which count as distortions of the system. 
Hence abstraction must be a type of idealization (Frigg & Hartmann, 2009; Weisberg, 2007a). For example, 
when plants accumulate microbes such as mycorrhizal fungi and nitrogen fixers near their roots, this results 
in a beneficial effect on the plant which is called positive feedback (Callaway, Thelen,  Rodriguez, & 
Holben, 2004). However, when they accumulate pathogenic microbes, they create increasingly hostile 
conditions for themselves in a process called negative feedback. 
 It is thought that while native species accumulate pathogens which cause negative feedback 
reactions in the soil, species that are introduced into a new habitat are free from their native underground 
enemies and exhibit neutral or positive feedback with the same microbial species (Klironomos,  2002). In 
some cases, an invader might have both positive and negative feedback going on at the same time,  so that 
the effects of feedback are cancelled out. This means that even though these are important factors in plant 
competition (especially between native and invasive species) they are often overlooked. The omission of 
the feedback effects gives a distorted picture of the natural system, which can result in problematic 
explanations or predictions of competition between plant populations. 
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 This is a legitimate concern, one which practicing scientists often have to grapple with. Yet  it is an 
epistemic issue rather than an ontological issue. In ontological terms, target systems cannot be distortions, 
because they are real. In the example of plant-soil feedback,  there are countless potential target systems 
which scientists might use, some of which include all feedback, some of which include only some kinds of 
feedback and some of which include no feedback. All of these target systems are simply parts of a system 
and are neither distorted nor unreal. Of course, if we were to represent a plant target system without 
feedback, we would be distorting the system. Yet this does not mean that the target itself will be distorted. It 
would still be a collection of real and concrete parts of the world. 
 It might seem that this response is skirting the issue.  Surely not all target systems are ‘up for 
grabs’  in any scientific inquiry. I agree with this statement, because I think that what makes the choice of 
target system successful or not has nothing to do with ontology. Instead it depends on whether the specified 
target system is apt with respect to the particular study. In fact, part of the difficulty in finding the right 
target for a particular study lies in the fact that there are countless targets to choose from, all of which have 
the same ontological status. 
 To recap the argument so far,  the two alternative views of target systems are problematic as they 
introduce unnecessary complexity to model-world relations and do not provide a clear way to distinguish 
targets from models. Instead, on my view, target systems are just parts of the world. The elements of target 
system specification, partitioning and abstraction, do not alter the ontological status of the system, hence 
target systems of natural phenomena are always real. In the next section I will sketch out the preliminaries 
of a theory for target system evaluation, based on epistemic issues.  I will also give an explanation of cases 
where it seems that scientists have specified targets that are unrealistic or altogether unreal. 
5. Problems of Specification
 Throughout this chapter, I have only considered the relatively simple cases where the  
specification of an appropriate target system is successful. Yet part of the reason why formulating an 
explicit account of target systems is important, is that it can be very difficult to specify appropriate targets 
for a particular scientific purpose. For example, scientists sometimes erroneously classify relevant factors 
as irrelevant, or partition the system in a way which cannot be easily modeled. These target systems, while 
still real, are not successful given the scientists’ purposes.  A full account of target system evaluation is 
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beyond the scope of this chapter, yet I will give the basic elements of such an account in the remainder of 
this section.
 I begin my account of target system evaluation by considering three kinds of errors that theorists 
try to avoid. The first kind of error is when a target system is specified yet the abstractions and/or partitions 
are not optimal. The second is when a target system is specified, yet there is some mistake in the 
identification of its parts and/or properties. The third is when a theorist completely fails to specify a target 
system. I hope that the examination of these cases will provide additional support to my view that target 
systems are concrete real parts of the world, as it will show that many cases where targets seem to be 
immaterial are actually cases of mistakes in  target system specification. 
5.1  Inapt Target Systems 
 The way to think about the relative success of target systems is to determine whether or not they 
are apt. A subject or object is apt when it is suitable or appropriate given a particular purpose or set of 
circumstances. An apt description of a situation is suitable given the circumstances and gets the relevant 
information across to the audience. Whether a particular piece of information is relevant or not depends on 
the context of the situation. In the case of target systems, the context is the phenomenon we are trying to 
explain and the characteristics of the model or experiment that will explain it. The relevant information is 
the set of parts and properties that target selects from the actual system which will go into the model or 
experiment.
 The relationship between target systems and our descriptions of them is similar to the relationship 
between things in the world and the terms we use to refer to them in natural language. For example, we 
might ask someone to bring “the glass on the table”. By doing so we are picking out a particular object in 
the world and saying something about its location. We leave out a lot of information, because we don’t 
consider it relevant. However, there might well be more than one glasses on the table, in which case our 
failure to specify which glass can lead to confusion. It would have been more apt to include some more 
information about the particular glass we were referring to, for example “the glass at the far end of the 
table”. Yet our failure to include this relevant information does not mean that we are failing to refer to the 
particular glass. We are simply using a description of it which is not particularly useful, given this context. 
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 The same is true of target systems. Consider again the case of plant-soil feedback. Earlier target 
systems were rather inapt, as they did not include soil microbes. As it turns out, soil microbes are relevant 
for explaining plant competition, hence later targets,  such as those specified in the work of Klironomos 
(2002) are more apt. It is possible to view these target systems as better than previous ones, but only in the 
sense that they help scientists explain a particular set of phenomena. They are neither better overall,  nor 
more realistic in themselves. Target systems cannot be judged in terms of their aptness in isolation of their 
context, as they are just parts of the world. Whether or not a target system is apt depends on its relationship 
to the model and the phenomenon of interest. Of course, a description or representation of the target system 
which includes soil microbes and feedback is more realistic than another which does not include them. 
Still, the descriptions are descriptions of things in the world, which are parts of the world and hence real. 
  
5.2 False Beliefs about Target Systems
 Mistakes of relevance are not the only kind of errors that can occur in the specification of target 
systems. A different kind of mistake occurs when we manage to specify a target system, yet this 
specification induces or relies on false beliefs about the target. In the context of plant-soil feedback,  this 
would occur if a scientist identified positive and negative feedback between the plants and soil biota, yet 
mistook mycorrhizal fungi for bacteria.8 In this case the scientists would be specifying an actual target 
system, with particular plants and microbial biota, yet they would also have false beliefs about those biota 
(that they were fungi instead of bacteria). 
 Cases like the above suggest that we should maintain a conceptual distinction between target 
systems and our beliefs about them. Target systems are real parts of the world, but we can have mistaken 
beliefs about them. Going back to the analogy with language and reference, cases like these are similar to 
Keith Donnellan’s water-in-the-martini-glass example (Donnellan, 1966). If someone looks at an 
“interesting-looking person holding a martini glass” and asks “Who is the man holding a martini?”, they 
have succeeded in asking a question about the actual person in the room, even if the martini glass contains 
only water. In the case of target systems, the scientists are succeeding in specifying a target and asking 
questions about it, yet they have some false beliefs about it. These false beliefs might turn out to be 
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8 This hypothetical situation might seem absurd, but it is in fact quite easy to mistake one for the other if the partitioning of the target 
system is coarse-grained enough, so that what is measured is photosynthetic output or total biomass. 
problematic and require the re-specification of the target system, yet they do not change the nature of the 
target itself. The importance of the problems depend on what the target system will be used for and the 
manner in which it will be used. 
5.3 Failure to specify a Target System
 A more drastic type of problem occurs when scientists fail to specify a target system altogether. 
This might be the way to interpret the invocation of phlogiston to explain the processes of oxidation and 
reduction in the 18th century. The idea was that metals were composed of calx and phlogiston and would 
become dephlogisticated when burned (Weisberg, Needham, & Hendry, 2011). We now know that there is 
no thing with the properties of phlogiston. The question is whether scientists in the 18th century were 
specifying a target. If they were specifying a target, then this is a problem for my view, because they would 
specifying something imaginary. 
 There are two ways in which we can interpret cases like these. The first is to show that they are, in 
fact cases like the ones in 5.2, where scientists are succeeding in specifying a target system, yet have false 
beliefs about it. Indeed, one way to interpret this 18th century science is to identify phlogiston as hydrogen, 
dephlogisticated air as oxygen and phlogiston-saturated air as nitrogen (Weisberg et al., 2011). The 
important point is that phlogiston was not part of the 18th century target system. Instead the scientists were 
specifying a target system including hydrogen, but mistakenly attributed properties to it that it did not have. 
In other words, the scientists succeeded in specifying a target but had false beliefs about the target. 
 Yet even if we think that 18th century scientists were simply failing to specify any actual target 
system, this does not jeopardize the nature of target systems in general. Failing to specify a target system is 
not the same as specifying a target system that does not exist. Sometimes scientists make big mistakes and 
are not talking about any real part of the world. Yet,  as they continue to experiment and refine their views, 
they often do end up specifying an actual target, albeit with a number of mistakes and false beliefs. All this 
shows is that the natural world is complex and it sometimes takes centuries to even begin understanding 
what it is like and how it works. 
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6. Conclusion 
 Target systems are real parts of systems in the world. They have a part-whole relationship to 
natural phenomena,  and are represented by models. Target systems are specified by the partitioning of a 
domain of study into units and the omission of those units that are not considered relevant for studying the 
phenomenon of interest. They are an important aspect of science yet their role and importance has hitherto 
been overlooked. 
 The next step is to extend the theory of target system evaluation. On my view, target systems are 
evaluated in terms of aptness with respect to a particular model. The issue is to determine the criteria for 
aptness in terms of partitioning and abstraction. Before I turn to the theory of aptness I will examine the 
metaphysical implications of partitioning and abstraction in more detail in order to provide comprehensive 
answers to the criticisms raised in this chapter.
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3. Target System Metaphysics
Part 1: Partitioning 
1. Introduction
 The marmots of Vancouver Island are living, breathing organisms. Does this mean that they are 
real? A common sense answer to this question is that of course they are real, they are as real as you or me. 
But what if a scientist is studying these marmots? Do interactions with scientists change their ontological 
status? Again, according to common sense, they continue to be real after interactions with scientists. Yet 
what if the scientist constructs a model of these marmots? Now common sense dictates that the ontological 
status of the marmots has changed. The model does not contain living, breathing marmots, but idealized 
representations of marmots. Thus, at some stage between the unobserved marmots on Vancouver Island and 
the construction of the model the marmots have ceased to be real. The issue for my account of target 
systems is to determine the stage at which marmots stop being real. 
 On my view, target systems are real, as target system specification does not alter the ontological 
status of a system in the world. Yet,  in the previous chapter, I considered some criticisms of my view which 
argued that partitioning does change the ontological status of the system. If this is the case, then target 
systems cannot be considered real systems. In this chapter I will give a more extensive account of these 
criticisms and their motivations and show how they can be overcome. I will argue that the change in 
ontological status does not happen at the stage of partitioning,  but in the construction of the model. I will 
start by giving an overview of the views which give rise to criticisms of my notion of partitioning by 
providing a discussion of the debate on natural kinds. 
 The goal of this chapter is not to argue for one particular view of natural kinds. Instead, I hope to 
show that one of the attributes of my view is that it is compatible with a number of views of natural kinds. 
In the following discussion, I will identify the characteristics which make views of natural kinds 
compatible with my notion of partitioning. I will then examine two moderate views, one realist and one 
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conventionalist and show how they are both compatible with my notion of partitioning. The key to this 
compatibility is that partitioned systems need to be as real, but only as real as pre-partitioned systems. 
 
2. Natural Kinds
 Any discussion of the metaphysics of partitions incorporates some aspects of the debate about 
natural kinds, as views about the ontological status of partitions stem, directly or indirectly, from particular 
conceptions of natural kinds. Kinds are classifications of the world.  That is, they are groupings of 
individuals or particulars. Moreover, kinds tell us about the nature of individuals, as belonging to a kind 
defines what an individual is. If a kind is natural,  then it exists as a classification in nature, independently 
of humans.  Partitions are also classifications of a domain, as they are sets of individuals within a domain. 
Yet different views of natural kinds affect what can be counted as an individual for a partition, and in how 
many ways a domain can be partitioned.  
 A second reason for including an overview of the debate on natural kinds is that it is already well-
established in philosophy. Moreover, it provides a framework for categorizing the various views.  The 
dimensions along which views of natural kinds vary, have counterparts in views of partitions. My 
discussion of partitioning in this chapter will draw extensively on the framework for natural kinds provided 
by Bird and Tobin (2012). 
 There are two general debates about natural kinds. The first is metaphysical and concerns the 
nature of natural kinds, while the second is semantic, and concerns the meaning of natural kind terms and 
how they refer (Bird & Tobin, 2008).While the two debates are related, they are conceptually distinct, as 
metaphysical views of natural kinds do not determine the semantic content of natural kind terms and vice 
versa (ibid). Therefore, in my analysis, I will focus exclusively on the metaphysical debate.
 A straightforward way to categorize metaphysical accounts of natural kinds is through  two 
questions: (1) Are our classifications of the world determined by the world itself or are they merely 
conventional? (2) How many kinds does the world give us? 1 The two questions are straightforwardly 
metaphysical, as they refer to the nature of natural kinds. There is also an additional question, which is not 
obviously metaphysical but methodological, as it is concerned with how natural kinds are discovered: (3) 
What are the standards for determining whether a particular classification is a natural kind? Together, these 
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1 These questions are based on the discussion in Bird and Tobin (2012) and on conversations with Michael Weisberg.
three questions reflect three dimensions on along which views about natural kinds can be placed. (1) 
reflects the dimension of realism versus conventionalism,  (2) reflects the dimension of monism versus 
pluralism and (3) reflects the dimension of strict rules for determining natural kinds versus no rules. 
2.1 Realism versus conventionalism 
 The first question is the most fundamental, and amounts to whether or not there are natural kinds. 
Generally, those who answer the question in the affirmative are realists, whereas those who answer it in the 
negative are conventionalists (or constructivists) (Bird & Tobin, 2008). These two categories are not as 
distinct as they might seem at first glance. Both realism and constructivism have stronger and weaker 
versions, and the weaker versions of each are often motivated by similar epistemic considerations. In fact,  I 
think that the best way to understand this classification is as a continuum with strong realism and strong 
conventionalism as the two extremes. 
 Strong realism is the view that natural kinds are real entities which are ontologically distinct. On 
this view, each natural kind is an entirely different type of entity.  Thus, for example, classifying one atom 
as hydrogen and another as helium is not just a natural way of distinguishing  between lumps of matter, but 
it reflects a fundamental ontological division in nature. This point is important because it constitutes the 
basis of the distinction between strong and weak realism. 
 Naturalism is a weaker version of realism, which does not require the same ontological 
commitment (ibid).  A naturalist maintains that there are natural ways of classifying the world, yet she does 
not necessarily think that natural kinds are different entities.  For example, in the case of hydrogen and 
helium, a naturalist would agree that they are distinct natural kinds, but would also think that there is 
ontological continuity between them. In this sense, naturalism is compatible with ontological reductionism, 
a view which holds that objects are reducible to their smallest constituent parts (usually sub-atomic 
particles). 
 The realist dimension of naturalism comes from the view’s association with scientific realism 
(ibid). Scientific realists believe that the world which scientists investigate is mind-independent and that 
scientific theories give us knowledge about the world (Godfrey-Smith, 2009). The idea is that successful 
scientific theories latch on to real entities and discover relationships between them, hence we can say that 
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we gain knowledge about the world. In fact,  some scientific realists tie realism directly to the existence of 
mind-independent natural kinds (e.g. (Psillos, 1999)). 
 On the other side of the continuum lies conventionalism. In general terms, this is the view that the 
kinds picked out by science are conventions, and should not be privileged over other classifications. For 
example, while conventionalists might agree that angiosperms and gymnosperms are kinds which are 
important for science, they will also argue that vegetables and fruits are kinds, even though they do not 
match biological taxonomy. The latter classification is important, for instance, for dietitians and chefs. 
 As with the case of realism, there are weaker and stronger versions of conventionalism.  Weaker 
conventionalists, such as pragmatists,  do not deny the existence of natural kinds, yet argue that our actual 
classifications are not likely to be natural kinds, hence they should be viewed as conventions. Moreover, 
even if a particular classification happens to reflect a natural kind, we are most likely not in the position of 
perceiving it as such. It is interesting to note that the weak conventionalist’s ontological stance towards 
natural kinds is actually rooted in epistemic considerations. I will examine these epistemic considerations 
and their relationship with ontological considerations in sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
 Stronger versions of conventionalism deny that there are any natural divisions in the world (Bird 
& Tobin, 2008). Hence, it is not possible to discover natural kinds,  only to construct classifications which 
give us artificial kinds. The most extreme form of conventionalism is ontological relativism,  the view that 
all classifications of the world are dependent on a particular conceptual scheme (Goodman, 1978). On this 
view, there are no natural kinds,  only conventions. Each conceptual scheme has its own way of constructing 
reality, and science is just one of many. In fact, science can be further divided into disciplines or conceptual 
schemes, each with its own natural kinds. For example, on one reading of Kuhn, each scientific paradigm 
has its own method of constructing reality and its corresponding natural kinds (Kuhn, 1996). 
 
2.2 Monism versus pluralism
 The second dimension refers to the number of natural kinds that there are in the world. This 
dimension is also metaphysical as each view reflects a particular conception of how the external world is 
structured. In other words, the question is: how many joints does nature have? This dimension is more 
useful for classifying realist views, as it presupposes that there are natural kinds in the first place. At the 
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same time, however,  it is also possible to rank conventionalist views in terms of the number of 
conventional kinds which are acceptable. 
 On one side of the dimension lies monism, the view that there is only one kind in the world. In 
order to be a monist one would have to believe that the world only has one true substance,  while all other 
classifications are conventional. Moving along the dimension towards pluralism,  each view accepts a larger 
number of kinds as natural kinds. A weak pluralist view is ontological reductionism,  the view that the world 
is ultimately composed of a small parts (such as subatomic particles, strings, etc).  Moreover, these are the 
only natural kinds, while all higher levels of organization are conventions. 
 The most pluralistic view is promiscuous realism. The term was coined by John Dupré, who 
argues the world is extremely complex and natural kinds do not form a neat hierarchy. Thus,  the world can 
be categorized in many different ways, which can cut across traditional realist conceptions of natural kinds. 
Dupré’s pluralism is motivated by an anti-reductionist view of the world. For example, he rejects the idea 
that sciences at different levels of organization, such as chemistry and biology are operating at a different 
level of the overall natural kind hierarchy. Instead, he thinks that the natural kinds of biology are not 
reducible to the natural kinds in chemistry. Moreover, he also thinks that scientists working within the same 
discipline can have different but equally legitimate categorizations. For instance, a population ecologist and 
an ecosystem ecologist can study the exact same ecosystem, but carve it up in very different ways. The 
point is that both ways are equally legitimate. 
 With the exception of promiscuous realism, realist views tend to cluster towards the lower end, or 
middle of the dimension. This is because realists think that natural kind classifications are fewer than 
conventional classifications. The idea is that conventional classifications are quite easy to create, whereas it 
is much more difficult to discover truly natural classifications. I think that this stems, at least in part, from 
the motivation for realism, namely that discovering natural kinds and basing our scientific and 
philosophical investigations on natural kinds helps to gain a deep understanding of phenomena in the 
world. This motivation highlights the importance of the epistemic dimension in the discussion of natural 
kinds, which I will turn to next. 
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2.3 The Methodological Dimension 
 The reason for including a methodological dimension in an otherwise metaphysical discussion of 
natural kinds,  is that in many cases methodological or epistemic considerations provide the motivation for 
ontological commitments about natural kinds. As stated above, realist positions are motivated by the drive 
to understand which classifications are natural and which are conventional.  This is often tied in with 
scientific realism, the view that the phenomena studied by science reflect natural divisions in the world. 
Hence,  successful scientific divisions of the world are natural kinds and should be privileged over other 
divisions. This also means that the success of a scientific theory can be determined by whether it captures 
natural divisions in the world. Therefore, the epistemological objective for realists is simply to discover 
these natural divisions. 
 At the same time, commitments to conventionalism are also epistemically motivated. 
Conventionalists, especially pragmatists, argue that due to epistemic limitations, we are not in a position to 
discern which divisions are natural and which are not. Therefore,  even if there are natural kinds, our 
scientific theories might not capture them. According to the pragmatists, this should not diminish the 
importance or value of scientific theories. However, it does mean that there is an additional methodological 
question, namely how to judge when a scientific theory is successful. There are many accounts of how to 
judge scientific theories in pragmatist terms and a discussion of these is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
However, a similar epistemological concern can be raised for the divisions that scientific theories employ. 
In other words, how should we judge when a division is successful? I will give a full account of my view in 
chapter 5; for now, I will give a general overview of the methodological dimension for natural kinds. 
 The methodological dimension to the natural kinds debate concerns the standards, or rules,  by 
which classifications are judged. For realist views, it can be phrased as the question: (3)What are the 
standards for determining whether a particular classification is a natural kind? A traditional view is that 
natural kinds can be found by discovering the essential properties of a kind (cite). Once these are identified, 
then each particular can be classified based on these properties. Essential properties are those which make a 
particular object what it is.  Therefore, it follows that if a particular has the requisite properties it is 
automatically part of the natural kind classification. On strict essentialist views, essential properties 
constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for belong to a kind, hence each member of a kind must 
share all the essential properties of its kind and not share essential properties with other kinds. For example, 
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hydrogen and helium can be considered different natural kinds, because each kind has its own, unique 
atomic number. Therefore any element with atomic number 1 is classified as hydrogen, while any element 
with atomic number 2 is classified as helium. 
 Essentialism has been widely criticized. Critics argue that essential qualities are often difficult or 
impossible to locate. One of the most important set of criticisms of essentialism comes from biology,  as 
critics of species essentialism argue that evolution precludes species essences (Hull, 1965). The processes 
of mutation, recombination and random drift can cause new traits to appear and others to disappear, thus 
members of a species will not necessarily share their traits.  Moreover, members of a species often share a 
large number of traits with members of other species. A second argument is that the boundaries between 
kinds are often vague,  hence it is impossible to distinguish between natural kinds. In the case of species, 
speciation occurs gradually, and there is no principled way of drawing boundaries between different species 
(ibid). 
 Realists must accept that we often make mistakes in our classifications. Some classifications are 
better than others, even if they seem successful at first. Even in the case of science, it is often very hard to 
determine whether or not a kind is discovered or if it is merely a convention. Many conventionalists think 
that this problem is in fact insurmountable. They argue that we simply do not have the tools to determine 
which classifications reflect natural kinds. However, this does not necessarily imply that all classifications 
are equally viable. In other words,  being a conventionalist does not mean that anything goes in the selection 
of classifications. On the contrary, it is possible to have principled and strict ways of deciding whether a 
classification is appropriate, without appealing to the classification’s ontological status. 
 The main criterion for judging classifications in conventionalist terms is usefulness. Intuitively,  if 
a classification does not help with the overall goal of a project, then it is not appropriate for the project in 
question. For example, a biologist studying the growth of a particular population should employ a 
classification which includes organisms as units, as they are necessary for the experiments or models that 
she has at her disposal. A classification which has molecules as the basic units will not be useful in this 
instance. 
 The criterion of usefulness is not merely intuitive. In fact, most conventionalists devote a 
significant part of their accounts to setting out rules for judging the usefulness of classifications. This is 
usually achieved by determining what counts as acceptable and useful within a particular conceptual 
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scheme. Within each scheme, the criteria can be very specific and very strict. For example, according to 
Kuhn, different paradigms might have completely different ways of classifying phenomena in the world. 
They can also differ in the very concepts and methodologies they use to study phenomena and in the 
standards that they use to evaluate their theories (Kuhn,  1996). Moreover, these difference can make the 
contents of each paradigm unintelligible to the members of the other paradigm. Nonetheless, within each 
paradigm, there are strict rules for determining which classifications are appropriate. 
 The upshot of this section is that the methodological dimension to the natural kinds debate is 
important for both realist and conventionalist views. It often influences the ontological commitments 
towards kinds,  yet it also shows that there are considerable differences within each camp in terms of how 
kinds are discovered or evaluated. In the next section I will provide a summary classification of different 
views of natural kinds, using all three dimensions. 
2.4 Summary
 To sum up the discussion of natural kinds, putting the three dimensions together provides a 
method for understanding each view and its relation to other views. Figure 1 shows a spatial representation 
of the debate in three dimensions, with each axis corresponding to one dimension.  The figure also contains 
a selection of five views ranging from natural kinds realism (A) to ontological relativism (E). 
 The main point of this representation is to provide an easy way of visualizing the comparison of 
the different views. Thus natural kinds realism (A) is situated close to the starting point of all three axes, as 
it is a realist view, it is minimally pluralistic, and has strict rules for determining natural kinds. Promiscuous 
realism (B) is much more pluralistic and slightly less realist. In addition it also has slightly more relaxed 
rules for determining natural kinds.  This is because the pluralism allows for many more kinds to count as 
natural kinds.  In contrast, pragmatism (C) is conventionalist, yet has stricter rules for what can count as a 
kind. This is because it is less pluralist, hence there are fewer kinds overall. The Kuhnian view of 
paradigms (D) is more conventionalist, yet also more pluralist. However, it also has stricter rules for 
determining kinds,  because even though the number of kinds are determined by each paradigm, within each 
paradigm the rules are exceptionally strict. Finally, ontological relativism is very conventionalist and 
pluralist, as each conceptual scheme determines its own kinds, yet the rules governing this determination 
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are not as strict as they are on other views. This is because the view allows for conceptual schemes which 
contain arbitrary classifications of kinds.
Figure 3.1. Spatial representation of natural kinds views
  
 This leads to the second reason for including this diagram in my discussion of natural kinds.  I 
hope to have shown that the three dimensions are related yet not intrinsically so. That is, a particular 
position on any one dimension can influence a position on the other dimensions, yet there is some leeway. 
Thus, for example, realist views tend to be less pluralistic than conventionalist views, yet promiscuous 
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Figure 1. Spatial representation of natural kinds views in three dimensions. 
!e x-axis is the monism-pluralism dimension, the y-axis is the strict rules-no rules dimension and the 
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realism is an exception. Similarly, while some conventionalist views do not have strict rules for 
determining natural kinds, this is not a necessary implication of conventionalism. This point is very 
important for the following discussion of partitioning and its relation to natural kinds, as the subtle 
similarities and differences between views determine whether a particular view of partitioning is 
compatible with my view of target systems as partitioned parts of the world. I will give an account of which 
views are compatible with target system partitioning in the next section. 
3. Natural Kinds and Partitioning 
 In the previous section I gave a brief overview of the various positions on natural kinds. Views 
differ along three dimensions: in terms of realism, in terms of the number of natural kinds that the world 
gives us and in terms of the appropriate methodology for acquiring natural kinds.  I will now turn to the 
relationship between natural kinds and partitions of target systems. 
 Natural kinds and partitions are intimately connected, as views of natural kinds imply views of 
partitioning.  For example, a realist about natural kinds will partition the world in terms of those 
natural kinds. Thus, someone who thinks that hydrogen and helium are two different natural kinds will 
employ a partition which separates the two kinds of entities. Often, this partition will be hierarchical, with 
each level in the partition corresponding to a different natural kind. However,  it is also possible to be a 
realist and allow for more than one real partition. For example, Dupré, who is both a realist and a radical 
pluralist about natural kinds, allows for many different and crosscutting partitions to exist at the same time.2 
 Allowing for many partitions to coexist is more closely connected with conventionalist  views of 
natural kinds. However, on these views, the partitions themselves do not need to reflect kinds that are given 
to us by the world, but conventional kinds. Hence, on many conventionalist views, partitions are not real, 
but also conventions. Often, these partitions will be determined by  a particular conceptual scheme. 
 The methodological dimension of the natural kinds debate also has a corresponding dimension in 
partitioning. It is especially important for pluralist views of partitioning, as determining which partitions 
are appropriate is key. This is true both of conventionalist and realist pluralist views. In each case,  a 
substantial part of any theory of partitions must give an account of how to evaluate partitions, and how to 
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2 It is important to note that the single hierarchical partition view stems from moderately pluralist views about natural kinds. A monist 
realist about natural kinds, i.e. someone who thinks that there is only one natural kind, would argue that it is not possible to partition 
the world into real parts. 
distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate partitions. I will provide a full account of target system 
evaluation in chapter 5. Methodological considerations are also important for less pluralist views of 
partitioning, yet in a different way. In minimally pluralist, realist views of partitions, the methodological 
question is to decide which of the partitions reflect natural kinds, and which are merely conventions. 
However, on these views, the number of partitions is already restricted to the ones that have already been 
determined to be real. Thus, in some sense, the methodological dimension is less interesting for these 
views.  
 It is worth, at this point, to take a step back and take stock of the situation. The debate on natural 
kinds shows that there is an important tension between realism and conventionalism for my view of target 
system partitioning. On my view, target systems are real parts of the world,  yet there are also many 
different types of target systems, corresponding to different scientific disciplines or phenomena. Realist 
views of natural kinds imply that partitions are real, yet do not usually allow for a plurality of cross-cutting 
partitions. On the other hand, conventionalist views of natural kinds allow for cross-cutting partitions,  but 
at the cost of reducing partitions to conventions. 
 This diagnosis implies that not all views of natural kinds are compatible with my view of 
partitioning for target systems. Views that lie on the two extremes of the realism-conventionalism 
dimension will not be compatible with my view of partitioning, for the reasons outlined in the previous 
paragraph. More specifically, strong realist views tend not to be pluralistic enough to allow for cross-
cutting partitions of domains in the world. For example, a very strong ontological and epistemic 
reductionist, will not accept that higher-level organizations are legitimate partitions, hence most partitions 
which are regularly employed by scientists (e.g.  biologists) will not count as real.  This means that the target 
systems will also not count as real. 
 At the same time, strong conventionalist views, such as ontological relativism are also not 
compatible with my view of partitions. This is because, by definition, no partitions are considered real. 
Consequently, on this view, no target systems employed by scientists can be considered real.  Perhaps more 
importantly, ontological relativism does not have sufficiently strict rules for governing categorizations. 
Extending this view to partitioning would mean that an extremely large number of partitions are possible 
even within a particular conceptual scheme. This is not a problem in itself, yet without rules for 
determining which partitions are legitimate for a particular purpose, we have no method for evaluating 
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target systems. Being able to evaluate target systems for a particular phenomenon of interest is crucial, as 
without it the importance of spending time and effort to specify target systems is greatly diminished. 
 Fortunately, the number of views that are truly incompatible with my view of partitioning is quite 
small.  Most of the remaining views are moderate enough to be at least sufficiently compatible with my 
view of partitioning for target systems. An examination of the compatibility of each view with my own 
would be laborious but not particularly useful. Instead, in the remainder of the section, I will give a detailed 
examination of two moderate views, promiscuous realism and pragmatism. In each case, I will give a more 
detailed overview of the view itself, show how it is compatible with my view of partitioning and consider 
some criticisms which can be leveled against it. The motivation for this particular choice is twofold. The 
first reason is that these are the two views which fit most naturally with my view of partitioning. The 
second reason is that these two views are rather exceptional, as they combine elements of traditionally 
realist and traditionally conventionalist views. Thus, in considering the main criticisms leveled against 
these two views, I will be addressing the main criticisms which can be used against other views. Thus, I 
hope that the following discussion will also imply how other views of natural kinds can be made 
compatible with my view of partitioning. 
3.1 Promiscuous Realism
 The most obvious candidate for compatibility with target system partitioning is promiscuous 
realism. Promiscuous realism, according to its advocate John Dupré, is a realist view of natural kinds, 
combined with a “metaphysics of radical pluralism” (Dupré, 1995, p.18). In order for the combination of 
realism and pluralism to work, Dupré argues for a weaker understanding of realism and a weaker 
conception natural kinds. 
 Dupré’s argument starts from the observation that the classifications picked out by ordinary 
language terms are at odds with the natural classifications picked out by scientific practice. For example, a 
carpenter might group together pines, oaks, chestnuts and cherries because these are trees which provide 
the right type of wood for making furniture. This classification is entirely at odds with the classification of 
a botanist, as these are all examples of different species of tree. In fact,  a botanist would be especially irked 
at the inclusion of pines in this group, as pines are gymnosperms, while the rest are angiosperms. 
Angiosperms are a much younger group of plants which only emerged at the end of the Jurassic period 
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(Schulze, Beck, & Müller-Hohenstein, 2005). To put this into perspective, dinosaurs and early mammals 
were already roaming the earth when the flowering plants started their evolutionary life. 
 Dupré asks why the botanist’s classification should be privileged over the carpenter’s 
classification. One motivation for doing so is the belief that the scientific classification reflects natural 
kinds. However, according to Dupré, there are two ways of understanding the term ‘natural kinds’. The 
strong version is the view that particular properties determine membership in a natural kind. In other words, 
the strong version ties natural kinds with essentialism. Dupré argues that any sort of essentialism is 
untenable for a number of reasons, including that it is incompatible with an evolution. Instead, he prefers a 
weaker version of natural kins, defined as classes of things which are suited to particular roles. Moreover, 
he argues that it is a natural fact that these classifications exist and are mind-independent. That is, the 
carpenter’s classification of trees which produce wood that is suitable for making furniture is discovered 
rather than invented, because it is a natural fact that some trees produce the suitable kind of wood and 
others do not. 
 Dupré concedes that it is possible to have a somewhat more restricted view of natural kinds, by 
thinking that some kinds are more natural than others.  On this view, the carpenter’s classification would be 
less natural than the botanist’s classification. However, he argues that what makes a natural kind ‘more 
natural’  comes down to essentialism. Moreover, even if we accept this, the ‘true’ natural kinds would be 
few and far between, hence most of scientific practice would be operating with ‘less natural’ kinds. If this is 
the case, then we have no a priori reason to privilege the botanist’s classification (which does not rely on 
essences) over the carpenter’s classification. The only way to distinguish between the two is to determine 
which is better for the purpose at hand. 
 Perhaps more importantly, Dupré argues that pluralism is as plausible within science as it is 
between science and the rest of language. He states that “science, construed simply as the set of knowledge-
claiming practices that are accorded that title, is a mixed bag. The role of theory, evidence and institutional 
norms will vary greatly from one area of science to the next” (Dupré, 1995, p. 242). It is even more difficult 
to distinguish between more and less natural kinds within scientific practice, hence the only way to evaluate 
classifications is by taking into account their context and intended function. Thus, promiscuous realism is 
both realist (though weakly so) and pluralist, as it allows for a number of different, cross-cutting 
classification to coexist and enjoy the same objective status. 
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 The combination of realism and pluralism is what makes promiscuous realism naturally 
compatible with my view of partitioning for target system specification. Partitioning is a way of classifying 
a domain, just like any other. In the previous chapter I argued that partitioning amounts to choosing one set 
from the power set of a domain. This can be understood in the language of promiscuous realism in the 
following way. The power set is the totality of subsets of a domain, hence a particular partition is picked 
from the power set. In other words, the power set gives all the possible classifications (or natural kinds) 
from which we choose a subset.  This means that partitions of a domain are objective, natural and mind 
independent. In other words, partitioned systems are real, because they pick out objective natural 
classifications in the world. 
 Of course, this does not imply that anything goes in partitioning. First, the domain itself restricts 
partitioning, as it precludes classifications which include objects outside the domain. In addition, the power 
set itself precludes some classifications. For example, each object can only be part of one subset, otherwise 
the addition of subsets would produce additional objects.  More importantly, evaluating a partition in terms 
of its context and function actually amounts to strict rules about which partitions are viable and which are 
merely logically possible (I will give a more extensive account of evaluating partitions in chapter 5). 
 The downside to the compatibility of promiscuous realism with partitioning,  is that some of the 
arguments against the former also apply to the latter. Here, I will focus on two criticisms of promiscuous 
realism, (1) that it is too promiscuous and (2) that it cannot be understood as a true realist position.3 
 The first criticism can be associated with the third, methodological dimension of natural kinds. It 
is the view that promiscuous realism allows for too many natural kinds and hence too many partitions. The 
problem with promiscuity is that it does not allow for a clear-cut and universal way to distinguish between 
appropriate and inappropriate classifications. In other words, as soon as we allow many classifications to 
count as natural, then we lose an important method for evaluating classifications. The framework for this 
criticism is realism. It is the same criticism that realists use against conventionalist views of natural kinds. 
One of the supposed attractions of strong realism is that the classification between natural and conventional 
kinds gives us a clean way of determining which classifications are appropriate, at least in scientific 
contexts. Hence, discovering which classifications are natural and which are not is a unifying goal of all 
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3 I should note that the most famous criticism of Dupré’s book comes from Rob Wilson {Wilson:1996ju}. However, as this criticism 
focuses on Dupré’s treatment of the species debate and not on the general metaphysical implications of promiscuous realism, it does 
not apply to partitioning and so it is not relevant for the purpose of this discussion. 
scientific practice. However, pluralism about natural kinds makes the difference between natural and 
conventional kinds fruitless. 
 I do not think that this criticism is a serious threat to promiscuous realism. Dupré’s argument 
begins from the observation that there already exist different and cross-cutting ways of categorizing nature. 
Unless we accept (which I do not) that entire scientific disciplines or sub-disciplines are merely artificial, 
then we must accept that more than one classification is possible. But if we accept that more than one 
classification is possible, then there is no reason to think that we should accept few rather than many 
classifications. 
 A second counterargument is that a strong realist understanding of natural kinds seems to be 
untenable. Dupré shows quite convincingly that essentialism is problematic, as it is extremely difficult, if 
not impossible to discover the essences of natural kinds. Yet, as I stated above, without essentialism, the 
strong notion of natural kinds becomes untenable. This only leaves the weak notion of natural kinds, which 
is compatible with pluralism. Again, if modest pluralism is adopted, then there is no reason to think that 
radical pluralism should not be. 
 In the end, Dupré concedes that it may turn out that there are fewer natural kinds than his view 
seems to suggest. Yet he cautions that this is an empirically discoverable fact which cannot be determined a 
priori. He therefore urges that we adopt a ‘categorial empiricism’ and genuinely investigate whether “the 
discovery of a natural kind adds little,  if anything, to the discovery of whatever correlations may turn out to 
characterize it” (Dupré, 1995, p. 80). In other words, before attributing essences to natural kinds, we should 
empirically determine whether we have any good reason to do so. The upshot of this concession is that we 
have good empirical reasons to adopt at least a moderate pluralism but also that we do not have good 
empirical reasons to deny a more radical pluralism. Still,  if a moderate pluralism is all that the critic is 
ready to accept, then this is sufficient for a change in the way we think about natural kinds. 
 A third counterargument is that it is simply not the case that anything goes in the classification of 
natural kinds. As I argued above, there are both general and domain-specific reasons for favoring one 
classification over another. The fact that much of this evaluation is context dependent and determined by 
the usefulness of a classification for a particular purpose, does not mean that the rules within the context are 
not strict. Within a particular context there can be a fact of the matter about which classification is the best. 
Moreover, Dupré’s view does not assume incommensurability between contexts, in the Kuhnian sense. 
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Integration between scientific disciplines is compatible with promiscuous realism, as long as there is an 
overarching common purpose. Hence it is possible to translate between different scientific disciplines and 
to decide that a particular classification is more appropriate given the particular problem which needs to be 
solved. 
 Finally, given our epistemic limitations and the untenableness of essentialism, it seems that 
determining the usefulness of a classification is an indispensable part of any evaluation. In fact, this is 
exactly how a lot of scientific practice actually operates. Thus, Dupré can lay the burden of proof on the 
strong realist,  and argue that until a tenable way of distinguishing between natural and conventional kinds 
is discovered,  then the more pragmatic approach is the only one which is available. Given this situation, our 
theories about the structure of the world should reflect these epistemic limitations. 
 The second criticism is much stronger. It also has a realist motivation and is related in some ways 
to the first criticism. This criticism denies that such a pluralistic view can be considered a truly realist view. 
It is connected to the first criticism because it focuses on the incompatibility of realism with radical 
pluralism, but instead of disputing the pluralistic aspect of the view, it disputes Dupré’s claim to realism. 
The locus of the problem lies in Dupré’s definition of a natural kind as a class of things which have a 
particular role. The realist will argue, for instance, that the carpenter’s classification is wholly conventional, 
and that there is nothing in nature which makes that classification objective or mind-independent.  In other 
words, if there were no carpenters, the classification would not exist. 
 This can also be applied to cross-cutting classifications within science. Realists can argue that 
some scientific classifications are just better than others and that this is the only way to make sense of 
scientific progress. For example, even within the species debate, the fact that Linnaean taxonomy is 
generally thought to be outdated and has been replaced with a cladistic notion of taxonomy shows that the 
latter classification is simply better than the former. Moreover, there are objective grounds for this claim, 
for instance,  that the latter is compatible with evolution while the former is not. In other words, Linnaean 
taxonomy does not reflect natural kinds, and thus cannot be seen as a real classification. 
 The worry is that on Dupré’s view, Linnaean taxonomy is an objectively legitimate way of 
classifying the world which is as real as the cladistic taxonomy. If Dupré insists that the Linnaean 
taxonomy is on a par with cladistic taxonomy then, according to the realist, Dupré’s view misconstrues a 
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conventional classification as a real one. If this is the case, then the view cannot be considered a realist 
view. 
 As with the previous criticism there are a number of responses available. The first is a partial 
concession to the criticism, namely the reiteration that Dupré’s view is incompatible with strong realism. As 
stated above, any form of realism which invokes essentialism cannot be reconciled with promiscuous 
realism. The second counterargument rests on a distinction between   objective classifications and objective 
grounds for favoring a classification. 
 According to Dupré, the motivation for this criticism is the same as that of the previous criticism, 
and is methodological. That is, the realist insists on differentiating between real and conventional categories 
in order to have a way of choosing one type of classification over another. However, Dupré thinks that there 
are other,  better ways of distinguishing between classifications, hence there is no need to question the 
reality of some classifications. In other words, we have objective (though pragmatic) reasons to favor 
cladistic taxonomy over Linnaean taxonomy and the botanist’s taxonomy over the carpenter’s taxonomy, 
when we are studying particular scientific questions, so we do not need to privilege any taxonomy on 
ontological grounds. 
 The same criticism can also be understood in a conventionalist manner.  That is, a conventionalist 
could argue that the pragmatic motivations which give rise to pluralism, should force us to reject realism. 
This criticism has been applied to another view of natural kinds, which I will discuss in the next section. 
Both the criticism and the response are applicable to promiscuous realism. 
 
3.2 Pragmatism
 Pragmatism towards natural kinds can generally be understood as the view that we should take a 
pragmatic approach toward classifications. While pragmatists do not deny that there may be natural kinds, 
our epistemic limitations are such that we are not in a position to discover them or to know when we have 
discovered them. Therefore, we should use criteria other than realism to evaluate our classifications of the 
world. 
 The view which I will be considering is Philip Kitcher’s pragmatist understanding of science. 
Kitcher’s view is interesting because it started off as a more traditionally realist view (Kitcher, 1993) yet 
progressed towards a more pragmatist view over time (Kitcher,  2003; 2013). Strictly speaking, Kitcher’s 
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view is a realist view, as he self-identifies as a realist (Kitcher, 1993),  and others accept the identification 
(Stanford, 1995). However, there are two reasons why I think that Kitcher’s view counts as a pragmatist 
view.
 The most important reason is that the motivation for Kitcher’s view is thoroughly pragmatist. In 
later writing, Kitcher identifies himself as a pragmatist in general terms, because his view of science shares 
the important pragmatist themes “in the emphasis on local studies, on introducing considerations of value, 
in treating Science (and other institutions) in relation to their goals.” (Kitcher,  2013) (p.229). This 
pragmatist approach to science in general,  informs his view of natural kinds. He states that “invocations of 
“genuine properties”, “divisions in nature”, even of “objective similarity” are hardly pellucid. Because I 
distrust these notions, I am suspicious of the enterprises in which they are employed” (Kitcher, 2003) p. 44. 
Instead, he advocates a pragmatist view which “allows a place for human values and human interests in the 
constitution of the goals of the sciences” (ibid). 
 The second reason is that Kitcher thinks that our classifications of the world are not wholly mind-
independent. He argues that thinking of classifications as more natural than others, is tantamount to 
thinking that nature somehow has it’s own language which picks out particular objects and sets boundaries 
around them. In other words, we discover natural kinds when our language (everyday, scientific etc.) picks 
out the same objects as “nature’s own language” (ibid,  46). However,  this matching presupposes an already 
anthropocentric perception of nature.  The very phenomena or objects that we care about have something to 
do with the kind of creatures that we are (ibid). 
 For example,  different elements in the periodic table are thought to constitute natural kinds, 
because of certain microphysical structures. That is, the atomic number of each element is supposed to have 
some fundamental set of properties which make it similar to other tokens of the element and different to 
tokens of different elements. Moreover, these properties have important causal implications as they affect 
the way in which each element behaves. However, Kitcher argues that “the fact that these microstructures 
play a systematic unifying role, depends on the prior identification of a class of manifest properties”. We 
only notice these similarities between elements and focus on certain aspects of the world because they 
intrigue us. This interest lies in pragmatic reasons, such as “our sensory and cognitive capacities … 
interests that people have developed, either naturally or as a result of the accidents of human history” (ibid 
50). 
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 A more traditional conventionalist would applaud these conclusions, however, they would also 
argue that Kitcher cannot be called a realist.4 After all, Kitcher goes a step further and states that “different 
ways of dividing nature into objects will yield different representations of reality” (ibid 47). Moreover, he 
states that he is skeptical of the idea that there is an overarching aim for scientific inquiry, which is based 
on discovering natural kinds (ibid 59). However, this is entirely compatible with a conventionalist view of 
natural kinds and an instrumentalist view of science. 
 Nonetheless, there are two important differences between Kitcher’s view and full-blown 
conventionalism. The first is that, unlike the true conventionalist, Kitcher believes that there is  sufficient 
continuity between different classifications to allow us to evaluate them using criteria that are not internal 
to each context.  According to Kitcher, science can progress towards a better understanding of the world. 
Thus, for example we can say that for the purposes of biology, a classification which is compatible with 
evolution is better than the Linnaean taxonomy. Of course, the true conventionalist will argue that the 
notion of scientific progress and the discovery of truth is a futile endeavor, which should be abandoned 
(Stanford, 1995). 
 The second difference, is that Kitcher argues for a distinction between the world itself and our 
representations of it. The point is that different representations of reality can coexist but they do not change 
reality itself. That is, the fact that a chef might think of a tomato as a vegetable whereas a botanist thinks of 
it as a fruit does not in any way change the ontological status of the particular tomato. While the 
conventionalist will argue that this point ought to push us away from realism, Kitcher thinks that this is 
what ultimately grounds us in reality. 
 For Kitcher, our representations of the world are necessarily conventional, as they reflect our goals 
and purposes. This includes our scientific representations. However, to deny that the representations 
actually represent the real world implies that the world itself does not exist. Of course, the (moderate) 
conventionalist would agree with this point, as she would not want to align herself with extreme idealism. 
Yet if we agree that our representations of the world are representations of real objects, then according to 
Kitcher,  we are ultimately trying to understand the real world. Thus, science aims to understand how the 
world really is, despite our epistemic limitations and our pragmatic ways of evaluating our categorizations. 
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4 In fact, this criticism has been put forth against Kitcher’s view of species as natural kinds, even before his turn towards pragmatism, 
see{Stanford:1995tl}.
 This discussion shows that the debate reaches an impasse. This should not be surprising, as these 
are the arguments which form the two sides of the debate on scientific realism and antirealism, which is far 
from being solved. This is, in part, because in the moderate sides of the two camps, the same epistemic 
observations and motivations lead to different metaphysical conclusions. However,  this is not a problem for 
my view of partitioning, as it just shows that both moderate realist and conventionalist views are 
compatible with my view of target systems. I will show why this is the case in the next section. 
3.3. Compatibility
 The discussion of target system metaphysics in terms of partitioning,  was meant to show that 
moderate views on both sides of the debate are actually quite similar, as they stem from the same epistemic 
or pragmatic motivations.  Whether or not there are natural kinds, they are hard to locate, hence we should 
adopt criteria other than realism to evaluate our classifications. 
 In the case of target systems, saying that target systems are real is compatible with both realist and 
conventionalist views of natural kinds. This claim is based on a simple distinction.  What matters for target 
systems is that the partitioned system is as real as the pre-partitioned system. In other words, partitioning 
does not change the ontological status of the domain. This should not be a problem for the realist in 
principle, because she would accept that at least some partitions are real. Hence, it is not the action of 
partitioning itself that changes the ontological status of the system. The problem, for the realist, is that only 
some of these partitions should be considered real. The ones that do not reflect natural kinds should be 
considered conventional. 
 The response to this worry is similar to that provided by Dupré’. I could concede that the term 
‘target system’ be restricted to those partitions which pick out natural kinds. However, like Dupré’, I think 
that we do not have good reasons to think that we are in a position to determine which partitions reflect 
natural kinds and which do not. Hence we should adopt a pluralistic approach to partitioning. I agree with 
the realist that this should not imply a methodological or ontological relativism, because there are strict 
rules for evaluating partitions, as I will show in chapter 5. 
 However, if I concede that partitions are constructed based on pragmatic motivations,  both the 
realist and the constructionist might argue that partitioning does alter the ontological status of the system. 
However, I think that if we go down this route, we cannot restrict conventionalism to partitioning. If it is 
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the case that our scientific partitions are conventional, then our non-scientific classifications are also 
conventional.  The argument for conventionalism includes our basic perceptions of the world.  This means 
that any time we perceive a domain in the world, we are doing so under the influence of conventions. As 
scientists are humans, even their basic perceptions of a domain will be influenced by conventions. Yet this 
means that the pre-partitioned systems are also conventional, hence partitioning does not alter the 
ontological status of the system. 
 I will illustrate this point with an example. The biologists who studied the population growth of 
the Vancouver Island Marmots (see Introduction), decided that Vancouver Island was the domain in which 
the phenomenon of interest (population growth) manifested.  We can easily imagine that another group of 
population geneticists from the same academic institution, were also present on the island at the same time, 
studying a particular trait of the marmot population. Their partitions of the domain will be very different,  as 
each group of scientists is studying a different phenomenon. For instance, the population ecologists will 
partition the domain into marmot-sized objects whereas the population geneticists will partition the domain 
into marmot alleles. 
 There is no reason to think that one of the two partitions is more natural or more real than the 
other. I am assuming at least a modestly pluralistic view, where evolutionary biology and ecology are 
counted as sciences and have the same status in terms of their classifications. I do not think that this is 
particularly controversial, as it would take a strong version of reductionism to deny true scientific status to 
population ecology. Having established that both marmots and their alleles exist and are real, I will now ask 
what the pre-partitioned domains look like to each of the groups of scientists. 
  I think that it is safe to say that the pre-partitioned domains of the two groups of scientist swill be 
very similar, if not identical. Their interactions with the pre-partitioned system is based on  sensory 
perception. That is, their eyes, ears and language are sufficiently similar so that they perceive Vancouver 
Island in the same way. It is only when they start thinking of their domain,through the lens of their 
discipline that decide on different partitions. That is, it is the particular scientific discipline and the 
phenomenon which each group is studying which affects how they partition the system, yet in both cases 
the pre-partitioned system will be categorized in the same way. The question now is, what is the ontological 
status of the pre-partitioned system?
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 According to the conventionalist, the pre-partitioned system should also be a convention, as all 
categorizations are conventional.  However, on this view the partitioning itself will not make the system any 
less real,  hence we can say that the two target systems are as real as the pre-partitioned system. On the 
other hand, the realist will think that the pre-partitioned domain is real, yet this means that the partitioned 
system will also be real. In fact, most realist positions would argue that scientific partitioning is better at 
latching on to natural kinds than our everyday sensory perception. The point of doing science is to find the 
tools which help us locate natural kinds. Yet this means that the scientific partitions are more real than the 
pre-partitioned domains. 
 To summarize, my view of target system partitioning is compatible with both moderately realist 
and moderately conventionalist positions. This is because, the pre-partitioned systems and the partitioned 
systems have the same ontological status, hence target systems are as real as their pre-partitioned domains. 
At the same time, my view is not compatible with more extreme versions of realism and conventionalism. 
Realist views that are not sufficiently pluralistic will not allow target systems of accepted scientific 
disciplines, and therefore are not compatible. On the other hand,  strong conventionalist views which do not 
have strict rules for determining classifications will also not be compatible with my view. 
4. Conclusion
 In this chapter I examined the metaphysical questions concerning the partitioning of target 
systems. I hope to have shown that partitioning itself is a metaphysically neutral operation, which does not 
change the ontological status of a system. This should quell worries of both realists and conventionalists 
regarding the ontological status of target systems, as they are (only) as real as the pre-partitioned system. 
 This discussion does not exhaust the metaphysical and epistemic questions regarding target 
systems. As I have shown, it is important to be able to evaluate our target systems, in order to avoid the 
problems associated with ontological or methodological relativism.  I will provide the framework for a 
theory of target system evaluation in chapter 5. Before I can turn to target system evaluation, however, I 
must first examine a different set of worries, this time pertaining to abstraction. In the next chapter, I will 
examine the notion of abstraction, starting with a brief overview of some common notions of abstraction in 
philosophy of science, considering some important criticisms and finally providing an account of 
abstraction which avoids them. 
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4. Target System Metaphysics
Part 2: Abstraction 
1. Introduction 
 The west pediment of the Parthenon is a physical object that exists in space and time, but it is also 
triangular. We say that the west pediment is concrete, but that triangles are abstract. What accounts for this 
difference? The term ‘abstraction’ is used in many academic disciplines and everyday parlance, and is 
generally used to denote objects and systems that are not concrete or physical. People usually think of 
mathematical objects such as numbers and triangles as abstract,  because they are not physically 
instantiated. Examples of abstract objects in academic disciplines are concepts and ideas which are not 
tangible (e.g., fairness, evil, superego). This intuitive notion of abstraction is also the received view in 
philosophy of science, which I call the material view  (Cartwright 1994). Proponents of the material view 
think that the process by which we get abstract objects is one of omission. For example, we can start off 
with two roses, omit properties such as color, smell, photosynthetic capacity, chemical composition and so 
on, until we arrive at the number two, an abstract idea. Historically, philosophers writing on abstraction 
(e.g. Aristotle and Locke) have held versions of the material view and explained how we arrive at abstract 
objects through a process of omission (Rosen 2009, Cartwright 1994). 
 The problem with this view of abstraction is that it suffers from an important criticism, namely 
that it is indistinguishable from idealization. The criticism is based on the view that the process of 
abstraction misrepresents the system under consideration,  as it introduces distortions. As distortions are the 
hallmark of idealization, abstraction is a kind of idealization. I call this the distortion view of abstraction. If 
proponents of the distortion view are right in their understanding of abstraction, then as target systems are 
abstract they are also distortions of natural systems. This means that they cannot be considered real. Yet 
there is an alternative view of abstraction, the omission view which focuses on the process of abstraction by 
omission and does not make claims about the ontological status of an abstract system (Jones 2005). A 
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version of the omission view can overcome both criticisms of the material view of abstraction, and provide 
the conceptual space for a view of target systems as abstract, concrete and real. 
 In this chapter, I will present the three existing views of abstraction in philosophy of science.  I will 
examine the criticisms leveled by proponents of the distortion view against the other two views and show 
that a revised version of the omission view can overcome them. This revised version highlights the 
distinction between three aspects of abstracting, omission, de-concretization and generalization,  and argues 
that omission is sufficient for abstraction.  Moreover, the process of omission is not itself distorting, hence 
abstract systems can be concrete and real. I will argue that target systems are examples of systems which 
are concrete particulars, though incomplete with respect to the full natural system. I will then consider 
some cases which at first glance seem difficult for my revised view of abstraction as omission, and I will 
show that they can actually be used to support my view. 
2. Abstraction in Philosophy of Science
2.1 The Material view of Abstraction 
 The main proponent of the material view of abstraction is Nancy Cartwright. Her view is 
presented in a chapter titled ‘Abstract and Concrete’ (Cartwright 1994). She distinguishes between two uses 
of the word ‘abstract’ (Cartwright 1994 197) and thinks that philosophers are prone to conflating the two. 
This results in the more general conflation of abstraction with idealization. The first use of the terms comes 
from physics. It was used by Duhem and Kelvin as a synonym for ‘symbolic’ and described systems in 
mathematical physics that could not represent the world accurately. It arose from the need to give simple 
representations of complex natural phenomena. A concrete particular phenomenon may be described by a 
set of mathematical formulae. However, taken literally, these formulae do not represent that particular 
phenomenon but an imaginary one. For example, the sun is often represented as a geometrically perfect 
sphere, even though its surface is highly irregular and has huge protuberances (Duhem in Cartwright 194). 
The best (simplest/most easily comprehensible) way of describing phenomena such as the motion of the 
sun from a particular point on the earth, is to construct geometrical formulae which describe spheres, not 
gaseous giants with highly irregular surfaces. 
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 Cartwright does not think that this process is is best thought of as abstraction. It is closer to what 
we think of as idealization. When we idealize, we start off with a concrete object and “mentally rearrange 
some of its inconvenient features -some of its specific properties- before we try to write down a law for 
it” (ibid 187). Her paradigm example is that of a frictionless plane. We do not just delete factors of a plane 
that cause friction, but we replace them with others that make our calculations easier. In the example of the 
sun, we do not smooth out the sun’s surface, but replace the actual sun entirely with a gigantic sphere, 
complete with all its geometrical properties. We then construct formulae that represent the sphere, not the 
actual sun. 
 True abstraction, for Cartwright, corresponds to the second use of the term. It is an Aristotelian 
notion which involves subtracting properties of an object or system instead of changing them. As with 
idealization, we start with a concrete particular but then “we strip away, -in our imagination- all that is 
irrelevant to the concerns of the moment to focus on some single property or set of properties ‘as if they 
were separate’” (ibid 197). The object or system in the world has all its properties. All we need do when we 
abstract is to identify the properties, disentangle them (separate them from each other) and dismiss those 
that are considered unimportant or irrelevant for the particular model or experiment. An example of a 
concrete object is a triangle drawn on a slate. We can abstract by stripping away from the object various 
properties, such as the color of the triangle, the chalk that it is drawn from “and other properties incidental 
to being a triangle” (ibid 213).  The now abstract system consists of the remaining properties, the 
geometrical properties of triangles in general.
 Both the processes of  abstraction and idealization have their opposites.   The opposite of 
idealization is de-idealization, and it is achieved when the features that were rearranged in our 
representation are systematically put back as they originally stood, as we learn more about the object we 
are studying. The opposite of abstraction is concretization. This process involves adding back properties 
that were previously omitted.  Though de-idealization and concretization may seem similar, they have some 
important differences. De-idealization is itself an important goal for modeling. We are supposed to de-
idealize when we can, because models that contain fewer misrepresentations are better representations of 
real systems.  On the other hand, we don’t need to concretize when we model.  A concrete model is not 
particularly useful, because it contains a lot of irrelevant information. Concretization is useful in other parts 
of science, for example, when  applying the results of a model to a particular system. In other words,  while 
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de-idealization is ultimately a goal of models themselves, concretization is not part of modeling. Another 
important difference is that concretization is easier to achieve than de-idealization. This is because adding 
real properties to a set of other real properties is easier than converting idealized properties to real 
properties. 
 An implication of Cartwright’s account of abstraction is that we can rank objects in terms of their 
level of abstractness. A concrete object is thought to be closer to ‘substance’ in the Aristotelian sense than 
an abstract object (ibid). This is because the concrete object still has all the inessential (accidental) 
properties, such as color etc. However, merely counting how many properties have been omitted is not 
always a good method for ranking in terms of abstractness. This is because it is often very difficult to 
individuate properties. For example, are ‘being-white’,  ‘not-being-green’ and ‘not-being-red’  all inessential 
properties of the chalk triangle? Color may be relatively easy to distinguish as a type that can be 
instantiated with a variety of tokens, but this is not always possible, especially when we are dealing with 
systems of great complexity. Nonetheless,  Cartwright, following Aristotle, believes that focusing on the 
essential properties of objects can help with at least a partial ordering of abstract objects: “A is a more 
abstract object than B if the essential properties, those in the description of A, are a proper subset of the 
essential properties of B” (ibid 214).  For example, a right triangle is more concrete than a triangle because 
‘having-a-right-angle’  is an essential property of a right triangle which is abstracted in the case of a triangle. 
On the other hand, all the properties of triangles also apply to right triangles (ibid). 
 This ability to partially order abstract objects based on their essential properties is very important 
for the distinction between abstraction and idealization. Essential properties found in abstract objects are 
found in the real world, i.e. they are part of the world. A concrete object has them and retains them after the 
process of abstraction is complete. This is the main difference between abstract and idealized objects or 
systems: all the properties of an abstract system exist in the real world whereas at least some of the 
properties of an idealized system have no counterpart in the real world. This means that abstraction should 
not be viewed as involving distortions. A description of an abstract system will contain only truths. It may 
not contain all the truths, but it will not contain any falsehoods. 
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2.2 The Omission view of Abstraction 
 The main proponent of the omission view of abstraction is Martin Thomson-Jones. His view is 
similar to Cartwright’s in that he believes that while idealization is the result of misrepresenting features of 
a system, abstraction results from merely omitting features (Jones 2005). However, his account of 
abstraction and idealization is not identical to Cartwright’s, as he focuses explicitly on the process of 
omission as the hallmark of abstraction. Here, abstraction and idealization are distinct because idealization 
requires the assertion of a falsehood, while abstraction involves the omission of a truth (ibid). Thus, while 
both idealization and abstraction can result in the distortion of a system, the distortion is very different in 
each case.  When we abstract, we do not describe the system in its entirety, so we are not telling the whole 
truth. However, when we idealize, we add properties to the system that it does not normally possess. 
Therefore, our description of an idealized system contains falsehoods.  Thomson-Jones also highlights some 
issues that are of interest especially in the case of abstraction modeling. These points are intended to show 
precise ways in which abstraction and idealization differ. 
 First, Thomson-Jones considers a criticism that has been leveled against his (and Cartwright’s) 
account. The distinction between abstraction and idealization construed as omission versus 
misrepresentation is problematic because in some cases omission of factors results in distortion or 
misrepresentation of the system. For example, we can model a food web of an aquatic ecosystem without 
including primary producers,  yet this would result in the misrepresentation of the energy flows through the 
system. There are countless other omissions of this sort that can result in misrepresentation. However, 
Thomson-Jones attempts to avoid this problem by restricting abstraction to precisely those omissions that 
do not result in misrepresentation (ibid).  A ‘mere omission’ does not misrepresent a particular feature of a 
system because it retains ‘complete silence’  with respect to whether the system contains the feature (ibid). 
So if an omission results in a misrepresentation, then it is not the type of omission that is part of 
abstraction. 
 It is important to note that this setup presupposes that we have enough knowledge of the system in 
question to know which features we are misrepresenting or omitting. There may be times where we omit a 
feature of a model thinking that it is irrelevant,  only to find out later that it resulted in a misrepresentation 
of the system. In cases like these the problem is our epistemic limitation. Thomson-Jones’s account is 
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construed as a general theoretical framework and applies to cases where such limitations have been 
overcome. 
 An interesting consequence that arises from this first point, is that idealization and abstraction are 
mutually exclusive. That is, a particular feature of a model can be either abstract or idealized, but not both. 
If the primary producers from the previous example are absent from the model of the food web, then they 
cannot be misrepresented as being in another trophic level.  Conversely, if their population is represented as 
infinitely large (a common misrepresentation in biology) then they cannot be entirely absent from the 
system.
 Second, Thomson-Jones shows that successful idealizations are thought to approximate the truth, 
whereas this notion is meaningless for abstractions. Idealizations are supposed to be useful fictions so they 
need to be distinguishable from non useful fictions (mistakes). The condition as Thomson-Jones presents it, 
is quite weak. Either the idealization itself can approximate the truth, or it can be part of a model which 
‘captures the approximate truth overall’ or it can be part of a model that gets the basic ontology of the 
modeled system right (ibid 186). Moreover, he stresses that this is supposed to constitute neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for a misrepresentation to count as an idealization. It is simply a feature 
of idealizations in general, that they depart less from the truth than outright mistakes. 
 The third point refers to simplicity. Idealizations are often introduced in a model, to make the 
model simpler (ibid 187). This is because a simple model is more computationally tractable. Thus, a 
successful idealization will simplify a model. The case of abstraction is slightly different. It makes no sense 
to say that a successful abstraction simplifies a system, because all abstractions simplify a system by virtue 
of their being omissions (ibid 188). Therefore, we can use simplicity as a criterion for identifying 
successful idealizations, but it is not useful for distinguishing between abstractions. 
 The fourth point of divergence between the omission view and the material view concerns 
relevance. Idealizations are thought to misrepresent relevant features of a system. They are relevant in 
terms of predicting and explaining the particular behavior of the system for which the model was 
constructed (ibid 187). The idea is that accidental or irrelevant features of the system will not need to be 
misrepresented,  thus idealizations will focus on features that are important to the functioning of the system. 
At first glance it seems that abstractions by definition omit features that are irrelevant, which would give us 
a neat way to distinguish between idealizations and abstractions. However, Thomson-Jones thinks that the 
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situation is more complex. Though irrelevant features of models are omitted as a result of abstraction, some 
relevant features can also be omitted. This can happen when we wish to screen off a feature, even when we 
believe it is relevant. For example, we may know that nitrogen uptake is necessary for the growth of a 
plant, yet we might want to isolate other important factors of plant growth. We can then construct a model 
that abstracts away from nitrogen uptake and focuses on differences in other causal factors.
2.3 The Distortion view of Abstraction
 There are two versions of the distortion view of abstraction, a stronger and a weaker version. The 
first version is articulated explicitly by Paul Humphreys in his review of Cartwright’s chapter ‘Abstract and 
Concrete’ (Humphreys 1995), though it also implied in many accounts of idealization (McMullin 1985). 
The view is presented in the form of a criticism of Cartwright’s view, which states that abstraction and 
idealization are not kept apart as easily as Cartwright asserts. In fact,  Humphreys goes so far as to assert -in 
direct contrast to Cartwright- that abstractions are useless unless idealization is already possible 
(Humphreys 1995 159).
 Humphreys takes issue with the idea that all the properties of an abstract object or system exist in 
the real world.  Even though he agrees with Cartwright that ‘symbolic’ or idealized representations contain 
falsifications and that ‘they give us concepts that do no describe reality‘, he thinks that this also applies to 
the case of abstraction (ibid 158). He points out an important passage that Cartwright uses to illustrate the 
difference between abstraction and idealization.  The example, outlined in the previous section refers to a 
triangle: ‘Consider a triangle, a real triangle, drawn on a blackboard. Even when the chalk and the colour 
and all the other accidental features are subtracted, the shape that is left is never a real triangle. But let us 
pretend that it is …’ (Cartwright in Humphreys 158). As I showed in chapter 2, for Humphreys, as soon as 
we start pretending that an abstraction is different than it seems, we have blurred the line between 
abstraction and idealization. 
 Cartwright wants to pretend that the abstracted triangle is real because that means that all the 
properties it has are real and are still there after the process of abstraction. If this were an idealization, the 
triangle would involve distortions and would have properties that were not there in the world before the 
process of idealization started. The abstract triangle is not entirely real, but it is not unrealistic in the sense 
of idealized representations. The problem is that we start off with a shape that is not a true triangle because 
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we have drawn it with chalk and it is not perfectly triangular. When we abstract away its accidental 
properties, the triangle that remains is therefore also not perfectly triangular. According to Cartwright, this 
is a different sort of issue than the unrealistic nature of idealizations. In the case of abstraction, we start off 
with all the distortions and imperfections that end up in the abstract system. No additional 
misrepresentations are introduced in the process of abstraction. The distortions that are present, are 
themselves part of the world and arise because of our limited capabilities as humans, i.e. we cannot draw 
perfect triangles.  Still, these triangles are close enough to reality that the imperfections do not distort the 
geometrical properties of triangles when we abstract. Therefore, Cartwright thinks that it is legitimate to 
pretend that the abstracted triangle is, for all intents and purposes, real. 
 Humphreys thinks that this move undermines Cartwright’s position. He grants to Cartwright that 
idealizations may not always be useful, because they fail to give us realistic representations. Even so, he 
thinks that making these sorts of pretenses adds an element of idealization to abstractions. As mentioned 
above, Cartwright distinguishes between cases such as representing the sun as a sphere and conceptualizing 
triangles in the abstract. The former is considered to be an idealization, because we substitute properties of 
the sun with the geometrical properties of spheres, whereas the latter is an abstraction, because we simply 
omit irrelevant properties of the particular triangle and focus only on its geometrical properties. Yet 
Humphreys points out that we cannot legitimately focus on the triangle’s geometrical properties because an 
imperfect concrete triangle will remain imperfect after we abstract. If we have to pretend that the concrete 
triangle has geometrical properties, then we will also have to pretend that the abstract triangle has them. 
This is because in the case of true abstraction all the properties of the abstract object exist in the real world. 
If we are forced to pretend, we must continue pretending throughout the process of abstraction, and 
consequently there seems to be no substantial difference between the ‘imperfect real triangle’ and the 
‘imperfect real sphere’ (ibid).  
 Humphreys takes his criticism a step further. He asserts that whenever a system is represented 
mathematically, the process of abstraction will contain elements of idealization.  Though Humphreys does 
not elaborate, the problem here is that mathematical representations of real systems have properties that the 
systems themselves do not. Consider again the logistic growth model described in the introduction.5  It 
measures how the growth rate of a population N is limited by the density of the population itself. An 
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5 For a full description and use of the logistic growth model see chapter 2, pp. (x-x).
interesting aspect of this equation is that it is differential. That is, it is a set of functions whose derivative 
can be found for every point in their domain. The derivative,  in turn, is a secondary property which shows 
how the dependent output of the equation changes with respect to its input. In the case of logistic growth, 
the rate of change the population N with respect to time t, is given by a linear equation. The problem is that 
it does not make sense to say that real growing populations have the same properties. For example, the 
marmots of Vancouver Island have a number of biological properties, but differentiability is not one of 
them. Only the mathematical representations of the populations have these special mathematical qualities.
 If this is the case, then every time we represent a system mathematically, we introduce properties 
in the representation that are not there in the original system. Yet the introduction of new properties is a 
mark of idealization, not abstraction. This does not mean that abstraction is impossible. We can still omit 
properties of the system in our representation. However, any such abstractions can only go hand in hand 
with idealization. Without the mathematical representation and the idealization it introduces, we would not 
be able to model the system in the first place.  Therefore, it is only because mathematical representation 
makes idealization possible that abstraction can be useful (ibid 159). 
 The weaker version of the distortion view can be seen as a middle ground between the material 
view and the strong version of the distortion view. Proponents of this view think that abstraction is distinct 
from some kinds of idealization, but not from all kinds of idealization. They think that idealization itself is 
not a unified concept, and abstraction falls under one of these kinds of idealization. There are two accounts 
of the weak version of the distortion view, Frigg & Hartmann (2009) and Weisberg (2007). According to 
Frigg and Hartmann, idealization in general terms is ‘a deliberate simplification of something complicated 
with the objective of making it more tractable’ (Frigg & Hartmann, 2009). Further, they think that it can be 
divided into two basic kinds, Galilean and Aristotelian. Galilean idealization was first described in detail by 
Ernan McMullin, who outlined Galileo’s use of distortions in his explanations, the problems they caused 
and potential solutions (McMullin, 1985).  The important aspect of Galilean idealization is that the 
distortions are supposed to be temporary, at least in principle. We are forced to distort our representation of 
the system for greater ease of explanation or computational tractability, yet our aim is to eventually de-
idealize our model as we learn more about the phenomenon we are studying. Aristotelian idealization, on 
the other hand, involves stripping away irrelevant properties from  a representation of a system (ibid). 
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 Moreover, the two kinds of idealization are thought to coexist in models. For example, a 
mechanical model of the planetary system only takes into account some properties, omitting a number of 
others and hence engaging in Aristotelian idealization while distorting the remaining properties engaging 
thus in Galilean idealization (ibid). The result is a model that describes planets as ideal spheres with a 
‘rotation-symmetric mass distribution’  (ibid).  This distinction mirrors the one presented in Cartwright and 
Thomson-Jones between abstraction and idealization.  The difference here,  is that abstraction is thought to 
be a kind of idealization.
 A more nuanced version of this view is presented by Weisberg in his paper “Three kinds of 
Idealization” (Weisberg, 2007a). As the title suggests he identifies a third type of idealization, in addition to 
the two identified by Frigg and Hartmann. Galilean idealization features in Weisberg’s account, as the first 
kind of idealization. As in the case of Frigg and Hartmann, it is presented following McMullin’s account. 
That is,  one starts with an idea of what a non-idealized representation of a system would look like, and then 
introduces distortions that help simplify the representation and make it computationally tractable.  The 
model that is created includes these distortions (Weisberg 2007). An important aspect of this kind of 
idealization is that it allows for  the systematic removal of distortions, as the system is better understood. 
 Another type of idealization is called ‘Multiple Models Idealization’. This occurs when theorists 
create a number of related but incompatible models that describe a particular (usually extremely complex) 
phenomenon (ibid). Each model will have a different set of idealizations and simplifications, and will 
highlight different aspects of the phenomenon. Taken together, the collection of models is meant to give a 
better understanding of the phenomenon. A good example Multiple Models Idealization is found in climate 
science. The United States Weather Service use three different models of global circulation patterns, each 
with different assumptions, to predict weather patterns (ibid). 
 The third kind of idealization is ‘Minimalist idealization’.  This is ‘the practice of constructing and 
studying theoretical models that include only the core causal factors which give rise to a 
phenomenon’  (ibid). A representation of a system that has omitted all factors except the core causal factors 
is called a ‘minimalist model’  (ibid). Cartwright’s account of abstraction is seen as an example of this kind 
of idealization. This is because abstraction results in isolating the relevant causal factors which affect the 
behavior of the system and omitting the remaining irrelevant factors. The model based on abstraction will 
therefore be a minimalist model. 
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 On Weisberg’s account, there is an important difference between Galilean idealization on the one 
hand and Minimalist and Multiple Models idealization on the other. Only Galilean idealization has de-
idealization built in to the process.  That is, this kind of idealization is justified by the possibility of de-
idealizing, when more knowledge about the phenomenon is available. On the other hand, the justification 
for Minimalist idealization is that the omission of irrelevant factors allows theorists to find the underlying 
mechanisms that give rise to the phenomenon. The idea is that the omission of irrelevant details reveals 
underlying truths about real phenomena, so that there is no need for de-idealization in the future. The 
minimalist model is supposed to give precise and useful representations of phenomena. Similarly, there is 
no de-idealization built in to the Multiple Models type of idealization. Here, each of the models has 
different idealizations built in,  and they are supposed to complement each other, or cancel each other out. 
Taking the models collectively counteracts any problems that arise from a particular assumption or 
idealization. 
 As in the case of Frigg and Hartmann, this view can be seen as a middle ground between two 
extremes. On the one hand, abstraction is a process in its own right, which has different motivations and 
justifications from other kinds of idealization. It can coexist with Galilean idealization, but it is far from 
being the same process. The various kinds of idealization are separable and each has its place in science. 
Whenever minimalist models are useful, abstraction is the key. On the other hand,  Weisberg views the 
process of abstraction as involving distortions, as omitting factors in a representation distorts the 
phenomenon which is represented. In this sense, abstraction it is no different to other kinds of idealization. 
 Even though these two views are less extreme than Humphreys’s in their dismissal of abstraction 
as a process distinct from idealization, they nonetheless present a challenge which the material view and 
omission views cannot overcome. As long as abstraction distorts a system in any way, then cannot be seen 
as an altogether different type of process. If this is the case, then it seems that proponents of the material 
and omission views do not have the requisite support for their case for abstraction. For my purposes, this 
criticism is even more devastating. On my view of target systems,  they are abstract but concrete and real 
entities. If the process of abstraction necessarily introduces distortions, then it is not possible to claim that 
target systems are at once abstract and real. 
 In summary, here are two distinct criticisms which arise from the distortion view of abstraction. 
The first, associated with Humphreys, is that abstraction and idealization are indistinct. The second, 
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associated with Frigg & Hartmann and Weisberg, is that abstraction and idealization are not identical, yet 
both are distorting processes. As they stand, the material and omission views of abstraction cannot 
overcome these criticisms. However, I will argue that a revised version of the omission view can overcome 
them. 
3. The Revised Omission view of Abstraction 
 All the accounts of abstraction presented so far have an important point in common. Even though 
they may give the process different names or disagree on some implications or details, they all define 
abstraction as the representation of a real-world system or phenomenon with all the irrelevant factors or 
parts omitted. The process of omission is the key to defining and understanding abstraction. I propose a 
revised view of abstraction which is restricted to omission. In order to present the revised omission view, I 
will first introduce a distinction between omission, de-concretization and generalization. I will argue that 
pulling these three aspects apart is important for overcoming the criticism of the material view of 
abstraction. I will then analyze the main criticism of the material view of abstraction, stemming from the 
weak version of the distortion view, which is mainly aimed at the standard omission view.
 The main criticism of the material view is the one outlined in chapter 2 concerning the triangle.  In 
Cartwright’s example, a physical triangle drawn on a board becomes abstract when we remove, in our 
minds, all the properties which tie it to the world. In the end we are left with an abstract and not physical 
idea of a triangle. Continuing on the theme of triangles,  the west pediment of the Parthenon is a physical 
object which exists in space and time. When we talk of the west pediment in isolation from the rest of the 
Parthenon,  we are abstracting. That is we start off with the entire Parthenon and focus only on some aspect 
of it, the west pediment. On Cartwright’s view, we can also abstract further, omitting the colors, the frieze 
etc., and we are left with an abstract idea of a triangle. 
 The problem is that,  as Cartwright herself notes, we could never arrive at a true triangle from 
omitting properties of a real physical triangle. The reason is that no physical triangle is a true triangle, but a 
mere approximation of a true triangle. Therefore,  in order to get a true triangle, with all the important 
geometrical properties, we must ‘smooth it out’ or, to use Cartwright’s phrase,  we must pretend that it is a 
real triangle.  According to Humphreys,  as soon as we pretend or ‘smooth out’ we are misrepresenting and 
idealizing. A closer look at this last step, reveals that two processes are happening, omission and de-
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concretization. The omission of the properties itself, does not make the triangle immaterial. This is 
precisely why we have to add the ‘smoothing out’  step.  However this also means that simple omission of 
properties does not suffice for getting an immaterial, true triangle from an actual object. The final step, or 
steps, involves de-concretizing and idealizing from the physical triangular object to the immaterial true 
triangle. 
 We must concede Humphreys’s criticism. He is right in saying that the last step is an idealizing 
step. However, as argued in chapter 2, it is also possible to bite the bullet and restrict abstraction to 
omission without de-concretization. In the example, when we abstract we are left with the actual physical 
west pediment, without taking into consideration any other properties other than its triangular shape. 
Importantly, this shape merely approximates a true triangle and is itself not a true triangle. 
 De-concretization is a central aspect of the material view of abstraction, as an object is abstract 
precisely when it is de-concretized. However, it is also responsible for blurring the distinction between 
abstraction and idealization, which is the main point that proponents of the material view set out to prove. 
Therefore the first important revision for a successful omission view of abstraction, is to distinguish it from 
de-concretization. De-concretization is often tied together with omission in views of abstraction, because 
abstraction is thought to be a mental process which involves representing the system with parts and 
properties omitted.  For example, for Cartwright abstraction, like idealization, happens “in our 
minds” (Cartwright, 1994). Thomson-Jones also implies that abstraction involves representing a system, 
even though he does not explicitly tie it in with de-concretization (Jones 2005). 
 While I agree that we sometimes construct a mental picture of the process of abstraction,   this 
does not mean that an abstract system is itself a representation. That is, the fact that we sometimes find it 
helpful to construct a mental representation of the abstracting process does not mean that the process itself 
is happening in our minds. In addition we might represent an abstract system by referring to it with 
language or a model. Yet,  this does not mean that the system that we are referring to is itself a 
representation. For example, when we talk about the west pediment of the Parthenon in isolation from the 
rest of the Parthenon, we are referring to an abstract system and hence representing it. Yet the system itself 
is not a representation, it is the actual physical system. In other words, when we refer to the west pediment 
of the Parthenon, we are not representing a representation of the west pediment of the Parthenon; we are 
representing the west pediment itself. 
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 The same is not true of idealization. The mental representation which is connected to idealization 
results in models, paintings, poems etc., systems which are themselves representations of actual systems.  In 
fact, in the case of modeling, the important representation is not the internal representation in each 
scientist’s mind, but the external mathematical,  computational or concrete representation of the system. The 
internal representation is relevant only in the sense that it provides the original intention of the scientist, for 
the model to count as a representation of the system. This is important for getting the possibility of 
representation off the ground, yet once that happens, the nature of the representation, its analysis and 
evaluation does not deal with the internal representation but the external one. If the internal representation 
has a limited role to play in the process of idealization, I do not see why it should have a more extensive 
role to play in the process of abstraction.  
 Another concept which is often tied together with abstraction is generalization, which also helps to 
blur the lines between abstraction and idealization. Abstraction is thought to be a generalizing process in 
the material view because an abstracted system is thought to be a general idea which refers to many 
particularizations of that idea. For example, the notion of a triangle is a general one, which can refer to 
many particular physical objects that are triangular, such as the west pediment of the Parthenon and the 
chalk triangle on Cartwright’s blackboard. Yet general notions or ideas unlike particular instantiations of 
them are not grounded in the physical world. Hence, if we assume that omission and generalization are one 
and the same, then abstract systems cannot not be concrete and real. 
 There is a relationship between omission and generality, in the sense that in order to get from a 
concrete particular to a general notion we must first omit the properties which make the particular unique 
and use the remaining properties to construct the general idea. Hence omission is a prerequisite of 
generalization when going from the concrete to the general. However, this does not mean that the process 
of omission implies generality. It is possible to omit properties and not proceed to the next step of 
generalization. For example, when we talk about the west pediment in isolation from the rest of the 
Parthenon,  we are abstracting away the metopes,  the friezes, the doric columns etc. Yet we would not say 
that the west pediment is general. Even if we abstracted more and focused only on the triangular shape of 
the pediment without the statues of Athena, Poseidon and co., it would still be a concrete particular, an 
imperfect instantiation of the notion of a triangle. 
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 To sum up the argument so far, I have analyzed the first criticism which comes from the strong 
distortion view and is mainly directed against the material view of abstraction. I have shown that the 
criticism can be overcome by separating the notion of omission from the notions of de-concretization and 
generality. The revised view of omission explicitly restricts abstraction to omission. I will now turn to the 
second criticism, which comes from the weak distortion view and is directed mainly against the standard 
omission view of abstraction. 
 The crux of the weak distortion view of abstraction is that omission constitutes a distortion of a 
system, even though this distortion might be different in kind to the distortion which results from 
idealization. In other words, all omission is by definition a distortion of the system. Thomson-Jones 
attempts to avoid this problem by restricting abstraction to precisely those omissions that do not result in 
misrepresentation (Jones 2005). As stated above, a ‘mere omission’ does not misrepresent a particular 
feature of a system because it retains ‘complete silence’ with respect to whether the system contains the 
feature. So if an omission results in a misrepresentation, then it is not the type of omission that is part of 
abstraction. To emphasize the distinction further, Thomson-Jones states that a property that has been 
omitted from a system cannot be misrepresented, hence with respect to a particular property, abstraction 
and idealization are mutually exclusive. 
 The problem is that the criticism presented here is much stronger, as it denies the possibility of 
‘mere omission’ altogether. The standard omission view cannot overcome this criticism, because it assumes 
that abstraction and idealization both occur at the level of the model which is a representation of the 
system. As stated above, if we allow abstraction to be part of the representational process, then we cannot 
distinguish it from idealization. This is because abstraction is distinct from idealization because abstracted 
systems are not representations of systems, hence abstract systems are concrete physical and real systems. 
Real systems are not distorted, they simply exist. By restricting abstraction to the specification of the target 
system and idealization to the model which represents the target,  we can have omissions which are not 
misrepresentations. 
 Another issue which is important is the question of relevance. The standard view of omission 
allows for relevant factors to be omitted from a system. Thomson-Jones states that even though many 
omissions are of irrelevant factors, it is still possible to omit relevant factors in two cases: (a) when we 
want to screen off factors that are relevant and (b) when we mistakenly omit a factor even though it is 
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relevant. The problem with this statement is that it leads to inconsistency within the view. Thomson-Jones 
argues that ‘mere omissions’  remain silent on whether the system has the property or does not. Yet, 
remaining silent means omitting the property from the model. But why would we omit a property from a 
model if it really is relevant? This would result in a model with distortions that are not the intentional kinds 
of distortions which occur from idealization.6 
 I think that the underlying cause of the problem is the particular use of the term ‘relevant’.  
Thomson-Jones is stating that factors which are generally relevant to the functioning of a system can be 
omitted.  I previously illustrated this point with an example from ecology,  where a scientist can screen off 
nitrogen from a model of plant growth, even though she knows that plants cannot survive without nitrogen 
uptake. I agree that it is possible to screen off factors that are generally relevant, yet only when they are not 
relevant for the particular problem we are trying to solve. Nitrogen can be omitted from a study if it is not a 
limiting factor, and occurs in sufficient abundance so as not to have an effect on the plants in the study. For 
example, the scientist in question might be trying to determine how different plants respond to predation 
from a particular predator, and the amount of nitrogen will not affect regeneration. Yet in doing so, the 
scientist is implicitly asserting that nitrogen is irrelevant for the particular experiment, even though it is 
generally relevant for plant growth.
 The point is that the relevance of a particular factor is determined (at least in part) by the 
intentions of the scientist, given the specifics of a phenomenon and the method used to study it. Whether a 
factor is generally relevant or of limited importance, the point is to determine if it is relevant for a particular 
model or experiment. Therefore,  for the omission view of abstraction to be consistent, it must be the case 
that only irrelevant factors are omitted. 
 To sum up, the revised omission view of abstraction departs from the material view by 
distinguishing omission from generalization and de-concretization. It also departs from the standard 
omission view by isolating abstraction from representation, and maintaining that only irrelevant factors can 
be omitted in an abstracted system. In doing so,  the revised omission view provides a coherent way to 
distinguish between the process of abstraction and idealization and their respective products. It also results 
in a view which is internally consistent. Finally it creates the conceptual space for understanding target 
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6 It is important to note that I am not claiming that the omission of relevant factors does distort the system itself, because it is not a 
representation of the system (see previous paragraph). However, I am claiming the resulting model will contain additional distortions 
which are not intended.
systems as parts of the world, which are both abstract and real. In the next section I will consider three 
cases which can be seen as counterarguments to the revised omission view of abstraction, and show that the 
view has the necessary tools to overcome them. 
4. Difficult Cases
 My exposition of the revised omission view of abstraction dealt with the general theoretical 
framework concerning abstraction and aimed to provide a conceptual argument for distinguishing between 
the notions of abstraction and idealization. However, there are three cases that appear in philosophy of 
science literature, which could be seen to undermine the revised omission view. The first is the case of 
errors in abstraction brought up by Thomson-Jones, which occurs when features are mistakenly thought to 
be irrelevant. The second is an example of a case where an idealization appears to be an omission, and thus 
threatens to weaken the distinction between abstraction and idealization. The third is the notion of 
“generalized targets”, which threatens the distinction between abstraction and generalization. 
4.1 Mistakes
 According to Thomson-Jones, the second reason why we should allow for the possibility of 
omitting relevant factors from a system, is in order to allow for mistakes. Scientists often do not realize that 
a particular factor is important for the explanation of a phenomenon and re-design their models and 
experiments to accommodate these realizations. For example, in the case of plant ecology, there was a 
recent realization that abiotic factors and the soil microbes through which plants absorb them are a lot more 
important than previously thought (Klironomos 2002).  In fact, these microbes can even be used to 
predict and explain some plant invasions.  It is thought that while native species accumulate pathogens 
which cause negative feedback reactions in the soil,  species that are introduced into a new habitat are free 
from their native underground enemies and exhibit neutral or positive feedback with the same microbial 
species (ibid). In some cases, an invader might have both positive and negative feedback going on at the 
same time, so that the the effects of feedback are cancelled out. This means that even though they are 
important factors in plant competition, especially between native and invasive species, they are often 
overlooked. 
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 Thomson-Jones wants to allow for the possibility of omitting relevant factors,  in order to make 
sense of cases like these in scientific practice.  However, the distinction to be made here is between the 
possibility of making inapt omissions and the goal of scientists while abstracting. Cases like these show 
that one cannot deny the possibility of making inapt omissions, yet one must also recognize this as a 
mistake. When scientists realize that their omissions are inapt, given the phenomenon being studied, they 
re-specify their targets in order to include all relevant information. Hence it is still possible to say that the 
goal of abstraction is to omit only irrelevant factors, yet this is often difficult to achieve.
 The question is whether these cases of inapt omissions count as distortions of a system. However, 
as I argued in the previous chapter, they do not. The problem is an epistemic one,  not an ontological one. 
Omitting aspects from a system does not change the ontological status of the system, because omission is, 
like Thomson-Jones states, remaining silent on whether the system has the property or not. This implies 
that a scientist thinks that the omitted factor is not relevant, so it does not have to be included in the model. 
It does not mean that the scientist physically removes the factor from the system or distorts the system in 
any way. 
 The fact that this is an epistemic rather than an ontological problem does not imply that it is not 
important. In fact,  I think that part of the reason why the study of target systems is important, is because it 
can help us understand when factors are relevant and when they are not. The way to deal with this problem 
is to have a method for evaluating target systems, which is the subject of the next chapter. There is no need 
to think of the problem as an ontological one in order to make it worth noting. 
4.2 Friction
  There are many models in science which contain idealizations which, at first glance, seem to be 
omissions. A standard example is a model of harmonic oscillation without friction. If we say that the model 
represents a target system, then one way to understand the difference between the model and an actual 
pendulum is that the friction has been omitted. If this is the case, then the revised omission view of 
abstraction faces a problem. Omitting friction by all accounts counts as a distortion of the system, as a 
target system without friction cannot possibly be real. 
 However, I think that this problem rests on a misunderstanding. The harmonic oscillation model 
potentially represents many target systems. Let us assume that in this particular case it represents Ron 
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Giere’s grandfather clock. What is the target system of the model in this case? It is not the entire clock, but 
only the pendulum mechanism. All the other parts of the system (the clock) have been omitted. Aspects of 
the pendulum, such as its color and chemical composition are also omitted. What about friction? Friction 
could be omitted, in principle, if the scientists thought it to be irrelevant.  This would result in a very inapt 
target system, like the case mentioned above. However, omitting friction as irrelevant does not mean that 
the scientist is asserting that there is a system in the world without friction. She is simply asserting that 
friction is not important. In other words she is saying that the friction of the system could have many 
different values, yet this is simply not important given the goal of the model. Whether this turns out to be 
true or not is an epistemic issue, like the one mentioned above. 
 In fact,  making any sort of change to the amount of friction in the system is an idealization, and 
happens at the level of the model. In other words we can represent the target system with the full amount of 
friction, a diminished amount of friction or zero friction in the model. Yet this does not alter the state of the 
actual pendulum in the particular clock, which always continues to have friction. To illustrate this point 
more clearly, I will consider another idealization which is used very often in biology. Many biological 
models misrepresent populations of organisms as infinite,  as it simplifies the mathematics involved in the 
model’s computations. We would not say that this counts as an omission, as all real populations are less 
than infinite. Yet the change that occurs in these models is the same kind of change that occurs in the 
harmonic oscillator model. The world is a certain way: a particular population has 2 or 85 or 1003 
individuals, just as particular pendula are subjected to certain amounts of friction. Increasing or decreasing 
these values even in the extreme, happens at the level of the model and are misrepresentations of the world. 
They are distortions, but distortions resulting from idealization. 
4.3 Generalized Targets
 Scientists construct generalized models when they want to learn about classes of phenomena in 
general, instead of particular instances of phenomena. These models are often very simple, in the sense that 
they aim to capture only the basic dynamics of a system and include very little detail. Many models in 
population ecology fall into the category of general models, as they describe general phenomena such as 
population growth, competition and predation. Other examples can be found in population genetics. An 
important account of generalized models is found in Michael Weisberg’s book Simulation and Similarity 
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(Weisberg 2013). Weisberg uses a model of sexual reproduction as an example of a generalized model. 
According to Weisberg, a “generalized model of sexual reproduction isn’t supposed to be about kangaroo 
sex or fungi sex, but about sex itself” (Weisberg 2013 116). The point of studying sex in this general 
manner is not to discover facts about sexual reproduction in particular populations, but to understand larger 
issues such as the relative merits of sexual reproduction when compared to asexual reproduction.  Weisberg 
points out that the emergence of sex is a strange phenomenon and there is no real consensus on why it 
evolved. Therefore, our best bet for determining why sexual reproduction confers some evolutionary 
advantage,  is constructing and analyzing a generalized model of sexual reproduction (Roughgarden 1997, 
in Weisberg 2013). 
 According to Weisberg, generalized models are used to understand abstract targets. The term 
‘abstract’ here means that the targets are themselves general and do not have details specific to particular 
instantiations of the phenomenon. This is important for Weisberg’s account, as otherwise it would be 
difficult to connect a general model to a non-general target. As Weisberg points out, there is no such thing 
as ‘sex in general’ in the world, but only a collection of instances of sex in particular populations “kangaroo 
sex, Tasmanian devil sex, human sex, but not sex in general” (Weisberg 2013). He continues: “sex in 
general is an abstraction over these more specific kinds of sex” (ibid). 
 But this raises an important question, namely how does an abstract and general model represent 
particular instantiations of a phenomenon? Weisberg gets around this problem by stating that the target of a 
general model is also general. In other words, according to Weisberg, a generalized model of sex will have 
a generalized target. This is a target of generalized phenomena, not particular instances of them and is “by 
its very nature, more abstract than any specific target” (ibid). 
 The problem, for my view, is that generalized targets are not real.  The number of general models 
in science is substantial, so if their targets really are general targets, then the view that targets are real parts 
of the world can at best be limited to a small subset of targets. However, a closer look at the generation of 
generalized targets reveals that they rely on local (and hence particular and real) targets.
 On Weisberg’s view,  there are two ways in which generalized targets can be generated. The first 
occurs when the generalized target lies at the intersection of a number of specific targets. That is, the 
generalized target has the features common to all targets that the model can represent (Weisberg, 2013). In 
the case of sexual reproduction, the generalized target has the set of properties which are shared by all 
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sexually reproducing species. Once the relevant features shared by all specific targets are identified,  the 
scientist can abstract further by leaving out all the specifics of each case and focusing only on those 
generalized properties. The generalized target is therefore more abstract than the set of specific targets, and 
more importantly, it is exactly as abstract as the model.  This is the simple case of generalized modeling, 
which works as long as: “1. The relevant set of specific targets actually share the relevant features, such 
that an intersection of their sets of features is an informative generalized target, and 2. A model can be 
constructed at the appropriate level of abstraction so that just those features can be modeled” (Weisberg, 
2013, 117). 
 It is obvious here that these generalized targets rely on local targets for their generation. The 
generalized target is nothing more than a generalization over a number of real local targets.  But this means 
that there is no reason to claim that the target of a general model is a generalized target. It is one thing to 
state that a general model gives us information about a phenomenon in general, and quite another to state 
that it represents that phenomenon in general. Instead, what the general model represents, are many local 
targets.7  Therefore, even though the general model of sexual reproduction might tell us about sex ‘in 
general’ it is about kangaroo sex and Tasmanian devil sex and human sex, and so on. 
 Yet, for Weisberg, there are also more complex cases where the second criterion is not satisfied, as 
many models are “less abstract” than their generalized target. Models that are less abstract than their targets 
contain feature types that go beyond what is shared between the specific targets. Examples of these types of 
models are individual-based computational models. If a scientist were to construct an individual-based 
model of sexual reproduction, she would not represent the distribution of genotypic fitness in a population 
(a very abstract property) but specific genotypes tied to specific organisms which are represented as agents. 
In order to do this, the scientist would have to include concrete properties such as the life-cycle, spatial 
distributions and fitness of individual organisms. 
 Weisberg correctly points out that in cases such as these, the model does not obviously connect to 
the generalized, abstract target. Instead,  the scientist must place special constraints on the construal of the 
model and its intended scope.  Even if the model is capable of generating concrete detail, the scientist must 
restrict its scope to the more general results which are compatible with the generalized target. Thus, if a 
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7 The actual number of targets that the model represents is determined by the world itself, that is the model can potentially represent 
all populations throughout space and time which reproduce sexually. The model actually represents only those populations in space 
and time that scientists have applied it to.
model has features that cannot be part of the generalized,  abstracted target, such as being able to generate 
specific predictions about a particular population, the theorist “must regard these features as remaining 
outside the model’s scope” (Weisberg, 2013, 117).
 This complex case is problematic for Weisberg’s account, but it is not really a problem for my 
view of target systems. This is because the problem is in fact generated by the introduction of a generalized 
target.  The only reason the mismatch occurs, is because the model is being compared to a generalized target 
in the first place. An individual-based computation model of sexual reproduction need not be understood as 
a model of sex in general, but as a model of kangaroo sex and tasmanian devil sex and human sex etc., just 
like the population genetic model. The models might have different types and levels of idealization and 
abstraction but they represent the same type of target, local targets.8 
 I understand Weisberg’s point that it is useful to have a term to refer to a collection of targets 
which a model can represent. Yet there is no need for the collection to take on a different ontological status 
from other targets. There is a much simpler way to have a name for a collection of targets without 
undermining the coherence of the account of targets as real systems in the world. The solution is what I call 
a ‘family of targets’, i.e. a group of local targets which shares some common features. Applying this to 
Weisberg’s account, it is the group of targets which shares common features before the extra step of 
abstracting to a generalized target. This group of similar targets has important properties, namely that it 
focuses the scientists’ attention to the features that are shared by a number of systems in the world.  The 
general model is general because it applies to these local targets which share a number of properties. 
Moreover, identifying another target to which the general model might apply is straightforward, at least in 
principle.  All that the scientists need to do is determine whether the particular instantiation of a 
phenomenon shares the relevant features and can be incorporated into the family of models.
5. Conclusion 
 Abstraction is an important process in science,  especially in modeling. However, its role has been 
overlooked by many and those who have defended it have been criticized. Some of these criticisms are 
truly valuable, because they have shown that existing accounts of abstraction need to be revised and 
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8  It is important to note that the targets will not be identical, as the two types of models will have different abstractions because 
different properties will be relevant in each case. Nonetheless, the important point is that the targets will all be local and quite similar 
to each other. 
refined. The key to understanding the notion of abstraction is omission, and this forms the core of what it 
means to abstract in science. The important and difficult part of the process is therefore the decision of 
which properties are relevant and which are not. The other notions which are often associated with 
abstraction, de-concretization and generalization can be divorced from the notion of abstraction. Doing so 
will help to overcome the charge that abstraction is nothing more than a kind of idealization. For the 
purpose of target systems, abstracting by omitting irrelevant parts and properties is an extremely important 
and difficult endeavor. In the next chapter, I will give an account of how this endeavor can be constrained 
and evaluated. 
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5. Target System Evaluation
A Theory of Aptness
1.  Introduction
 The North American lakes have been invaded by an exotic plant. Like many other ecosystems in 
the world, an alien species has become firmly established and is spreading through the ecosystem at the 
expense of the native flora. In this case, the culprit is Typha angustifolia, a species of aquatic cattail, native 
to Europe. In order to explain this particular phenomenon, scientists must determine why it is the case that 
T. angustifolia has succeeded in invading the  Indian Creek ecosystem in the North American lakes. 
 There are a number of ways in which scientists can go about studying this invasion. For example, 
they can focus on the invader (T. angustifolia) and look for traits that help it outcompete native species. 
Alternatively, they can focus on the community of Indian Creek and determine whether there is something 
about these communities which makes them susceptible to invasion. These two alternatives are quite 
different, as they involve distinct conceptual schemes for understanding invasions. In other words, each 
alternative affects the way scientists conceptualize the phenomenon of invasion, and the methodology for 
studying invasions. 
 Translating this into the language of target systems, the scientists must choose one of the available 
target systems in order to model or experiment this particular invasion. Given this choice, there are two sets 
of questions we can ask. The first, is why the scientists chose this particular target system, and by extension 
what governs target system choice,  in general. The second is how we can know that the scientists made the 
right choice of target system, and, more generally,  how we can evaluate target systems. A brief examination 
of the first set of questions will pave the road to answering the second set of questions.
 In this case, the choice pertains to partitioning and abstraction,  as the domain of study (Indian 
Creek) and the phenomenon of interest (invasion by T. angustifolia) are already set. Yet there are at many 
partitions to choose from, and numerous ways to abstract in each partition. Instead of specifying the various 
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target systems that the scientists could choose from, I will focus on three, which differ in important and 
illuminating ways. Target System 1 (TS1) is partitioned at the level of communities and its properties are 
community-level properties such as biodiversity and disturbance.  Target System 2 (TS2) is partitioned at 
the level of individuals, thus organisms (of natives and invaders) are its main units. It is also highly 
abstract, as it does not include any other parts of the ecosystem. In addition, it includes only the traditional 
properties of plants, associated with competition (such as growth rate, seed size, photosynthetic rate, root/
shoot ratio biomass).  Target System 3 (TS3) has the same partition as TS2, yet it differs in abstraction, as it 
contains an additional property of T. angustifolia, allelopathy,  which is not contained in TS2. Allelopathy is 
the exudation of toxins from the root of a plant which inhibit the growth of other plants.
 In their study, published as “Allelopathy as a mechanism for the invasion of Typha angustifolia”, 
Jarchow and Cook chose TS3 over the other two targets (Jarchow & Cook, 2009). The fact that they 
included the property of allelopathy in an otherwise traditional target system of population ecology gives us 
a lot of information about their choice.  The particular partition shows us that they are part of  what I call 
trait-level invasion research, a sub-field in invasion biology which takes its concepts and methods from 
population ecology.1 Trait-level researchers believe that the best way to study invasions is to identify the 
traits which make an invader a good competitor.  In contrast, if they had chosen TS1 they would be part of 
community-level invasion research, a sub-field which comes from conservation ecology and uses very 
different methods for studying invasions. These partitions are larger as their main units are entire 
communities, with aggregate or emergent properties such as biodiversity, biotic resistance and disturbance. 
In terms of abstraction, it is significant that they included an additional property not usually included in 
standard competition studies. This means that they thought that allelopathy was important enough to be 
included explicitly in the target system. 
 In order to understand why TS3 was chosen over the other two targets, we must look at the method 
used to study the invasion. Jarchow and Cook set up an experiment, consisting of four different treatments, 
some of which contained activated carbon. Activated carbon can counter the effect of the allelopathic 
chemicals in the soil/water, because it absorbs hydrophobic molecules (such as the toxins exuded by 
allelopathic plants) but does not absorb hydrophilic molecules (which include most of the nutrients in the 
85
1 The existence of these two distinct sub-fields in invasion biology is well documented, as are their differences in conceptualizing and 
studying invasions {Richardson:2011un}. For a full examination of these two fields and their history, see chapter 6. 
soil such as Nitrogen and Phosphorus). Thus, if allelopathy was the cause of the competitive advantage and 
hence the invasion of T. angustifolia, then we would expect to see its competitive advantage reduced, when 
grown with the activated carbon.
 This experimental setup requires a partition at the level of individuals, and cannot work with a 
partition at the level of communities.  The results of the experiment are measured in the growth rate and size 
of individual plants after they have competed with each other. This type of measurement cannot happen (or 
at least will be extremely difficult to accomplish) with a partition which measures biodiversity and 
disturbance. Thus, it seems that the particular partition goes hand in hand with the experimental setup and a 
particular sub-field in invasion research. In fact,  it seems that belonging to a particular sub-field determines 
the experimental set up, or that the choice of set-up brings with it the concepts and norms of the subfield. 
Either way, both of these affect the choice of partition as not all partitions work equally well with each 
experimental setup. In other words, some partitions are more useful than others given a particular 
experiment or model. 
 While usefulness of a partition may explain the choice between TS3 and TS1, it does not explain the 
choice of TS3 over TS2, as both targets have the same partition. Nonetheless, as stated above, they differ in 
terms of abstraction as TS3 includes allelopathy but TS2 does not. Why then did Jarchow and Cook choose 
a level of abstraction which broke with tradition. The answer is that they must have thought that TS2 and 
the experiment associated with it,  would not provide them with a good enough explanation of the invasion. 
Instead they hypothesized that including allelopathy would give them a better explanation of the invasion. 
In other words, they hypothesized that allelopathy was relevant for the explaining the invasion. 
 This discussion is meant to show that the criterion for a successful partition (usefulness) is distinct 
from the criterion for a successful set of abstractions (relevance). Thus,  a complete theory of target system 
evaluation should take into account both of these criteria.  It should also determine whether there is some 
relationship between the two or if they are entirely independent. 
 In this chapter I will give a more general account of target system evaluation, based on usefulness 
and relevance. I will argue that they are not entirely independent criteria, and will therefore refer to the 
theory as a whole as a theory of aptness. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the notions of 
usefulness and relevance, I will look an account of salience and an account of relevance from the literature 
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on scientific explanation. I will then show similar accounts can be constructed for the evaluation of target 
systems. 
2. Aptness
 The point of departure for a theory of target system evaluation, is that target systems cannot be 
evaluated in themselves. That is, target systems are real parts of the world, hence they cannot be considered 
better or worse per se. In the example given above TS1, TS2 and TS3 are all just parts of the world and no 
one is inherently better than the others. However, as I showed in the introduction,  as soon as the scientists’ 
goal is taken into account, TS3 can be judged as the best of all three options. In other words, any account of 
target system evaluation must take into account the aims of the scientists and the context of their scientific 
practice. 
 This notion of target system evaluation is entirely coherent with my view on the nature of target 
systems. Most importantly,  a pluralistic notion of partitioning means that there will be more than one 
possible partition of each domain, and those partitions will not be distinguishable through ontological 
criteria (see chapter 3).  In addition, it will possible to abstract in many ways from each partition, again 
without changing the ontological status of the target system (see chapter 4). Therefore, it is not possible to 
distinguish between targets on ontological grounds. Instead,  the criteria for target system evaluation will be 
epistemic and  in some cases,  pragmatic. I hope to show that Despite its pragmatism, my theory of target 
system evaluation is sufficiently strict to be a useful tool for scientific practice. 
 I should note that this theory of target system evaluation is only directed towards target systems 
which are unsuccessful because they are inapt,  yet still real target systems. To clarify, I showed in chapter 2 
that there are three ways in which target system specification can fail: cases where target systems were 
inapt, cases which involved false beliefs about targets and cases where target systems were not specified at 
all. The theory of target system evaluation is restricted to the first case, as this is only case where target 
system actually exist (even though they are not optimal). In the other two cases, scientists are not actually 
succeeding in specifying a target system, hence the theory cannot be of use.  In those cases, scientists must 
first realize their failure to specify a target and specify an actual target before it can be evaluated in terms of 
aptness. 
87
 The notion of ‘aptness’ is itself apt for target system evaluation, as it implies context dependence 
even in our everyday use of the term. What we usually mean when we say that a subject or object is apt, is 
that it is suitable or appropriate given a particular purpose or set of circumstances. Imagine a situation with 
three friends: Sara, Aisling and Meera. Sara has just received a glowing set of teaching evaluations from 
her students. Aisling, her friend, might give an apt description of her emotional state to their mutual friend 
Meera by saying that Sara feels happy but also vindicated, given the large amount of time and effort that 
went into preparing for her course. The description is apt because it takes into account the context of Sara’s 
emotional state, identifies the important causal factors that give rise to Sara’s set of emotions and conveys 
all the important information to Meera. In contrast, we would think that Sara’s description would be inapt if 
it did not contain all the relevant information, or if it contained a wealth of irrelevant information. In 
addition we would imagine that Sara would not be able to communicate her point to Meera if she used a 
method of communication which Meera could not understand (such as ASL). In all of these alternative 
cases, the words (or signs) that Sara uttered would not be problematic in themselves, but only given the 
context of the conversation. 
 In the case of target systems, the situation is somewhat different, as targets are parts of the world 
and not representations of parts of the world like models or utterances. That is, a scientist specifies target 
systems in order to provide explanations of a phenomenon, yet does so by representing it through a model 
or experiment. Also, in the case of target systems, the context can be understood generally as the 
framework in which the phenomenon is conceptualized, but it also contains the specific model or 
experimental setup. Thus, the characterization of the context is often more precise than it is in everyday 
natural language. 
 I find it useful to think of target systems as containing causal factors which give rise to the 
phenomena we are trying to explain through science. This may seem strange, as a traditional way of 
understanding causal relations are between two (or more) events, the cause(s) and the effect. Yet, it is not 
controversial to think of a phenomenon we are trying to explain as an event, or the parts of a system as 
causal factors. In the standard example used to illustrate causation,  the event is the a billiard ball moving 
(or falling into a pocket). The ball itself and the cue ball that hit it are part of the system and they are related 
to each other in a causal way. Yet, on my view, models and experiments are tied to target systems, and those 
target systems are are spatiotemporally strictly defined. For instance, we can think of the invasion of 
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T.angustifolia into Indian Creek as an event, and the parts of the system as factors which have some kind of 
causal relation to each other and which somehow bring about the event. At this point, I do not wish to say 
any more about the metaphysics of the causal factors or the causal relation itself, as I think it can remain 
open for now. The account of causal explanation I will use in the next section also has a liberal notion of 
the metaphysical aspect of causation. 
 With all these pieces in place, it is now possible to give a general definition of aptness for target 
systems:
 (1) A target system T is apt for a scientific purpose S just in case:
(i) it’s partition P is useful for S and 
(ii)  It contains the relevant causal factors of S. 
At this stage, the definition is not particularly illuminating, as there needs to be an analysis of the terms 
‘usefulness’ and ‘relevance’. In order to do this, I will make use of two accounts, both from the literature on 
scientific explanation. The first is Bas van Fraassen’s account of salience as part of the ‘pragmatics of 
explanation’  and the second is Michael Strevens’s account of relevance in his kairetic account of causal 
explanation. 
 I should note that scientific explanation is by no means the only place where relevance is 
discussed. In fact, relevance is key in philosophy of cognition and philosophy of language,  as it is enters 
into pragmatic aspects of communication. That is, communication involves much more than just the syntax 
and semantics of a speaker’s utterances,  as it depends on the context in which the utterances are made and 
the expectations of the interlocutors. For example, Grice observed that a lot of conversation relies on 
information that has not been directly stated, but implied. He also thought that conversations should be 
viewed as cooperative enterprises, where speakers are trying to understand each other and make themselves 
understood (W. Davis, n.d.). In order to do this, speakers must try to obey maxims, which fall into certain 
categories.  The category of interest is that of Relation,  whose maxim is “be relevant”. In another account, 
Sperber and Wilson (1995) go beyond language and communication as think that relevance is key for 
understanding human cognition. The main idea is that “Human cognition is geared towards the 
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maximization of relevance (that is, to the achievement of as many contextual (cognitive) effects as possible 
for as little processing effort as possible)” (Korta & Perry, n.d.). 
 While these are important and comprehensive accounts of relevance, I think that the scientific 
explanation approach is better suited to understanding usefulness and relevance in the case of target 
systems. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the type of ‘context’ investigated in scientific 
explanation is the same as in the case of target systems, and it is affected by scientific disciplines, norms 
and practices.  While these may have analogues in communication and cognition, it is simpler to use the 
theory where context is restricted to scientific practice. 
 The second reason is more complicated. As I will explain further on,  most accounts of pragmatics 
or relevance rely on one (or a few) main principle(s) to explain both contextual factors and relevance. This 
is also true of Strevens and van Fraassen,  yet they are interesting because the former thinks that relevance is 
key and influences the context whereas the latter thinks that context is key and influences relevance. This 
makes the accounts complimentary, provided that they can be combined under a single umbrella account. I 
think that this is exactly what is needed in my account of aptness, as I want to distinguish between 
usefulness of partitions (which can be illuminated by van Fraassen’s account of salience) and relevance of 
abstractions (which can be illuminated by Strevens’s kairetic account of causal explanation). 
 In the next section I will give an overview of these two accounts, situated in a more general (albeit 
brief) summary of some topics in scientific explanation. 
3. Scientific Explanation 
 The topic of scientific explanation is arguably one of the most important debates in philosophy of 
science (Woodward, 2009). The debate has many dimensions, yet the basic issue is to determine the criteria 
which make an explanation of a scientific phenomenon successful. In the early 20th century, the received 
view in philosophy of science was that a successful scientific explanation of a phenomenon showed how 
the phenomenon in question was an instance of a more general pattern. Examples include Hempel and 
Oppenheim’s covering law model of scientific explanation (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948) and Kitcher’s 
unification account (Kitcher, 1981; 1989). Moreover, Hempel and Oppenheim also thought that explanation 
and prediction are symmetric as they have the same logical structure. That is, the structure of a scientific 
explanation contains laws and antecedent conditions and the explanation follows logically from these. 
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 While Hempel and Oppenheim’s view of scientific explanation gained some popularity it then 
came under heavy attack. Much of the criticism came in the form of counterexamples, many of which have 
now become famous in their own right (Salmon,  1999). More specifically, some counterarguments brought 
to light that the covering law model did not account for causal factors in the explanation of an event. Thus, 
for example, we can derive the length of a flagpole’s shadow, given the height of the pole,  the angle of the 
sun and laws governing the rectilinear propagation of light. However, the covering law model also allows 
us to determine the length of the flagpole from  the same laws, the angle of the sun and the length of the 
shadow. The problem with this explanation,  however, is that while the flagpole’s height causes the shadow 
and its length, the existence of the shadow cannot cause the flagpole, nor can it cause the flagpole to have a 
certain height. 
 Problems like these led to a number of causal accounts of scientific explanation, which  focused 
explicitly on the factors which caused a particular phenomenon (Salmon, 2006). Views differ on many 
dimensions,  including the nature of causation and the adequate method for determining the causal factors 
relevant to an explanation. The main issue for causal accounts of explanation must be able to determine 
which causal factors are actually relevant for a particular explanation. Each phenomenon is influenced by a 
great number of causal factors, yet not all of these factors have the same degree of influence. Most of these 
factors will have a negligible degree of influence, as they will be spatiotemporally distant (Strevens, 2008). 
 The problem is that an explanation which sites all of the causal influences or even just most of 
them will be extremely laborious and time consuming. For example, if we had to specify the gravitational 
force of every single planet in the solar system, the ambient temperature, the elasticity of the materials in an 
explanation of the length of the flagpole’s shadow, scientific investigation would not get off the ground. 
More importantly, it seems intuitive that an a true explanation of an event must isolate the factors which 
actually caused the event, from the factors which merely made the event’s taking place possible. In other 
words, not every causal factor that gives rise to an event is explanatory. The problem is that if irrelevant 
factors are left in the explanation, it can lose explanatory power as irrelevant factors might obscure the 
explanation of an event. 
 While there are numerous accounts of explanatory and causal relevance, I will focus on one of 
these accounts, which I think is both promising and easily applicable to target system evaluation. This is the 
kairetic account of causal explanation, which I will examine in the following section (2.1). 
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 A second criticism of the covering law model is that it is too formalized, as it only accounts for the 
syntactic and semantic aspects of explanation, but not its pragmatic aspects (Salmon, 1999). According to 
Bas van Fraassen, it is impossible to construct a theory of scientific explanation or a method for evaluating 
explanations without these pragmatic factors. Instead determining what makes an explanation successful 
must take into account the context in which the explanation is put forward. This pragmatic account of 
explanation focusing in salience will be the key to explicating the term ‘usefulness’ in my account of 
aptness. I will explain the basics of van Fraassen’s account in the next section. 
3.1 The Pragmatics of Explanation - van Fraassen
 Bas van Fraassen’s discussion of scientific explanation begins from the view that scientific 
language is very similar to natural language, as it is characterized by syntactic, semantic and pragmatic 
factors. Therefore, a full account of scientific explanation must include a discussion of these pragmatic 
factors. According to van Fraassen, Hempel and Oppenheim’s covering law model was doomed to fail, 
because it focused exclusively on syntax and semantics (Van Fraassen, 1980). 
 According to van Fraassen,  the problems started when Hempel and Oppenheim attempted to give 
an objective, context-independent theory of scientific explanation.  Moreover, he does not think that the 
alternative causal accounts of explanation address this problem. For van Fraassen,  giving an account of 
relevance is not sufficient for generating a successful theory of scientific explanation. This is because he 
thinks of relevance as a weaker notion, which does not capture the importance of pragmatic factors in 
scientific explanation. He argues that once the context of an explanation is determined in a sufficiently fine-
grained manner,  the relevant factors will be easily determinable.  He states that “the context,  … determines 
relevance in a way that goes well beyond the statistical relevance about which our scientific theories give 
us information” (ibid p. 128).
 I will explain this point with the use of a term coined by Peter Railton, the ideal explanatory text 
(IET) (Railton, 1981). This vast hypothetical document contains all the facts, laws, causal connections and 
hidden mechanisms of a particular phenomenon or event.  What counts as a successful explanation of said 
event is an explanation that uses elements of the ideal explanatory text. Of course, no explanation can 
include everything in the IET, so selections must be made. The problem is that everything in the IET is 
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relevant for the phenomenon and can be used as a sufficiently good explanation. But if everything is 
relevant, then how are we justified in using explanations which do not reference the IET in its entirety? 
 According to van Fraassen, this is where pragmatics come in. While everything in the ideal 
explanatory text is relevant for the explanation of the phenomenon, it is not the case that everything in the 
IET is salient for the human beings providing the explanation or trying to understand it. For example, we 
give many different explanations of why a brick broke a window, many of which are generated from the 
IET. However, explaining the event in terms of molecular structure and properties, would be futile,  if the 
audience consisted of young children. The salient aspects of the IET  will be differ depending on the 
background knowledge and interests of the humans involved in the explanation. 
 However, picking out the salient factors from an IET is what is meant by ‘picking out the relevant 
causes of an explanation’. All the factors in the IET are causal,  and all of them are contributing factors, 
however, the particular subset which is picked out as an explanation is determined by factors which are 
considered salient. He states that “the salient feature picket out as ‘the cause’ in that complex process, is 
salient to a given person because of his orientation, his interests, and various other peculiarities in the way 
he approaches or comes to know the problem - contextual factors” (van Fraassen, 1980) p.125. 
 The positive part of van Fraassen’s argument begins from the idea that scientific explanations 
should be understood as answers to explanation-seeking why-questions (ibid 126). That is,  the explanation 
of a phenomenon P can be understood as an answer to the question Why P? The point of involving 
questions is that working on clarifying the question both illuminates the phenomenon being explained and 
constrains the answer. In more formalized terms, a why-question Q is determined by three factors: 
 (i) the topic Pk 
(ii) the contrast class X = {P1, … Pk, … } and 
 (iii) the relevance relation R
Yet these three factors are not equal partners in the relationship. In order to determine whether a proposition 
is relevant to a question Q, we must determine whether it is relevant to a certain topic with respect to that 
contrast class. I should note that there is not one kind of relevance relation, but many relations could be 
considered relevant, given the context. Thus, for example, in this case, the   relation of ‘affecting the tides’ 
will not be relevant but the relation of ‘affecting plant growth’ will be relevant.  
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 This process of clarification and determination of relevance is primarily a pragmatic endeavor. 
Consider again the example mentioned in the introduction, where T. angustifolia has invaded the North 
American lakes.  If our aim is to explain the phenomenon of invasion,  an obvious why-question is: Why did 
T. angustifolia invade the North American lakes? However, as van Fraassen points out, this question needs 
pragmatic clarification. By asking this question I could be interested in at least three different questions: (a) 
why it was T. angustifolia rather than another organism which invaded (b) why it invaded rather than failed 
to invade or (c) why it invaded the North American lakes rather than another community. 
 According to van Fraassen, these are more than merely different interpretations of the same 
question, they are actually different questions which have distinct contrast classes. A contrast class is 
simply a set of alternatives, hence the contrast class of (a) includes other species of cattail,  other plants of a 
different genus, and could even include other objects or animals. The contrast class of (b) includes other 
interactions, such as competition,  predation, etc. Identifying the contrast class is extremely important,  as it 
is determines what constitutes an explanation of an event or phenomenon. That is, once we have identified 
the contrast class of the question, we are in a much better position to know what it is that we are explaining 
and how we should go about explaining it. 
 In the case of the T. angustifolia invasion, the way in which the question is clarified is very 
illuminating. If, for instance a group of scientists chose (a),  then they would be focusing on the invader. In 
asking why it was that this particular organism rather than another managed to invade,  the scientists are 
asking what it is about T. angustifolia which makes it a good invader, that is, what traits does T. angustifolia 
which other plants do not have? Scientists who choose this clarification and contrast class are part of what I 
call trait-level invasion research. This is a sub-field within invasion biology which has its roots in 
population ecology, and uses many of the concepts, models and experiments developed by population 
ecologists. On the other hand, scientists who choose (c) are focusing on the community which is being 
invaded and asking what  traits of the North American lakes community made it susceptible to invasion. 
These scientists are part of what I call community-level invasion research which has its roots in 
conservation ecology and studies invasions with its own set of concepts, models and experiments. In short, 
the way in which a question is clarified affects the concepts and methods used in answering that question, 
hence it is an extremely important aspect of the explanation itself. 
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 If it is determined that Q arises in the right context (that is, if it is an appropriate question given 
the context), then it can be answered directly, in the form (*) Pk in contrast to (the rest of) X because A, 
provided that the following conditions hold:
(i) A is true. 
 (ii) Pk is true.
(iii) No member of X other than Pk is true. 
(iv)  A bears R to < Pk, X>.
According to van Fraassen, we are now in a position to evaluate the answer (*), in probabilistic terms, 
depending on our prior probabilities and the relationship of A to the probabilities of other reasons. 
 The important upshot of this discussion is that the factors which are considered relevant, are only 
considered thus because of the context which frames the explanation. In other words, this is a one-sided 
view of the relationship between context an relevance where context determines relevance but not vice 
versa. In addition, the connection between the two is quite strong, as determining relevance often follows 
easily from the determination of the context.
 Having given a summary of van Fraassen’s account of salience, I will now show how the notions 
of ‘why-questions’ and ‘contrast class’ can help to explicate the notion of usefulness for partitions. 
3.2 Useful Partitions
 Usefulness is an inherently pragmatic criterion for evaluation, as something can only be useful 
given a certain purpose and context. However, this context dependence does not imply that there are no 
rules for determining when something is useful, or at least when it is more useful than something else. In 
the case of aptness, this means that we can use contextual factors to determine which of the available 
partitions will be useful for a particular scientific purpose. 
 Before I show how this can be done in actual scientific practice, I want to try and give a more 
precise definition of ‘usefulness’ for partitions. What makes a partition useful? As I argued in chapter 3, a 
partition is a way of grouping the contents of a domain of study into units. Thus, a partition is useful when 
it groups the contents of a domain in the ‘right way’. But what does it mean to group the contents in the 
right way? Given that usefulness is a pragmatic criterion, the ‘right way’ of grouping results in units which 
can be used for a particular scientific purpose, where a scientific purpose is the study of a phenomenon of 
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interest. Yet the study of a phenomenon of interest is constrained by the tools and methods available to the 
scientist. Hence, the scientist must partition the domain in such a way as to individuate units which can be 
used in the study of the phenomenon. This means that a partition is maximally useful when it individuates 
all the units which can be used in the study of the phenomenon of interest. 
 There are two points to note. The first is that this individuation does not necessarily mean that the 
finest-grained partition is always the most useful. For a start, fineness of grain depends on factors such as 
the possibility of measurement and technology, which means that there is a lower (and a higher) limit to the 
grain.  Moreover, many scientific partitions are multi-level, as they contain units of different sizes and at 
different levels of grain. The point of the criterion is to make sure that all units which can be used to study 
the phenomenon are categorized or individuated as units. 
 The second point to note is that this individuation is not meant to show which units will actually 
be used to study the phenomenon, as this is the job of abstraction.  Abstraction is the process by which a 
scientist identifies the relevant units from the others. However, in order for it to be possible to identify 
which units are relevant and which are not, the scientist must have first categorized them as units.  Thus, a 
partitioned domain will have a large number of units, yet in order to be maximally useful, all the units 
which could turn out to be relevant must be individuated as units. 
 Of course, it will probably never be possible to identify the maximally useful partition for the 
study of a phenomenon. However, we can still keep the idea of maximally useful partition as a goal to 
which we can strive for in our scientific endeavors.  Thus, instead of trying to find the unique maximally 
useful partition for each scientific purpose, we can start at the other end and try to eliminate those partitions 
which we know will not be useful. 
 I should note that given that the starting point for any partition is the domain of interest, we cannot 
include any units which are not actually part of the system. This is not because they will not be useful, but 
because a partition is a categorization of what is actually there, and cannot include anything additional. 
Thus, for example, units such as the plants in the scientist’s garden will not be part of the partition (even if 
they are individuals of the same species as those found in Indian Creek). In addition, units which are not 
located in the system at the time in which the study is taking place will also not be included. Thus, for 
example, the prehistoric species of plants which once occupied Indian Creek cannot be part of the domain. 
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 With the domain is spatiotemporally defined, we can start eliminating partitions which  are not 
useful. The first set of partitions which can be eliminated are the ones which do provide scientific 
classifications. This is determined by the fact that the phenomenon of interest is a scientific phenomenon. 
For example, a partition which classified the plants of Indian Creek into two units of ‘magical’ and ‘non-
magical’  would not be useful for studying the invasion of Indian Creek by T. angustifolia, as they cannot be 
used in the study. 
 The second set of partitions which can be eliminated are the ones which will not be useful, given 
the specifics of the phenomenon of interest.  Within science, there are a number of ways in which a 
particular phenomenon can be studied. A scientist might be looking for an explanation of a phenomenon, a 
prediction about the phenomenon, a way of manipulating the phenomenon etc. Each type of scientific 
endeavor can be formulated as a different kind of question. In our example, the phenomenon is framed in 
explanatory terms, hence it is formulated as the why-question “Why did T. angustifolia invade Indian 
Creek?” While van Fraassen only considers the contrast classes within the framework of why-questions, we 
can also think that the entire question has a contrast class. That is, if we were interested in prediction, then 
we could ask the question “Will T. angustifolia invade Indian Creek?” or even “When will T. angustifolia 
invade Indian Creek?”.2 
 The next step is to consider the contrast classes of the actual why-question so we can further 
narrow down the number of useful partitions. The easiest one is the contrast class of ‘invade’. The contrast 
class here includes other relations between units in the system. We can first eliminate all non-ecological 
relations, as we are within the framework of invasion biology, which is part of ecology. We can also 
eliminate other ecological relations such as predation, facilitation and intraspecific competition. 
 We are now left with two of the questions which came up in the previous section: (i) why it was T. 
angustifolia rather than another organism which invaded and (ii) why it invaded the North American lakes 
rather than another community. As I stated in the previous section, each of these two questions represents a 
different sub-field in invasion biology. The scientists in the paper from which the example was taken are 
answering the first question, which means that the partitions associated with the second question are also 
ruled out. This leaves the partitions associated with trait-level invasion research. All of these partitions 
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2 I should note that there is another constraint implied here. The predictive questions about the invasion of Indian Creek would make 
for an unsuccessful study, as the domain has already been invaded. This means that the domain itself precludes the study of some 
phenomena in some ways.
count organisms as units but some of them also contain smaller units such as nitrogen, phosphorus and the 
chemical compounds which make up toxins. Of these, the scientists will choose one of these multilevel 
partitions. At this stage, the partitions will all be useful, and any difference between them will be minimal. 
 To sum up, a partition is useful when it individuates units in a domain such that the phenomenon 
can be studied. In addition, we now have an answer to the question posed in the introduction: how should 
scientists study the phenomenon of the T. Angustifolia invasion of Indian Creek? The answer is that they 
should choose a partition from trait-level invasion research. This kind of analysis helps when the context of 
a field or sub-field is known and when methods that are already well established are used to study the 
phenomenon in a different domain.  Another way of putting this point is that if we are within a Kuhnian 
paradigm engaged in normal science, the context of the paradigm will determine the useful partitions for 
each puzzle. 
 The problem with this answer is that it is overly reliant on the norms of the field (or paradigm) and 
does not give us a way to determine whether the methods of one field are better than another. In this 
example, the field is already established,  which makes the choice for Jarchow and Cook easy. However, 
what if community-level research is actually a better way to study invasions? Merely relying on context 
and usefulness of partitions will not help us in this case.  Still, there is another criterion with which we can 
evaluate target systems, namely relevance. The account of relevance which I will use, is aimed at finding 
the factors which make a difference in the occurrence of an event. While the relevance of a particular factor 
is affected by the context (and in the case of target system, the chosen partition), identifying the difference 
makers can also affect the usefulness of a partition. These two criteria together will determine the aptness 
of a target system.  
 
3.3 The kairetic account of causal explanation - Strevens
 Michael Strevens’s account of causal explanation focuses on the factors which make a difference 
to the explanation of an event. His motivation for developing the kairetic account was to give an account of 
explanation which combines aspects of classical causal accounts of explanation and the unification 
approach to explanation. A causal explanation identifies an event’s causal history, while a unification 
explanation aims to explain an event using a theory that unifies many other phenomena. An important 
feature of unification accounts is that they can account for more general explanations, because they do not 
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aim for causal accuracy. In fact, unification accounts are often enhanced by omitting or changing details 
(Strevens, 2004). Causal accounts, as I showed above, face the problem of explanatory relevance.  
 For Strevens, the key for explaining an event is to pick out, from the complex causal network,  
those factors which made a difference to whether or not the event in question occurred (Strevens 2004). 
Strevens’s germane example concerns the death of Rasputin. Rasputin was famously poisoned, shot (twice) 
and finally tied up and drowned. Strevens’s account allows us to make sense of this complex situation, by 
helping us to identify drowning as the factor which ultimately caused Rasputin’s death. 
 To this end, Strevens proposes a test called the eliminative procedure,  with which we can 
determine the difference makers in the explanation of an event E.  Before we can administer the procedure, 
we must first determine the event to be explained. Each event is individuated at a particular level of grain, 
which is determined by the explanatory request. That is, the way we ask the question about event E, 
determines how finely we specify that event, and how much causal detail will be present in the explanation. 
A fine-grained individuation of an event will elicit an explanation with more difference makers than a 
coarse-grained individuation. For example, asking why Rasputin died will elicit an explanation with fewer 
causal details than the explanation elicited by the question ‘why did Rasputin die in exactly the way he 
did?’ (ibid 159). 
 Once the event has been specified, we look at the causal network in which the event E is 
embedded, and pick out a part of that web that was sufficient to cause E. By ‘part’, Strevens means a set of 
actual initial conditions and laws that could, in itself, cause E.  We then construct a representation of this set 
of actual causes, in terms of propositions. This is the veridical deterministic causal model of E (ibid 162). 
Strevens calls it a veridical model, because the conditions are actual causal influences on the event. In the 
model, relations of causal production are represented through relations of logical entailment. In other 
words, Strevens uses the notion of logical entailment to represent a situation in the real world,  where a set 
of initial conditions produce an event in virtue of laws (ibid 163). The second step is to eliminate from the 
causal model any factors that are not necessary in the causal production of E. The factors that are not 
necessary are the ones that do not play a role in the entailment of E.  What remains is the set of initial 
conditions and laws that made a difference to the occurrence of E. It is called the explanatory kernel of E.  
 I will illustrate how the eliminative procedure works through Strevens’s own example of 
Rasputin’s death (E). The event is specified through the question “What caused Rasputin’s death?”, and the 
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causal network includes the drowning, the shooting and the poisoning,  but also a number of other factors 
which have some causal influence on E, such as  “the length of Rasputin’s beard, the day’s pollen count, the 
gravitational influence of Mars” (ibid 158). The next step is to determine the veridical causal model for 
Rasputin’s death and eliminate all the factors which can be eliminated from it. 
 It is easy to see why drowning counts as a difference maker. ‘Being thrown in the river’ is part of 
the causal network that entails E, therefore is part of the veridical model. Also contained is a law which 
states that ‘people thrown in the river under certain conditions die’, and the conditions for which the law 
holds. Therefore, we cannot remove the being thrown into the river without invalidating the entailment. 
This means that being thrown into the river is a difference maker of E. Contrast this with explanation of 
Rasputin’s death by poisoning. To do so we would construct a causal model which contained the 
proposition that Rasputin was poisoned, together with a law which stated that a person poisoned under a set 
of conditions, will die. The problem  is that in Rasputin’s case,  these conditions did not hold. We now have 
two options.  Either we bite the bullet and state the conditions were present or we eliminate the conditions 
from the model.   However,  if we choose the first option, we end up with a causal model which is not 
veridical, as it asserts something which not the case. On the other hand, if we eliminate the conditions from 
the causal model, then we are left with a model which does not entail E. This is because,  as Rasputin 
showed,  simply being given a certain poison does always result in death. Thus, the poisoning cannot be 
considered a difference-maker for Rasputin’s death. 
 The eliminative procedure also gives us a precise method for eliminating the tangential factors 
which are definitely not difference makers yet have some sort of weak causal influence,  such as the 
gravitational force of Mars, the length of Rasputin’s beard etc. Strevens’s explanation focuses on the 
‘gravitational force of Mars’, which is part of the veridical causal model, as it is present and has some 
influence over events on Earth. However,  it can only be part of the veridical causal model if the ‘being 
thrown in the river’ is also part of the model (otherwise the model would cease to be veridical). Yet as long 
as the ‘being thrown in the river’ is part of the causal model,  then the ‘gravitational force of Mars’  is 
superfluous. Removing it from the model will not affect the model’s entailment of E,  as the actual cause of 
E (being thrown in the river) is sufficient to have caused it. Thus the ‘gravitational force of Mars’  and all 
similarly superfluous causal factors are not difference makers and can be eliminated. 
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 Strevens also considers a trickier situation. What if the ‘gravitational force of Mars’ entailed 
another factor which was a difference maker (being thrown into the river)? It seems that in this case, it 
would be a difference maker, and we would have to keep it in the model. This would spell trouble for the 
kairetic account,  yet Strevens has the means to overcome it. He argues that that it is not possible to 
construct a veridical causal model where a factor such as the ‘gravitational force of Mars’ entails a 
difference maker such as ‘being thrown into the river.’ This is because the notion of entailment he uses here 
represents an actual causal relation in the real world.  Yet there is no physical system where the gravitational 
force of Mars causes someone to be thrown in a river. Thus, the model that included the gravitational force 
of Mars as entailing a difference maker, would not be veridical. 
 To sum up, the kairetic account of causal explanation,  gives us a method for determining which 
factors from a complex causal network actually make a difference in an event’s being brought about. In the 
next section, I will show how some aspects of this method can be applied to target system evaluation, so 
that we can determine whether the factors in the target system are relevant and whether those omitted from 
the partition are irrelevant.  
 
3.4 Relevant Abstractions
 While there are many similarities between causal explanation and target system analysis, there are 
also some important differences, which mean that ‘applying’ an account of causal explanation to target 
systems is not entirely straightforward.  The most important difference is that  target systems are real parts 
of the world, whereas causal explanations are representations of actual factors and events in the world. Still, 
this difference does not need to be problematic,  provided that the some adjustments are made for the 
different ontological status of targets and causal models. 
 The second issue is that, at least on my account of target system evaluation, the criterion of 
usefulness and the selection of a partition renders a substantial part of Strevens’s account redundant. On my 
view, there is no need to follow the first steps of the kairetic account, namely specifying the event, 
identifying the causal network and constructing the veridical causal model. In the case of target systems, 
specifying the domain of study and the phenomenon of interest are the equivalent of specifying the event. 
In addition, the role played by the identification of the causal network and the veridical causal model in the 
kairetic account, is played by the choice of partition in my account of target systems. 
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 There is an important functional similarity between partitions and veridical causal models. A 
partition is not a model, but a particular categorization of the domain. Also, a veridical causal model is 
constructed so that it contains all the causal factors which influence the event, yet the partition contains 
everything in the domain categorized in a particular way. Thus, while the veridical causal model is the 
selection of a subset of the causal network, in the partition nothing which is part of the domain can be 
omitted.  This means that a partition might contain factors which have little or no influence on the 
phenomenon of interest. Still, the important point of similarity is the ‘veridical’ nature of the causal model 
and the partition. The causal model is veridical by definition, as it contains all the causal factors which 
influence the phenomenon. The partition is veridical in the sense that it is real, and contains all the factors 
which are present in the domain. 
  In the case of the T. angustifolia invasion, the partition will contain everything that exists in the 
Indian Creek ecosystem, categorized in a particular way. This includes: all the organisms in the ecosystem 
identified as organisms, all the properties of these organisms (i.e. their traits, such as allelopathy, 
phenotypic plasticity,  births, deaths etc), abiotic factors (such as nitrogen, phosphorus, water, radiation, 
toxins and some of their properties (such as temperature, salinity,  velocity (of the wind)). We can now 
apply the eliminative procedure to this partition, in order to determine which of the parts and properties are 
difference makers for the phenomenon of interest.  
 An obvious candidate is T. angustifolia itself, and at least some of its properties (births, deaths, 
allelopathy). If we eliminate T. angustifolia these properties from the target system, then we will have a 
target systems whose factors do not entail the phenomenon. That is, we cannot explain an invasion (in the 
context of trait-level research) without the invader or the properties which help it outcompete the native 
plants. 
 The scientist must also choose how to represent the community in their experiment. One option 
would be to include a number of different species, yet a closer examination of the system shows that some 
species are more important than others. The plant which seems to have suffered the most is Bolboschoenus 
fluviatilis, probably because it was in direct competition from T. angustifolia and the direct recipient of the 
toxins. In other words, the invasion might not have occurred if a different plant was the main competitor of 
T. angustifolia. This means that the B. fluviatilis and some of its properties are difference makers in the 
invasion of Indian Creek.  In contrast, the rest of the organisms in the system are not difference makers. 
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While it is true that other plants might have suffered from competition with T. angustifolia,  yet they have 
not suffered as much, because they were not in direct competition with T. angustifolia.  In other words, the 
invasion would still have occurred if the other plants were absent. The animals are not relevant because 
changes to their populations would occur as effects of the invasion, not causes of it. Animals could prey on 
particular plants or use native plants for cover, and hence suffer because their resources are reduced by the 
invasion. Nonetheless there would come about as a result of the invasion and hence not important for 
explanation of why the invasion occurred. 
 There are a number of other factors in the partition which are definitely not difference makers. 
These have the same status that the gravitational force of Mars has on Rasputin’s death. Factors of the 
ecosystem that are constant over time, or between the two plant populations will not be important.  For 
example, the amount of radiation, precipitation and temperature are not likely to be relevant. The close 
proximity of the two plant populations means that these factors will not affect the growth or reproductive 
rate of the plants.  Similarly, with exception of a case where the toxins inhibit the uptake of a particular 
nutrient, nutrient availability will not be relevant, because nutrients tend to be dispersed uniformly in lakes. 
 There is a third category of factors, which are neither obviously relevant or irrelevant.  These could 
be factors that are only relevant in some invasions but not others, or factors whose effects we do not clearly 
understand. For example, we might not know if the acidity or salinity of the water is important, because it 
may affect the spread of the allelopathic toxins or their uptake by the native plants.  
 To sum up the argument so far, applying the eliminative procedure to the partitioned domain helps 
us to identify the factors which are relevant for causing the phenomenon. Another way of putting this point 
is that it can help us determine the right level of abstraction given a particular partition and phenomenon of 
interest. By applying the eliminating procedure we can abstract as much as possible, thus specifying a 
target which is simpler and easier to experiment on or model. The eliminative procedure is a way to test our 
abstractions so that we can determine if we are abstracting too much or not enough. 
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4. A General Theory of Aptness
 Now that all the parts of my theory of aptness are in place, I can put them together and give a 
general definition of aptness for target systems. This definition is pragmatic to a certain extent,  as the 
context of a scientific purpose provides the criterion for usefulness, which in turn places constraints on 
what is considered relevant, yet this does not mean that any target system is equally apt for given a certain 
context. Within the contextual framework, there is a fact of the matter about which factors are relevant and 
which are not,  hence there are strict rules for evaluating target systems. A phenomenon is either caused by a 
combination of factors or it is not. The pragmatic aspect constrains how we individuate those factors, yet 
the world itself determines whether and how the phenomenon occurs. Therefore, provided that a partition is 
sufficiently useful,  we have an objective measure for determining which factors are relevant and which can 
be omitted. 
 This point will be made clearer by the discussion of two issues. The first concerns the difference 
between a maximally apt target,  and a sufficiently apt target. A target is maximally apt when its partition is 
maximally useful and its abstractions are maximally relevant. A maximally useful partition is one which 
individuates all the factors which could be relevant, and a maximally relevant set of abstractions omits all 
those factors which are not difference makers. The definition of a maximally apt target then becomes:
 A target is maximally apt for the explanation of phenomenon P just in case:
(i) it individuates all the causal factors which are potential difference-makers for P 
(ii) all factors which are not difference-makers for P are omitted
The problem with a maximally apt target is that there are few, if any, cases where a scientist can specify a 
maximally apt target for her purposes, or indeed be in a position to know that she has specified such a 
target. These difficulties can arise in relation to both partitioning and abstraction. 
 In the case of partitioning the difficulties can be grouped into two categories. The first occurs in 
cases where the contextual framework within which the scientist is working rules out the partitions which 
are most useful for studying the phenomenon. For example, if it were the case that biodiversity was a 
difference maker for the invasion of Indian Creek, the scientists operating within the trait-level framework 
104
would not be in a position to determine that biodiversity was a limiting factor, as their framework excludes 
the partitions which individuate communities as units, with properties such as biodiversity. In fact, as I will 
show in the next chapters, there is an important debate in invasion biology, concerning the appropriate 
framework for studying invasions. 
 The second category deals with more extreme cases, where there is simply no available framework 
which can provide useful partitions for the study of the phenomenon. For example, it could turn out to be 
the case that none of the available frameworks individuate all the difference-makers for invasion biology. 
This is a real enough problem, which has led some invasion biologists to ‘go back to the drawing board’ 
and try to identify new frameworks for invasion biology (see chapter 6).  This means that in some cases the 
contextual framework itself is limiting scientists from specifying the maximally apt partitions. 
 A possible answer to these problems is to dispense with pragmatics and contextualization in the 
evaluation of target systems and focus only on relevance. In fact, in many of the accounts of causal 
explanation, context plays a minimal role. In the kairetic account, for example, context is minimally 
relevant, as it helps individuate the event and the causal factors but it does not itself preclude other 
individuations. For Strevens, the causal model should always be made as abstract as possible, without 
invalidating the fact that the event is causally produced. Strevens’s notion of abstraction is not identical to 
mine, as it is not the omission of irrelevant factors, but the fineness of grain with the factors are 
individuated. Thus, for Strevens, a more abstract individuation is a less precise, or vague individuation of a 
factor. For example, in the case of Rasputin, the veridical causal model could be made less abstract by 
individuating the causes more precisely. Thus, the shots could be individuated, as could the precise location 
of the entry wounds. The drowning could be more precisely specified in terms of the length of time 
Rasputin would have to be underwater for him to drown, and so on.
 According to Strevens,  these modifications are not necessary for the veridical causal model of 
explaining Rasputin’s death because the more abstract model leads to the desired result. However,  he agrees 
that if the event needed to be specified in a more fine-grained manner, then the causal factors would also 
have to be individuated more precisely (Strevens, 2004, p. 159). Yet it seems to me that in this case,  context 
is a lot more important than the account implies. The problem I am trying to solve for target system 
evaluation is the analogue of being able to determine how the event of Rasputin’s death should be specified 
in the first place. For Strevens, this is not an important problem because he assumes that the reasons for 
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choosing one individuation over another are not themselves important, and also that it is very easy to 
change how the event is individuated. Still, this is an extremely important problem for target system 
evaluation. 
 There are also difficulties which pertain to the identification of difference makers,  and create 
problems for identifying the maximally relevant set of abstractions for a phenomenon. Even if the partition 
is sufficiently useful, a scientist might not succeed in determining the difference-makers for the 
phenomenon. In real-world systems, it is not always possible to know what the causal connection between 
objects is,  hence we cannot use the notion of entailment,  as it represents the actual causal connections in the 
system. That is, we might not know how a particular object affects other objects in a system so we might 
not know if the object or facts about that object really are relevant. For example, one could hypothesize that 
in a complex ecosystem, there might be additional dynamics that affect the course or strength of the 
invasion. The existence of animal populations might have dynamical effects which affect the course of the 
invasion, by magnifying or diminishing it.  However, if there is no available data which suggests that such 
an effect exists, then the scientists might not identify in the first place.
 This difference has important implications. The notion of entailment is very important in the 
kairetic account because it helps us eliminate factors which have some influence yet are not difference 
makers. In Strevens’s account the gravitational force of Mars is part of the veridical causal model, yet it is 
eliminated because we can be sure that Rasputin still dies if we not include it in the account. We are not 
always able to determine whether eliminating a factor will affect the system unless we actually eliminate it 
in an experiment. This means that we might not be able to know if our target is apt until we actually 
conduct the model or experiment. 
 The same is true in the other case that Strevens describes, namely the situation where the 
gravitational influence of Mars entails a factor that is a difference maker. In his example, we are able to 
determine that the gravitational influence of Mars does not entail someone being thrown in a river. 
However, we might not be able to determine entailment when dealing with target systems. We can imagine 
a situation where allelopathy, which is a difference maker, is inhibited by another factor in the system, 
which is usually not considered important. For example, it is conceivable that water temperature will affect 
allelopathy if T. angustifolia cannot produce toxins below a certain temperature, or if the toxins bind to 
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molecules in the water above a certain temperature.  If this is the case, then we will not be able to know that 
a particular target is apt.
 One way to deal with these problems is empirically, though a process of trial and error.  As we 
cannot manipulate a target system in the way we can manipulate a model,  we have to actually conduct an 
experiment in order to test whether the target is apt.  Scientists can go back and forth between hypothesizing 
what sort of target is apt,  conducting an experiment which fails and then going back and re-determining the 
target.  For example, it could turn out that allelopathy did not cause aquatic invasions, because the toxins 
became diluted in the water and did not inhibit the growth of the native plants. 
 This should not be particularly surprising. After all, if we were always in a position to identify the 
difference makers of each phenomenon then there would be no need to actually conduct an experiment or a 
model. One of the most important reasons to practice science is so that we can determine the difference 
makers of a particular phenomenon. When we do, this knowledge becomes part of a scientific discipline 
and can be used later on, when a similar phenomenon or domain is being investigated. 
 Consider again the factor of temperature. Jarchow and Cook decided that it was not relevant for 
their purpose and omitted it from the target system. While they could not know that temperature was not 
relevant, they could make an informed guess given the body of knowledge of ecology, with which they are 
familiar. 
 We know that the temperature of the water in a lake varies within a certain range throughout the 
year and across years.  However, we also know that this variation did not have an effect on the structure of 
the ecosystem before the arrival of T. angustifolia.  We also know that since the invasion, the temperature of 
the water has continued to vary within the specified range, but this has not accelerated or decelerated the 
rate of the invasion. We know this because there has not been any change in the sizes of the native and 
invasive populations that correlates with the changes in water temperature. Moreover, we did not need to 
conduct any additional empirical tests to determine this. All we had to do is use already existing data to 
check whether there was variation in this particular factor, and whether this variation was correlated with 
any change in the system. This sort of data is often readily available to scientists working within a 
particular framework, so it is a useful way to determine whether a factor can be omitted from a system. 
 In the end, however, this data might not always be available,  hence scientists will sometimes make 
mistakes and specify inapt target systems. In many of these cases, the only way forward is to move back 
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and forth between the model (or experiment), the target and the world, until a more successful target-model 
combination can be found. Still, I think that there are actually more constraints within the theory of aptness, 
as I have set it up, which will help minimize these cases. 
 The key for explaining to this point is to determine the exact relationship between usefulness and 
relevance. As I have already shown, each of these criteria alone is not sufficient to determine a maximally 
apt target system. Simply looking for the most useful partition does not automatically give us a way of 
determining the factors which are actually relevant, while it is impossible to determine the difference-
makers independently of the partition and by extension, the contextual framework which affects the choice 
of partition. This means that the two criteria are not independent of each other.  However,  this also means 
that the two criteria are distinct from each other, and cannot be collapsed into one. Identifying the 
maximally useful partition still leaves us with a number of causal factors which are not difference makers, 
which have to omitted from the target system, while a maximally relevant target still can only be evaluated 
as such given a certain context. These issues are compounded by the fact that we are rarely, if ever, in a 
position to identify either maximally useful partitions or maximally relevant abstractions. 
 However, in many cases, these two constraints together will be able to provide us with a 
sufficiently apt target system. The definition of a sufficiently apt target system is: 
 A target system is sufficiently apt for phenomenon P just in case
(i) the partition individuates enough causal factors which could be difference-makers for P and 
(ii) the abstractions succeed in identifying enough of the difference-makers which causally entail 
P 
 I have already shown how, given a certain partition, a scientist can identify enough of the 
difference-makers in order to have a sufficiently relevant set of abstractions. The problem which remains is 
how to identify a sufficiently useful partition, without relying entirely on the contextual framework. This is 
a more general version of the worry mentioned above, namely given there are two well-established 
contextual frameworks for studying invasion (individual-level and community-level) which one of the two 
provides the most useful partitions? 
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  I will argue that in some cases, relevance can constrain usefulness, as testing for difference-
makers can help determine the usefulness of a partition. The individuation of difference-makers is built in 
to definition of usefulness, and this is not accidental. This implies that a partition which does not 
individuate difference-makers will not be useful.  Yet it also implies that the difference-makers themselves 
can also cut across the boundaries determined by the context. That is, a partition which individuates fewer 
than sufficient difference-makers will be less useful than a partition which individuates sufficient difference 
makers. 
 I should note that  there is no upper bound for identifying difference makers for the usefulness of a 
partition. That is, the more difference-makers that a partition individuates, the more useful it is. It can be 
argued that this implies that a more finely-grained partition will automatically be more useful but this is not 
so. The term ‘individuation’ here guards against this possibility. In order for a factor to be a difference-
maker,  it must make a difference as a causal factor. That is, it cannot be jointly sufficient with other causal 
factors to be a difference-maker (though it can be jointly sufficient with other difference-makers to entail 
the phenomenon). This means that a partition which is too fine-grained will individuate factors which are 
not themselves difference-makers. This will make the omission of irrelevant factors much more difficult, 
even impossible. For example, if it were the case that the community-level traits were difference-makers 
for invasion, then the partitions of individual-level research would be too fine-grained to be useful.  That is, 
if emergent properties of communities (such as biodiversity) alone, resulted in resistance to invasion, then 
scientists using individual-level partitions would not be able to identify the relevant factors of the invasion. 
 However, as it turns out, the opposite in the case. Empirical results show that biodiversity, as an 
emergent property of communities is not a difference-making factor for invasions. This is because there 
have been many documented cases of highly diverse communities being invaded, yet communities with 
low diversity resisting invasion (Levine & D'Antonio, 1999). This means that the partitions which 
individuate community-level properties are not useful for studying invasions, and therefore Jarchow and 
Cook were right to choose the individual-level framework. Of course, the knowledge that biodiversity is 
not a difference-making factor can only come about after empirical investigation. It is often the case that 
this kind of knowledge is not available. Still, the point is that when this knowledge is available, it can be 
used to evaluate the aptness of target systems. Moreover, this knowledge can be used to cut across 
contextual frameworks making the criteria for evaluating target systems not merely pragmatic. 
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 At this point, we have an answer to the question posed in the introduction to the chapter. The best 
framework to study the invasion of Indian Creek by T. Angustifolia is the individual-level  framework. This 
framework provides the most useful partition, given our knowledge of invasion so far, one which 
individuates the trait of allelopathy as a difference-making factor for the invasion. This is an important 
achievement, which can be used to further refine our knowledge of invasions. 
5. Conclusion
 The ultimate goal for providing a theory of target system evaluation is not in order to identify the 
maximally apt target for each scientific purpose. This would not be possible due to our epistemic 
limitations. However, in many cases, identifying a sufficiently apt target is a goal that is well within our 
reach, as the evaluation of the target systems for invasion of Indian Creek demonstrates. This method of 
evaluation relies on two criteria, usefulness and relevance, which are distinct conceptually, yet closely 
related. 
 There is also a broader goal for the theory of target system evaluation, which is to identify the 
precise location of a problem in order to determine the best way to overcome it. Target systems are part of a 
more general network which makes up scientific practice, as they are represented by models or manipulated 
by experiments. When a model or experiment is successful, it is not so important to complete a full analysis 
of the target system. However, if a model or experiment does not meet its goal then the scientist must be 
able to determine the reason for this failure. In some cases the problem will lie within the model or 
experiment itself. For example, if a model contains idealizations which distort the target system too much, 
then the model will have to be adjusted. However, in many cases the problem lies with the specification of 
the target system. As I have shown, the theory of aptness can further distinguish between problems of 
partitioning and abstraction. This is important because, as we have seen, different problems require 
different solutions. The theory of aptness, while not infallible, provides us with tools which can provide 
significant assistance in such endeavors.
 In the next chapter, I will examine the field of invasion biology in more detail. In doing so, I hope 
to show that the issues raised in my theory of target system evaluation are questions which are currently 
being raised by practicing scientists. In chapter 6, I will show that some invasion biologists are 
reconsidering the usefulness of the two main existing frameworks (individual-level and community-level 
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research),  as they are capable of providing explanations for particular invasions, yet are not capable of 
providing successful predictions of invasions. I will then (in chapter 7) show how a closer examination of 
the target systems of individual-level and community-level research shows the different ways in which each 
is limited, and provides the space for the creation of a new, integrative framework for invasion biology. 
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6. Case Study
Can there Be a Unified Theory of Invasion Biology?
1. Introduction 
 Invasion biology is a relatively young discipline which is extremely important, interesting and is 
currently in turmoil.  Invasive species become established outside their native ranges and displace existing 
inhabitants (Jeschke et al., 2012).  In doing so, they can “threaten global biodiversity, introduce diseases, 
cause other ecological problems, or incur economic costs” (ibid p.  2). Because of this, invasion research 
has captured the attention of the media and the public and has entered the political sphere (Davis, 2011). 
However, the field is also in turmoil as there  are deep-rooted disagreements about the definition of 
invasive species (Richardson, 2011), the threat they pose to ecosystems (Lodge, 1993), the best way to 
manage invasions (Hulme 2009), and the conceptual framework which dictates the methods used to study 
invasions (Gurevitch et al.  2011, Jeschke et al.  2012,  Moles et al.  2011).  I will be focusing on this last point 
of disagreement, as it brings up interesting questions but has not yet been examined from a philosophical 
perspective. 
 The main issue in the controversy is whether the field invasion biology can be provided with an 
overarching unified theory. In order to understand why this is important for invasion biologists, we must 
look more closely at the history of the field (Davis, 2011). The history reveals that the discipline is very 
heterogeneous both with respect to conceptualizing the problem of invasions and with respect to the 
methodology used to study it. It also reveals that invasion itself is very heterogeneous, as invasions are 
caused by numerous and diverse factors. Moreover, these factors are so diverse that providing a unified 
theory of invasion based on the causes of invasion is extremely unlikely. A unified theory of invasion is 
possible, yet it must reconceive the problem of invasion. One way to achieve this is to focus on the process 
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of invasion, and classify particular invasions in terms of stages and barriers that need to be overcome in 
order for the invasion to pass to the next stage (Blackburn et al., 2011). 
 However, there is an additional problem, which relates to the prediction of invasions. Achieving 
successful predictions is perhaps the most important goal of invasion research, given  the ecological and 
economic implications of invasions (Moles et al., 2011). The problem is that so far, few studies have 
produced successful predictions,  while the ones that have are local, and focus on the causes of specific 
invasions. These studies are limited to small groups of invaders, and cannot be generalized to a greater 
theory of invasion. This means that the goals of unification and prediction must be pulled apart in invasion 
biology, as studies can either focus on providing a unifying theory of invasions, based on non-causal 
classifications of invasions, or they can focus on identifying the causes of particular invasions in order to 
provide predictions. 
 The point of this analysis is not to show that one of these goals is unimportant. Instead, it is meant 
to provide the conceptual space for both goals, yet to highlight that each must use different 
conceptualizations of invasion and different methodologies.  This distinction is important because there is a 
view within invasion biology, which argues that the way to achieve successful predictions is to strive for 
greater theoretical unification of invasion. I will argue that causal accounts of invasion can achieve 
integration but not unification, and that this integration is the key to successful predictions.   
2.  A brief History of Invasive Species Research
 The recognition that species outside their native range can cause problems for indigenous species 
dates back to Darwin (Reichard & White,  2003), who realized that in each habitat species have friends and 
enemies which affect their population’s growth. Moreover, he saw that if a species was introduced to a new 
habitat without enemies, it could take over at the expense of the native species (ibid). After Darwin, there 
was little interest in the problems associated with invasive species, until the publication of Charles Elton’s 
book The Ecology of Invasions by Animals and Plants in 1958 (Davis 2006). Elton thought that invasive 
species were exceedingly problematic and his main aim was to provide a framework for the conservation of 
native communities (ibid). Of particular interest is Elton’s focus on the relative susceptibility of various 
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communities to invasion, as it eventually gave rise to one of the important conceptual frameworks of 
invasion research, ecosystem-level research. 
 The next landmark in invasion research was the first Biological Sciences Symposium held in 
Asilomar, California in 1964. The aim of the meeting was to understand the evolutionary significance of 
introducing species to a new habitat (ibid). The proceedings of the symposium, published as The Genetics 
of Colonizing Species (Baker and Stebbins 1965, in Davis 2006), reveals that the main focus of the meeting 
was on the invading species themselves and the traits that made them invasive (Davis 2006). This focus 
gave rise to another notable conceptual framework of invasion research, individual-level research.  
 Research continued largely separately within each conceptual framework until 1982, when the 
Scientific Committee on the Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) attempted to establish a single 
overarching framework for the discipline (Davis 2011). The committee identified three questions for 
invasion research: (1) What traits make species invasive? (2) Which communities are invaded? (3) How can 
we use the answers to (1) and (2) in order to manage invasions? The first two questions are a direct 
reflection of what had become the two main strands of invasive species research. Individual-level 
researchers were those who followed the approach set out by the Asilomar conference, and aimed to 
identify the traits of invaders as the causes of invasion. A notable example of this was Baker’s account of 
the traits that make up the ‘Ideal Weed’ (Baker 1974). On the other hand, ecosystem-level researchers 
followed the ecosystem-level focus that originated in Elton’s book. They sought the causes of successful 
invasions in the characteristics of invaded communities, arguing that irrespective of the invaders’ traits 
some communities can resist invasions whereas others cannot.  The factors that are most commonly referred 
to as affecting the susceptibility of a community to invasion are biodiversity (Levine & D'Antonio,  1999), 
biotic resistance (Shea & Chesson, 2002) and disturbance (Burke & Grime 1996, D’Antonio et al 1999), all 
of which are thought to be emergent properties of ecosystems. 
 Since the SCOPE publication, invasion research has made progress on the first two questions. 
However, there has been little -if any- progress made in answering the third question set out by SCOPE. 
Invasions remain exceedingly hard to predict and therefore difficult to avoid. What is troubling is that 
successful predictions elude scientists despite the advances that have been made in answering the first two 
questions. There is a reason for this. The results from studies and experiments tend to be specific to a 
particular system, and do not easily generalize to other systems. For example, traits that are thought to 
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promote invasiveness are context-specific (Pyšek and Richardson 2007). That is, a trait may predispose a 
plant to be invasive, yet only in a particular environment. Achieving a deep understanding of an invasion by 
a particular organism in a particular community, does not provide sufficient insights for predicting new 
invasions by similar organisms or invasions in similar communities. In fact, some invasion biologists 
believe that invasive species research is a science that is simply non predictive, much like earthquake 
science (Williamson 1999). Because of this,  they think that the best we can hope for as a goal for invasive 
biology, are better explanations for particular invasions. 
 Despite this pessimism, there have been efforts to generalize results,  mainly within taxa or 
geographical location. Most of this type of research has focused on plants and traits that universally make 
plants successful invaders. Notable examples include a series of papers on pine species (Rejmánek & 
Richardson,  1996) which found that compared to non-invasive species, invasive species had shorter 
juvenile periods, shorter intervals between seed crops and smaller seed mass. Other relatively general 
results come from the study of invasions on island ecosystems, as there is generally a higher rate of 
invasion in small habitat fragments and islands (Lonsdale, 1999). Yet these lower-level generalizations are 
quite limited. Most of them rely on idiosyncratic characteristics of a genus or geographical feature (Moles 
et al, 2012),  while in some cases the generalization does not even apply to all genera within a taxon 
(Valentine et al, 2007). 
 In addition to the continuation of the research within the two major frameworks endorsed by 
SCOPE, a number of other lines of research into biological invasions have emerged, most notably 
propagule pressure, resource fluctuation, the enemy release hypothesis, evolution of increased competitive 
ability of invaders and the impact of invasive species on ecosystems(Davis, Grime, & Thompson, 2000; 
Gurevitch et al., 2011; Moles et al., 2011). Scientists usually advocate for one of these lines of research, 
trying to show how it is better than others in explaining the most biological invasions. There is a tendency 
of a group of scientists to publish a succession of papers within one line of research, which has led to 
increased specialization and fragmentation of invasive species research. This has led some scientists to 
believe that due to the diversity of approaches “researchers may overlook that they are studying different 
pieces of the same invasibility puzzle and that they should combine their findings in order to get a complete 
picture” (Milbau et al 2009).
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 In light of this, there has been a recently renewed effort to integrate the various frameworks of 
invasive species research, in an attempt to bring together many of the approaches  in a fruitful way 
(Blackburn et al., 2011; Catford, Jansson, & Nilsson, 2009). One of the first attempts to integrate 
hypotheses for invasion and bring them under a unified general framework appeared in a landmark paper 
by Richardson & Pyšek (2006), whose aim was to “merge the concepts of species invasiveness and 
community invasibility”. They kept the main framework provided by SCOPE, which divided invasive 
species research into individual-level and ecosystem-level approaches to invasions, but incorporated the 
other hypotheses into this framework. Thus, the tens rule, residence time, taxonomic affiliation, enemy 
release, phenotypic plasticity and long-distance dispersal come under the umbrella of trait-level research, 
while community invasibility is joined with propagule pressure, biotic resistance and invasional meltdown 
in the ecosystem-level camp. Perhaps the most important advance, however, was that two hypotheses, the 
theory of seed plant invasiveness, developed by Marcel Rejmánek (Rejmánek,  1996; 2000; Rejmánek et 
al., 2005a; 2005b) and the theory of fluctuating resources (Davis et al 2000), were seen as theories that 
integrated the two lines of research identified by SCOPE, as each of them focuses on aspects of both 
invaders and communities, attempting to match particular traits which increase invasiveness with 
environmental conditions that facilitate invasion because of the particular invasive traits. This type of 
integration which focuses on pairing up traits and ecosystem characteristics, has since been adopted by a 
number of invasion biologists (Catford et al 2009, Davies & Sheley 2007, Shea & Chesson 2002). 
 Still,  this attempt at unification was still quite limited, as it was meant as a first sketch at 
unification, and as it was only meant to apply to plants. Since the publication of that paper, there have been 
many more attempts to provide invasion biology with a unified conceptual framework.  According to 
Gurevitch et al (2011) “Invasion biology is clearly ripe for conceptual synthesis and integration,  by 
subsuming these individual hypotheses in a broadly applicable conceptual framework grounded in basic 
principles of ecology and evolutionary biology”. A number of invasion biologists  have voiced the worry 
that the lack of integration between frameworks can inhibit progress in invasion research.  For example, 
Milbau and colleagues (2009) lament the scarcity of interdisciplinary collaboration, despite the “knowledge 
that combining studies encompassing different factors and scales usually largely improves our 
understanding of ecological processes”. Some researchers believe that within the last few years, progress 
has been made towards developing a general, synthetic conceptual framework for invasions (Gurevitch et al 
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2011). Nonetheless, many agree that there is a lot more work to be done if the integration is to be successful 
and yield fruitful results (Moles et al 2012).
3. Two Conceptual Frameworks
 Before turning to the analysis of unification and integration in invasion biology, I will give a more 
detailed analysis of the two conceptual frameworks outlined by SCOPE. This is necessary for gaining a 
detailed understanding of the background concepts and methodologies that drive different types of invasion 
research. It also serves to highlight the extent of diversity between different approaches to 
invasion. 
 An interesting fact about invasions is that the actual fraction of plant species that spread and 
impact native populations is rather small (about 1%) (Weidenhamer & Callaway, 2010). In fact,  most 
introductions of species to a community do not result in a successful invasion. Even successful invasions 
are usually not the first introduction of a particular species to a particular community (Sax and Brown 
2000). Facts like these have motivated some scientists to look for the causes of invasion in the ability of a 
community to resist invasion. As most invasions are resisted by native communities, these scientists believe 
that understanding the factors that affect resistance are the key to understanding invasions.
 I call this approach ecosystem-level research, as it gets its name and many of its concepts and 
methods from ecosystem ecology. The framework for ecosystem-level research was set by Elton, whose 
treatment of invasion focused on the effects it had on native communities (Davis 2006). Elton saw invaders 
as threats to native ecosystems (ibid). An invader destabilizes an ecosystem, resulting in the loss of native 
species. Because of the strong connections between members of an ecosystem, the loss of some species 
often results in the loss of more and more species. The result is often catastrophic. The job of the ecosystem 
ecologist or conservationist is to protect these native ecosystems and minimize any type of disturbance to 
them.
 There are numerous versions of ecosystem ecology, which view ecosystems slightly differently.  In 
the most extreme version, ecosystems are thought of as individual entities (Odenbaugh 2007). Here the 
differences between biotic and abiotic components of the system are broken down and the system is studied 
in terms of the flow of energy through it. For example, a food web is not conceptualized in terms of the 
organisms or populations that constitute it,  but in terms of the transfer of energy from one level of the web 
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to another. As energy moves up the levels of the web, it is lost. In a less extreme version, communities and 
ecosystems are thought of as wholes, with emergent properties that their parts do not posses (de Laplante & 
Odenbaugh 2006). These researchers think that it is meaningful to speak of properties such as “stability” 
that often occur in a system, which no individual part of the system possesses. At the same time, they may 
attribute causes of balanced states or equilibria to individuals or populations in the system.
 Ecosystem-level research incorporates many different methods for studying invasions. 
Biodiversity studies use models and experiments which attempt to find lower levels of invasion in species-
rich environments (Kennedy et al., 2002). There are also related experiments that focus on mechanisms of 
biotic resistance to invasion. These often take the form of experiments on island ecosystems, as continents 
typically have higher biodiversity than islands, because they are geographically and evolutionarily isolated 
(Jeshke et al. 2012). More recently, niche-based ecological models such as GARP and MAXENT are used 
to identify similarities between ecosystems in different parts of the world and use that to see whether they 
might be susceptible to the same invader (Sobek-Swant et al, 2012). 
 The second conceptual framework is individual-level research, and views invaders as individual 
competitors. Researchers look for the traits that make an organism a successful invader. Traits can 
contribute to invasion success by helping an organism to disperse,  by helping it to utilize resources and by 
conferring a competitive advantage so that it can become established and spread at the expense of native 
populations. As in the case of ecosystem-level research, individual-level research has links to general 
ecology, more specifically to population ecology. This sub-discipline studies the dynamics that emerge 
from interactions between organisms. One of the most important population interactions is the competition 
within and between populations for resources (Cooper, 1993). A successful invader can be thought of as a 
good competitor. For example, a plant which is allelopathic1  can outcompete other plants and successfully 
invade a new environment. In population ecology and individual-level research,  the main unit of analysis is 
the individual, as the focus is on characteristics which can potentially make an individual a successful 
invader.
 The majority of individual-level research takes the form of experiments which aim to find the 
causes an invaders competitive advantage over native species. For example, many experiments on plants 
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1  Allelopathy is the release of toxic compounds from a plant which results in the suppression of neighboring plant growth (Fitter 
2003). It confers a competitive advantage to the invader by inhibiting the reproduction and growth of native populations.  
identify traits that affect their growth and reproduction.  Increased relative growth gives plants a competitive 
advantage because they are faster to reach the stage of optimal resource uptake. This means that they are 
capable of utilizing a greater fraction of the limited resources, which gives them an added growth boost but 
also means that the native species’  growth is restricted. Faster reproduction rates increase competitive 
advantage simply because there are more invasive propagules than native ones. As a population, the 
invaders then utilize a greater fraction of resources. 
 Other experiments have focused on phenotypic plasticity and its relation to invasions. An 
organism exhibits phenotypic plasticity when it can express different phenotypes (i.e. when it can change 
its chemistry, physiology, development, morphology or behavior) depending on changes in the biotic and 
abiotic environment (Agrawal,  2001). Phenotypic plasticity has been thought to facilitate biological 
invasions in communities with more specialized native species (Hulme, 2007).  Individual-level research 
also utilizes a variety of models. These include growth models which examine the connection between 
density dependent growth and invasion (Taylor & Hastings, 2005), and individual based models, which aim 
to determine the potential spread of an invader in a new environment (Higgins, Richardson, & Cowling, 
1996). 
 In the next section I will address the notion of synthesis, used by invasion biologists and determine 
its connection to the notions of unification and integration, as they are used in philosophy of science. 
4. What is a Synthesis?
 The discussion in the previous section makes it clear that invasion biologists are calling out for 
synthesis in their discipline, as they believe that this will help the discipline move forwards. From a 
philosophical standpoint, there are two important issues which need examination. The first is to understand 
what exactly is meant by synthesis or integration and the second is to determine how exactly synthesis can 
help improve the discipline. 
 There are three terms used in invasion biology to denote union within the discipline: ‘synthesis’, 
‘unification’  and ‘integration’. In many cases these three terms are used interchangeably, yet there are some 
distinctions which should be made, which may prove useful in understanding the motivation and aims of 
the scientists. In the philosophical literature, unification is understood as the provision of a single 
theoretical framework for a field or a discipline (Mitchell, 2003).  It can be a ‘regulative ideal’ for theories 
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or explanations (Kitcher, 1999), as theories aim to unify by being able to explain a wide range of 
phenomena. Important unificatory accounts of scientific explanation include reductive accounts of science, 
where phenomena at one level are explained by mechanisms at a lower level (such as Nagel 1949),  the 
‘covering law model’ of scientific explanation, where phenomena were viewed as instances of general 
patterns explained by laws (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948), and Kitcher’s unification account where a 
unifying theory “advances our understanding of nature by showing us how to derive descriptions of many 
phenomena, using the same pattern of derivation again and again,  and in demonstrating this, it teaches us 
how to reduce the number of facts we have to accept as ultimate” (Kitcher, 1981). 
 In biology, the notion of integration started being used as an alternative to the traditional idea of 
reduction (Brigandt, 2013b). According to Plutynski (2013), who put together a list of various uses of 
integration in biology,  integration is usually attributed to particular research programs which aim to solve a 
particular problem and usually involves some form of collaboration between fields or research programs. It 
often takes the form of merging together results of particular studies, and “‘integrative explanations are 
frequently local, that is, they often involve establishment of epistemic and ontological connections between 
two specific areas of research” (p.  468). The main contrast to unification is that integration is usually 
attributed to particular research programs which aim to solve a particular problem, whereas unification is 
associated with large scale explanations,  theories and models. This focus on problem-solving is what brings 
together researchers, methods and materials from different disciplines and sub-disciplines, and often results 
in the creation a ‘meta-methodology’ for solving the particular problem (Plutynski, 2013, O’Malley, 2013). 
 Despite the alleged lack of collaboration in invasion biology (Milbau et al. 2009),  integration is 
already present.  For example, scientists have attempted to integrate results from studies of invaders’ traits 
with results from studies of invasibility of communities (such as Richardson and Pyšek 2006). The idea 
driving the integration is that pairing up particular traits which are advantageous with environments that 
have certain characteristics will help us identify the types traits and communities that have a higher risk of 
invasion. The problem with this method is that it is considered to have been unsuccessful so far.  The few 
studies and meta-analyses that have attempted this sort of integration have usually produced long lists of 
traits and characteristics that have been previously associated with invasions, together with 
recommendations that both traits and community characteristics should be taken into account in future 
research. 
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 For example,  the paper by Richardson and Pyšek (2006) is titled “Plant invasions: merging the 
concepts of species invasiveness and community invasibility”. However, the paper is divided into fourteen 
sections, with the majority of those sections providing an overview of recent research in different 
approaches to invasion. There are sections on taxonomic patterns, the naturalization hypothesis, phenotypic 
plasticity, long distance dispersal, plant-seed invasiveness, propagule pressure, diversity, fluctuating 
resources and mutualisms. The merger is shown in a figure which classifies the various approaches into one 
schema (shown in figure 6.1). 
 The idea is that the theory of seed plant invasiveness and the theory of fluctuating sources are the 
two theories which successfully merge the two frameworks. Seed plant invasiveness merges particular traits 
with particular environments in which they are likely to invade. The general idea is that “widespread 
species are more likely to be dispersed because they occur in more locations and have higher chances to be 
dispersed, and they are more likely to be adapted to wider range of conditions” (ibid p. 419). However, 
invasibility does not really seem to be part of the process. Environments which have already been invaded 
are included in the model, yet this does not make any mention to their initial invasibility. There is also 
mention of disturbed habitats, yet it is not clear how they factor into the model. In addition, there are many 
traits thats have been identified as potentially causing invasiveness, including small seed mass, small size, 
large size, flowering early, flowering late, non-dormancy or long dormancy.
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Figure 6.1. Merger of invasion studies (reprinted from Richardson and Pyšek 2006)
  
 The case for fluctuating resources is more promising. The idea is that “invading species must have 
access to available resources, e.g. light, nutrients, and water, and that an invading species will be more 
successful at invading a community if it does not encounter intense competition for these resources from 
resident species.” (ibid p. 423). Again, however, the generalizability of the framework is limited,  as there 
are many different resources available in an environment, and many different resources that an invader may 
need. There are also many  different cycles of resource fluctuation, which make the process even more 
indeterminate. In short, as it stands, this theory is still at an early stage and cannot do much more than 
prove a long list of potential environments which could be paired up to potential invaders at some stages of 
the resource cycles. 
 In response, there has been an increase calls for unification in invasion biology, rather than 
integration. For example, Gurevitch et al. (2011) argue that the way forward is to provide a general, 
synthetic conceptual framework for invasion biology. They define conceptual frameworks as theoretical 
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III How many invaders? The tens rule
The tens rule (originally the ten-ten rule;
Williamson and Brown, 1986) was proposed
as a quantitative estimate of the proportion of
introduced species that become pests
(Williamson, 1993; Williamson and Fitter,
1996). It is a probabilistic ssessm nt of the
proportion of species that reach particular
stages in the invasion process. It predicts that
10% of imported species escape to become
casual, 10% of casuals become naturalized
(sensu Richardson et al., 2000b), and 10% of
naturalized species become pests (sensu
Pyšek et al., 2004b). The rule was derived
from European plant data but the general
principle that successful invasions re rar
(the rule predicts that alien pests comprise
very r ughly only 1% of the introduced
species found casual) holds for other regions
and across many taxa of plants and animals
(Williamson, 1996). The tens rule received
considerable reaction, but has also been
wid ly misin erpret d, mostly when applied
directly to numbers of ‘invasive’ species. The
reaso ably constant p op rtion of alien taxa
that invade across a wide range of systems is,
at least partly, a result of the similar residence
times (see section IV) of species in different
alien floras (Rejmánek et al., 2005b). In other
words, the tens rule is largely an artifact of
the particular stage of invasions worldwide
and this will change over time (Figure 2).
Despite the wide limits, the many excep-
tions (Williams , 2000), a d the caveats
mentioned above, the tens rule is a useful
generalization that can be used as a
Figure 1 Continued
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entities which “encompass the assumptions, laws and ideas that underlie the construction of a broad 
concept”.  The point of such a framework is to generate new hypotheses, evaluate existing ones and lead to 
the development of models and experiments. Importantly, frameworks are unificatory, insofar as they 
“define connections and elements of knowledge in a general area of inquiry, giving coherence and direction 
to the study of empirical problems”. 
 According to Gurevitch and colleagues, a successful conceptual framework for invasion biology 
should first and foremost incorporate invasion research into the general context of evolution and ecology. In 
other words, invasion research should not be conducted in isolation from general biology, because the 
processes that give rise to invasions, such as population interactions (competition, predation), ecosystem 
processes, community and landscape ecology, and demographic factors, are all aspects of general biology. 
In addition,  they believe that the conceptual framework should take into account time lags and effects of 
scale: “a unified approach must in some way accommodate a consideration of how spatial and temporal 
heterogeneity facilitate invasion, and the role of stochastic variation in space and time”. Finally, they 
explicitly state that the framework should focus on both individual and ecosystem-level processes (as 
defined by SCOPE), by facilitating explanations of “the success of invasives relative to natives in the novel 
environment,  the success of invasives in the novel environment contrasted with their home environment 
and the success of invasive species or populations relative to non-invasive aliens in the novel 
environment”.  
 In the next section I will outline three examples of synthesis in invasion biology. In my analysis, I 
will use the term synthesis as a neutral term, to denote any account that the scientists themselves present as 
synthetic. I will argue that only one of the three kinds of synthesis is an example of unification.  
5. Three Kinds of Synthesis 
 Since the SCOPE publication and the later landmark paper by Richardson & Pyšek (2006), there 
have been many attempts to integrate results of invasion studies in a general framework, with the hope of 
finding the key to predicting invasions.  These typically take the form of theoretical or meta-analytic articles 
attempting to define a synthetic conceptual framework for invasion biology. In this section, I will take a 
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closer look at three different attempts to provide a synthetic framework.2 The first synthesis merges aspects 
of trait-level, ecosystem-level research and other other causes and processes of invasion (merger synthesis). 
In this sense, it can be seen as a continuation of the type of research outlined by SCOPE. The other two 
syntheses are different. There are some scientists who believe that the SCOPE framework is not the right 
way to synthesize results (Romanuk et al., 2009). In light of this, some invasion biologists have set out to 
construct integrative or synthetic frameworks that might fare better in questions of invasion prediction and 
management. The second framework synthesizes invasions hierarchically (hierarchical synthesis), while the 
third focuses on the process of invasions instead of their potential causes (process synthesis).  
5.1. The merger synthesis.  
 After spelling out their notion of a conceptual framework for invasion biology, outlined in the 
previous section,  Gurevitch and colleagues (2011) put forward their own synthetic framework, which 
satisfies the conditions they set out. They call their approach a ‘Synthetic meta-framework’ (SIM), as it 
synthesizes pre-existing conceptual frameworks. The SIM is constructed by first identifying the causes and 
process of invasions and then determining the causal interactions between them (see Figure 6.2). Any 
specific invasion, invasion hypothesis and prediction about invasion will be explained by some part of the 
SIM, not all of it.  For example, the authors consider a hypothetical case where the invasion is caused by 
enemy escape. In this example, a invading plant is subject to reduced predation on its seeds and seedlings 
(population interactions). This leads to an increase in survival at particular life history stages (invader 
demography), which can then result in rapid population increase. Finally, “if conditions are favourable for 
establishment beyond the extent of the local population, and means exist for dispersal, this may ultimately 
lead to range expansion and in turn alter landscape characteristics”. This invasion is explained by invoking 
a particular set 5 causes/processes out of the 17 possible ones. 
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2 These are by no means the only papers which provide synthetic frameworks for invasion biology. Yet I have chosen to focus on them 
because they are representatives of the three most common types of synthesis. The analysis of each type of synthesis can also be 
applied to other examples of synthetic frameworks. 
Figure 6.2. The SIM (reprinted from Gurevitch et al. 2011)
 According to the authors, the important point is the SIM provides a more in-depth understanding 
of invasions.  For example, ‘enemy release’  is a recognized cause of invasion, yet the authors believe that it 
is a black box explanation. With the SIM, the box can be opened and broken down, so that a more accurate 
picture of the invasion emerges. Moreover, the SIM is a flexible framework which can be used in many 
different ways to illuminate biological invasions.  One of the most important advantages is that it allows for 
the comparison of invasions.  More specifically, it can be used to “compare different specific invasions in a 
particular system, or general cases of invasion processes in different systems (e.g. terrestrial plant 
communities and invasions by freshwater invertebrates) to highlight their essential similarities and 
differences” (p. 141). A second advantage is that it allows for the formulation of new hypotheses, as it 
facilitates the combination of processes and causes and the discovery of new connections between them. 
 The SIM is considered to be synthetic in two ways. First,  because it merges a number of causes 
and processes into a single framework. For example, ‘organism traits’ and ‘evolutionary processes’ were 
traditionally thought of as having their own distinct frameworks, yet here they appear together, with causal 
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arrows between them. The second reason is that the framework also incorporates causes and processes from 
general ecology and evolution,  such as ‘evolutionary change’ and ‘rapid population increase’.  According to 
the authors,  the SIM is a reconceptualization of invasion biology “in terms of basic ecology and evolution, 
rather than in terms of special processes and factors unique to invasion biology”. 
 This framework aims to be synthetic in the top-down unification sense, outlined in the previous 
section. The focus on ‘reconceptualization’ of invasion biology and attempting to subsume individual 
instances of invasions under the general theoretical framework, both point to this. However, before we 
accept this as a true synthesis,  we should look more closely at the SIM and the way in which it is used to 
explain invasions. 
 The SIM is a merger of a number of different hypotheses, such as organism traits, demography, 
abiotic factors, ecosystem processes and so on. Some of the hypotheses come from trait-level research, 
others come from ecosystem-level research, while other still come from different areas of invasion 
research. Still, the result is a complex framework which reads like a list of most of the known causes of 
invasion. Consider again the example of enemy release mentioned above.  Despite the claims of the authors, 
there are numerous existing studies which explain ‘enemy release’ in great detail. For example, (Bever, 
2003) provides an extensive analysis of positive and negative feedback in plant communities which gives 
precise a explanation necessary for different types of feedback to occur. This study is firmly situated within 
the competition framework as it uses an amended version of the Lotka-Volterra model to determine the 
effects of competition.  At the same time, there are numerous biogeographical studies (which fall in the 
ecosystem-level camp), which show that soil biota generally have more positive effects on invaders than on 
native species (Klironomos 2002). 
 What additional information does the SIM provide? The SIM does make the case that population 
interactions, demographical factors, population increase, range expansion and the altered community 
landscape must be taken into account.  Yet these are factors which are already known to affect invasions, as 
they appear in studies like the ones of Bever (2003) and Klironomos (2002). In other words, the SIM 
simply links together factors which potentially cause invasions. 
 However, linking together is an integrative rather than a unificatory process. In order to count as a 
true unificatory explanation, a theory must provide “one (or more generally, a few) pattern(s) of argument 
which can be used in the derivation of a large number of sentences which we accept” (Kitcher 1981). The 
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SIM cannot be said give a pattern of argument which reduces the number of sentences which we accept, 
because it is simply provides disjunctive set of potential causes of invasions. Moreover, the SIM does not 
explain why or how a particular subset causes an invasion, nor does it give us a general pattern of invasion. 
Therefore, a better way to understand this synthesis is as an example of integration.  
5.2. The hierarchical synthesis 
 The next approach is the hierarchical synthesis which attempts to unify invasions under a theory 
based on scale. As stated above, invasions and methods of studying them are extremely diverse. Ann 
Milbau and colleagues (2009) identified no less than six factors distinguishing invasibility studies. Invasion 
studies can differ in terms of scale (micro, local, regional,  continental), factors studied (abiotic or biotic), 
stage of invasion (colonization, establishment, spread),  measure of success (e.g. germination of seeds, alien 
species richness,  percentage cover of a particular introduced species), status of invader (native versus non-
native) and applicability (explaining a case study versus looking for generalizations).  This diversity makes 
the creation of a synthetic framework quite difficult. However, the authors identified scale as being more 
important than the other factors, but also as a factor which has the potential to unify all the others in a 
single hierarchical framework. 
 The authors saw correlations between particular types of factors studied and stages of invasion 
with particular measures of scale. In light of this, created a hierarchical framework which determines the 
invasibility of a particular environment.  In this framework, “factors operating at a smaller spatial scale are 
subordinate to factors operating at a larger scale, and only if conditions at higher levels are satisfied, factors 
at a more local scale may become significant”. In other words, if a species is introduced to a new area, the 
most important barrier to its survival are the climatic conditions. If they are favorable,  then other, smaller 
scale factors such as topography,  “including topography-related effects on climate,  such as rain shadows 
and temperature changes with elevation”,  start to become important. Next, a species may be restricted by 
local factors such as soil type or biotic interactions, and so on. 
 At the same time, however,  the smaller-scale factors are “usually essential for precise predictions 
at more local scales”. In other words,  depending on the accuracy of the predictions required, a different 
level of the scale will be applicable. “If one is interested in the potential spread of a species at the landscape 
scale, only data on climate,  topography, land cover and land use are needed. However, if one is interested in 
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the invasibility of a particular site, both factors affecting invasibility at site-scale and at all higher scale 
domains should be considered.” In this way, pre-existing invasion studies can be categorized depending on 
the scale of the study, either because they explicitly mention the scale at which they operate, or indirectly, 
by inferring the scale from other factors,  such as the type of factors studied, the measure of success or the 
intended applicability of the study. 
Figure 3. The hierarchical framework (reprinted from Milbau et al. 2009)
 
 For example, the herbaceous summer-annual species Impatiens glandulifera is native to the 
Himalayas and is now present across Europe and North America.  It has been studied extensively and 
research has shown that it is sensitive to frost.  The hierarchical framework can therefore show that 
“regional climate data can be used to identify countries or regions where the species can potentially 
invade” (ibid p. 947). Also, “in regions where the climatic requirements are met, one can indicate 
waterways as the most vulnerable areas for invasion, since I. glandulifera is closely confined to riparian 
habitats” (ibid). Finally, “Because there is a strong positive correlation between total plant biomass of I. 
glandulifera and irradiance (Andrews et al. 2005), micro-climatic variables may be used to predict its 
invasion success at the smallest spatial scale” (ibid). 
 The new framework is synthetic, because it incorporates factors already mentioned in other 
invasion studies,  yet re-conceives of invasions in a new, hierarchical manner. This type of synthesis differs 
possibilities of an established non-native species to
invade an adja ent nature reserve, it i already clear
from the local occurrence of that species that the
climate, topography, etc. are within the limits for that
species. In that case, one need only focus on the local
factors determining invasibility.
Although it is not the aim of this paper to go into
technical details about how to combine different
factors, we would like to refer briefly to two methods
that are currently used for hierarchical analyses. The
first one is the use of Artificial Neural Networks
(ANN). The advantages and disadvantages of using
ANNs for characterising species distributions have
been discussed in detail by Hilbert and Ostendorf
(2001) and Pearson et al. (2002) and a worked
example is given in Pearson et al. (2004). A second
method is the implementation of hierarchical general-
ized linear models (HGLMs) within a Bayesian
framework, which allows simultaneous consideration
of the influence of abiotic variables on species
distributions at multiple spatial scales, and the
influence of local spatial autocorrelation (Diez and
Pulliam 2007). Several detailed descriptions of
building hierarchical linear models can be found in
the recent literature (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002;
Gelman and Hill 2007; McMahon and Diez 2007).
Applications of the framework
A first application of the framework is predicting the
invasibility of an environment (from continental to
micro-scale) towards a single species, for instance to
identify high-risk regions for future invasion of a
known invasive species (see also Table 4). To this
end, data are required on what promotes or resists the
establish ent and growth of that particular species,
from the largest spatial scale down to the scale
domain at which prediction is needed. The frame-
work can then be used for identifying which factors
should be considered at each of the different spatial
scales and for filtering out areas with no or low
invasibility towards that species. If a species is
completely excluded by a filter higher up, one need
not study filters lower down.
A second application is to improve our general
understanding of mechanisms that determine invasi-
bility (Davis 2005). Whereas invasibility can be
species specific (see Table 4), there are also mech-
anisms that apply to almost every introduced species
(e.g., increased performance if the local nutrient
availability increases). One could make an overview
(based on Table 3) of these general mechanisms with
particular attention to the spatial scale, which is
X
X
X
XX
Regional scale
Local scale
Suitable climate
Suitable topography
Invasible areaX
Suitable land cover
Suitable land use
X Invasible area
Suitable soil type
Suitable disturbances
Suitable biotic interactions
Fig. 1 Illustration of the application of the hierarchical
framework. In the left diagram, at regional scale, areas with
a suitable climate, suitable topography, suitable land cover, and
suitable land use are indicated. Only where the conditions of all
four factors are suitable, the area is considered invasible
towards the target species. If predictions at a finer resolution
are required, the areas that are invasible at regional scale
should be studied further, now considering factors important at
smaller spatial scales. The right diagram shows that at local
scale two out of the nine areas are potentially invasible and that
soil type, disturbances and biotic interactions now play a
determining role. The right diagram can be further downscaled
to micro-scale level
946 A. Milbau et al.
123
128
from the merger synthesis in that it is a departure from the framework set out by SCOPE. It does not aim to 
merge pre-existing frameworks, but identifies one factor of invasions (scale) and builds a framework based 
on that. At first glance, this framework seems more unificatory than the merger framework, as it aims to 
unify all invasions by classifying them in terms of scale. Re-conceptualizing in terms of scale seems like a 
top-down approach,  which would count as unification instead of mere integration. The unificatory power of 
the framework is that the reconceptualization in terms of scale adds to the explanatory power of the 
framework. In other words, we understand more about invasions by classifying them in terms of scale: we 
learn that different factors operate at different levels of scale. 
 However, I think that this interpretation of the framework is slightly overstated. While scale is 
used to classify particular invasions, the authors still rely on the factors operating within each scale to 
explain and predict invasions. In other words, scale is used as an organizing concept, yet the each invasion 
is explained by the causes operating at a particular scale. For example, figure 2 shows that at a regional 
scale, invasions can be caused by climatic and topographical factors, whereas at the local scale they can be 
caused by soil type, disturbances and social interactions. Yet this classification is too coarse-grained to 
explain a particular invasion or predict an invasion in the future. In order to do that, a scientist must identify 
exactly which factor combination of factors caused an invasion. For example, if a scientist is interested in 
explaining local invasion, it is not sufficient to show that the invasion is local and not regional.  She must 
identify whether the invasion is caused by suitable soil type, a particular kind of disturbance, particular soil 
interactions or some combination of these factors.  In other words,  even if the reconceptualization in terms 
of scale does increase our general understanding of invasions, we must still revert to examining the factors 
at each scale in order to truly understand and be able to predict particular invasions.  
 The ultimate reliance on the factors which cause an invasion for explanation and prediction is why 
this framework should be understood as integrative rather than unificatory.  Moreover, in order to be 
unificatory, based on my previous definition of unification, the framework should reduce the number of 
factors which explain invasions. However, this framework adds the factor of scale to the framework 
without reducing the number of other factors. Thus, even though the addition of scale might add something 
to our overall understanding of invasions, it does so by creating an additional factor, yet it does not subtract 
any of the pre-existing factors. 
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5.3 The process synthesis 
 The third synthesis is quite different to the previous two syntheses, in that it focuses on the process 
by which organisms invade ecosystems,  instead of the causes for invasion.  In other words, the point is not 
to determine why a particular organism becomes and invader but to explain how it does so. In the 
framework proposed by Blackburn et al. (2011), invasion is a process that can be divided into a series of 
stages (transport, introduction, establishment and spread) with barriers  at each stage (geographical, 
captivity/cultivation,  survival, reproduction, dispersal and environmental) that need to be overcome for a 
species or population to pass on to the next stage see figure 4. If, on the other hand, an invader is stopped 
by a barrier at any stage, then the invasion is considered a failure. For example, the budgerigar 
Melopsittacus undulatus, an Australian native is considered an introduced species (in the UK), as there are 
individuals released into the wild (i.e. outside of captivity or cultivation),  which are nonetheless incapable 
of surviving for a significant period. In this framework the budgerigar has passed the transport and 
introduction stages, overcoming the geography barrier (by traveling to the UK, with some help from 
humans) and the captivity barrier (by outsmarting said humans and escaping captivity) and is about to enter 
the the establishment stage.  Unless the population overcomes the survival and reproduction barriers (by 
surviving long enough to reproduce in sufficient numbers), it will not pass into the next stage and the 
invasion will fail. 
 This framework considered to be synthetic because it merges two previous frameworks. According 
to the authors, the two main frameworks of invasion biology are the ‘Richardson framework’, where 
invasions are seen as a “series of barriers that a species negotiates to become either naturalised or invasive” 
and the ‘Williamson framework’, which views invasions as “a series of stages that a species must pass 
through on the pathway from native to invasive alien”. The authors also state that the former framework is 
adopted by plant ecologists while the latter is favored by animal ecologists. Blackburn et al. create an 
overarching framework which combines elements of both organism-focused stages and ecosystem-focused 
barriers.  The main advantage of this framework, according to its proponents, is that all other invasion 
studies can be accommodated within it, even if they do not focus explicitly on a particular stage of the 
invasion process. This is because “different parts of this framework emphasize views of invasions that 
focus on individual,  population, process, or species”. For example, a study that identifies small seed size as 
a cause of plant invasiveness would be placed at the transport stage of invasion, as small seed size is a trait 
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that enables plants to disperse over wide areas (usually with the aid of wind or birds). The framework also 
affords an organized way to incorporate the various terms by which invasive species are known, as “species 
are referred to by different terms in the terminology depending on where in the invasion process they have 
reached”. 
Figure 4. The unified framework (reprinted from (Blackburn et al., 2011))
 
 Unlike the two previous synthetic frameworks, it seems that this framework is truly unificatory.  It 
re-conceptualizes invasions in terms of their process rather than their causes. In fact, it does more than that, 
as it takes two already general frameworks and creates an overarching framework which combines them. 
Yet it does not simply add causal factors to an overarching conceptual framework, as it does not aim to 
explain particular invasions in terms of their causes. Factors that might explain a particular invasion, such 
as small seed size are not used to explain a particular invasion, but are used to identify the stage of the 
invasion. This means that these factors, are only used to classify invasions, but not used to explain them. In 
other words, when a study of a particular invasion identifies the factors that caused it, this framework uses 
the factors as proxies to determine what stage the invasion is at and uses those, in turn, to determine the 
type of barrier it will have to overcome next. 
cases of biological invasions, such as managed relocation
(assisted colonisation) or biological control.
The proposed unified framework is an advance on the
previous frameworks in invasion biology for at least nine
reasons.
Reason 1: combination of stages and barriers
The unified framework recognises that the invasion pro-
cess can be divided into a series of stages and that, in each
stage, there are barriers that need to be overcome for a
species or population to pass on to the next stage. Although
this structure was implicit in both the Richardson and
Williamson frameworks, and recognised in some previous
treatments of invasions (e.g. [2,37]), the unified framework
makes explicit t at the stages are separated by b rriers,
and how.
Reason 2: the barrier of captivity or cultivation
The unified framework identifies an additional barrier to
invasion after the geographical barrier, which explicitly
recognises that a species can be prevented from becoming
an invader by a human-imposed barrier. Many animal
and plant species exist in captivity and/or cultivation
beyond the limits of their native ranges, but fail to cross
the physical barriers of a fence or hedge. This barrier is
probably lower for species in cultivation than for those in
captivity. The unified framework also includes an arrow
(B3) from Geography to Survival to recognise the fact
that this barrier is skipped by many aliens, especially
plants, fungi, protists, invertebrates, smaller fish and
other taxa, which are introduced unintentionally by
humans directly into the new environment. Indeed, there
is a variety of mechanisms and routes by which alien
species breach the barriers of Geography and Captivity
[34,38].
Reason 3: a barrier to survival
The environmental barrier in Richardson’s framework is
replaced with a Survival barrier in the unified framework,
which together with the Reproduction barrier lies within
the establishmen stage. This clarifies that an introd ced
population can fail to establish because individuals in the
population either fail to survive, or survive but fail to
reproduce. Failure to establish can result from factors
associated with the species (e.g. reproductive rate or spe-
cialism), the location (e.g. presence of enemies or mutual-
ists), apparently stochastic features of the individual
introduction event (especially propagule pressure) or, of-
ten, their interaction (e.g. species ! location, such as
climate matching); these factors can act on survival or
reproduction, or both. This clarifies that the failure of
individuals or populations to survive is not just a conse-
quence of the environment, and indeed the failure of a
population of a given species to establish at a given location
does not preclude the possibility that a subsequent intro-
duction of the same species at that location will succeed
(e.g. starlings in New York [39] or pines in the South
African fynbos [40]).
Reason 4: establishment is a population process
Individuals in an introduced population might be able to
survive and to reproduce in the exotic environment, but the
population can still fail to establish because the long-term
population growth rate is negative (geometric mean r < 0).
The unified framework includes an arrow from Reproduc-
tion to Survival in recognition of the fact that several cycles
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Figure 1. The proposed unified framework for biological invasions. The proposed framework recognises that the invasion process can be divided into a series of stages,
that in each stage there are barriers that need to be overcome for a species or population to pass on to the next stage, that species are referred to by different terms in the
terminology depending on where in the invasion process they have reached, and that different management interventions apply at different stages. Different parts of this
framework emphasise views of invasions that focus on individual, population, process, or species. The unfilled block arrows describe the movement of species along the
invasion framework with respect to the barriers, and the alphanumeric codes associated with the arrows relate to the categorisation of species with respect to the invasion
pathway given in Table 1 (main text).
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 I will illustrate this point by contrasting it to the hierarchical synthesis mentioned above.  The 
hierarchical synthesis aimed at both classification and explanation of particular invasions,  as it identifies 
the scale of a particular invasion and the factors which explain the invasion at that scale. This means that it 
ultimately relies on the causes of the invasion to explain it. In contrast, the process synthesis does not aim 
to explain particular invasions, but is primarily classificatory. The classification is top-down, as it relies on 
the general overarching framework and situates a particular invasion within it. It does not rely on lower-
level causes to explain the invasion. In this sense is it truly unificatory and not simply integrative. 
 Yet this framework is not merely classificatory. It does increase our understanding of invasions, 
albeit not in terms of their causes. That is, it does not explain why an invader might pass on to the next 
stage,  but explains how a barrier can be overcome.  For example, the framework does not aim to identify the 
reason why the budgerigar Melopsittacus undulatus might progress to the establishment stage,  but does 
explain the type of barrier which needs to be overcome and how the organism can overcome it. Moreover, 
the framework is explanatory in the sense that it identifies the strategy for managing invasions at each 
stage.  In the case of Melopsittacus undulatus, which is about to enter the establishment stage, this means 
that it is already too late to use the prevention strategy to manage the invasion, yet it is still possible to aim 
for complete eradication. The invasion is not already at the stage where the only possible management is 
containment. 
 This leads to another interesting difference between this synthesis and the previous two syntheses. 
In addition to explanation of invasions, the first two syntheses aim at the prediction of future invasions. In 
contrast,  the the authors of the process synthesis seem to substitute talk of prediction with management. I 
surmise this from the fact that there is absolutely no mention of prediction in the paper,  whereas there is a 
whole section devoted to managing invasions. Even though it might be possible to make predictions using 
the process synthesis,  it seems that the authors are not interested in pointing them out. I suspect that this is 
largely because these types of predictions might not be particularly interesting. For instance, one could 
predict what the next stage of the invasion will be if a barrier is overcome, yet this sort of prediction is not 
very informative.  If the framework gave us the tools to predict whether or not the invasion will pass onto 
the next stage or not, that would a very useful kind of prediction,  one which the authors would presumably 
take care to point out.
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 In contrast,  the previous two syntheses are supposed to be used to make more successful 
predictions of invasions.  For example, Gurevitch et al. (2011) state that without an “adequate conceptual 
framework” such as the SIM “important aspects of invasion biology can be overlooked and predictions can 
be incomplete, ambiguous, inaccurate or misleading.” (p.417). In the case of Milbau et al (2009) the 
importance of predictions is even more clearly stated. They frame the problem of invasion in terms of 
predictability and offer their framework as a solution to that problem: “Although the complexity of natural 
systems presents fundamental limits to predictions, we think this framework can provide a useful tool for 
the identification of areas of risk for biological invasions” (p. 491). 
 In fact, it is quite uncommon to find a paper which does not focus on predicting invasions. It 
seems that the received view of science in invasion biology is that unified theories give better explanations 
of more phenomena and better predictions of the same phenomena. I will examine this view and its 
implications for invasion biology in the next section. 
6. Symmetry Between Explanation and Prediction?
 The idea that unified theories have both explanatory and predictive power, is not a new one. It was 
the received view of science for much of the 20th century, adopted by scientists and philosophers alike 
(Salmon, 2006). The view was presented clearly in Hempel and Oppenheim’s account of scientific 
explanation and named the thesis of ‘symmetry between explanation and prediction’ (Hempel & 
Oppenheim, 1948). On their view prediction and explanation have the same logical structure. In both cases, 
an explanation is composed of an explanandum (that which is being explained) and an explanans (that 
which is explaining the explanandum). The explanans is composed of laws and antecedent conditions, 
which logically entail the explanandum. If the explanandum takes place before the explanation has 
occurred, it is an explanation, whereas if it takes place after the explanation has occurred, it is a prediction. 
For example, an explanans could be made up of the laws of planetary motion, and auxiliary conditions 
concerning the location of two planets at a particular point in time. These could be used to explain an 
eclipse (explanandum) which has already occurred, or predict an eclipse in the future. According to Hempel 
and Oppenheim, an explanation is not fully adequate unless it could have served as the basis of a prediction 
of the phenomenon in question (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). 
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 Many invasion biologists also take up the idea of symmetry between explanation and prediction. 
Given the progress that has been made in the explanation of particular invasions, they thought it only 
natural that good predictions would follow (Lodge, 1993). The way to go about making better predictions 
was to look for more general and more unified explanations. For example, Moles et al. (2012) state that 
better predictions will come about by incorporating different types of information. By so doing, they “hope 
that it will be possible to cut through the apparent idiosyncrasies and predict the circumstances under which 
species and ecosystems will respond in different ways.” (p. 120). In other words, they think that 
generalizing processes and results will help identify the general causes of invasions, which will increase the 
understanding of invasions and yield better predictions. This, they believe, will represent “a major 
advance” in invasion biology (ibid). 
 Nonetheless, there are reasons to think that, at least in invasion biology, more unified explanations 
will not yield better predictions. While it is too early to tell whether the synthetic frameworks presented in 
the previous section will yield successful predictions, I expect that they will not fare any better than 
previous frameworks. The crux of the problem for invasion biology, is that invasions themselves are 
extremely heterogeneous. More specifically, the causes of invasions are extremely heterogeneous. For 
instance, just within plant taxa, causes of invasion include climate, topography, land cover, land use, soil 
type, disturbance, resources, micro-climate, mutualism, competition, facilitation and pathogens (Milbau et 
al. 2009).  According to Romanuk et al (2009), the Global Invasive Species Database (http://www.issg.org) 
suggests that there are no natural rules that govern the processes of invasion, which have any real predictive 
value (Bright 1998 in Romanuk et al 2009). This is because any “generalizations about invaders over too 
wide a taxonomic range, such as all species, or all insects,  or all angiosperms, invariably (lead to) too many 
exceptions to be useful”  (Williamson 1996 in Romanuk et al 2009).
 From a philosophical standpoint, the invasion biologists’ adherence to the symmetry thesis seems 
a bit puzzling. While Hempel and Oppenheim’s view of scientific explanation gained some popularity it 
then came under heavy attack. The general consensus seems to be that the covering law model of 
explanation as a whole, is not an adequate account of scientific explanation (cite Kitcher, Strevens, 
Scheffler, Scriven). Much of the criticism came in the form of counterexamples, many of which have now 
become famous in their own right (Salmon 1992). The counterexamples were meant to show that there are 
cases of explanations which cannot be construed as predictions and cases where a successful prediction 
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cannot be constructed as an explanation. For example, we can explain why a patient who suffers from 
paresis, given that they had syphilis, yet we cannot predict that a person suffering from syphilis will 
develop paresis (as syphilis is a precondition for paresis, yet only a small fraction of those afflicted with 
syphilis develop paresis) (Scriven,  in (Salmon 1999)). On the other hand, the fall in a barometer predicts a 
storm, yet it cannot count as an explanation of the storm (ibid). 
 It is important to note that the invasion biologists mentioned above are do not necessarily espouse 
the symmetry thesis per se. That is, I do not think that they view explanation and prediction as symmetrical, 
in the Hempelian sense. Rather, the view is that better and larger scale explanations will yield better 
predictions. This view is implied by the symmetry thesis, yet it does not constitute the symmetry thesis. 
Moreover, the examples which are used to argue against the symmetry thesis cannot be used as arguments 
against the view that there is some relationship between explanation and prediction, albeit not one of 
symmetry. 
 The point of this discussion is to show that focusing on causes will not yield unification in 
invasion biology. On the other hand,  when unification is achieved, as in the case of the process synthesis, 
this happens at the expense of prediction. This shows that, at the very least, the idea that larger scale 
explanations are necessary for more successful prediction should be abandoned. Nonetheless, this does not 
mean that any hope of successful predictions should also be abandoned. In the next section I will show that 
integration and mid-level generalizations are possible and have been shown to yield successful predictions. 
7. The value of Integration and Mid-level Generalizations
 Given the recent philosophical literature on the importance and value of integration, there is good 
reason to investigate the role of integration in invasion biology. In the philosophical literature, integration is 
seen as a an acceptable middle ground between unificatory but reductionist accounts of science and 
accounts of the disunity of science, such as Dupré (1993) (Brigandt 2013). Moreover, the fact that 
integration is problem-oriented instead of theory oriented is seen as a value which unification does not 
share (Plutynski 2013). 
 At a theoretical level,  we have good reason to expect integration in the field of invasion biology, as 
it exhibits many of the hallmarks of integration cited by Plutynski (2013). For many years, invasion biology 
was also thought of as a problem-oriented field, as the focus of invasion studies were the prediction and 
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management of invasions. Also,  even though the problem of biological invasions is global,  invasions are 
often studied locally. For example, even large scale ecological niche models such as GARP and MAXENT, 
which are sometimes used to predict invasions, rely on local environmental variables such as temperature 
and precipitation (Sobek-Swant et al. 2012). With a few exceptions, invasion research usually focuses on 
identifying the mechanism of an invasion,  such as the factors which increase the competitiveness of the 
invader or the invasibility of the community. There is also a history of collaboration in the field, with 
researchers from different backgrounds contributing data, methodology and techniques particular studies of 
invasion. Even though some invasion biologists lament the fact that there is little collaboration in the field 
(Milbau et al. 2009, Davis et al.  2001),  there are numerous examples of collaborative projects in invasion 
biology (Gurevitch et al 2011 Rejmánek & Richardson 1996; Richardson & Rejmánek 2004; Richardson 
and Pysĕk 2006; Milbau et al. 2009; Moles et al. 2012). 
 Many of these collaborations have been very successful. Scientists now have a much deeper and 
more extensive understanding of the mechanisms of invasion and its management. More importantly,  some 
of these collaborations have also produced successful predictions. One of the most important of these 
collaborations is a series of papers by David Richardson and Marcel Rejmánek, on conifers (Rejmánek & 
Richardson 1996; Richardson & Rejmánek 2004). Richardson and Rejmánek originally studied invasive 
and non-invasive species of pines and showed that invaders shared three important traits: small seed mass, 
small juvenile periods and short intervals between seed crops (Rejmánek & Richardson 1996).  Plants which 
exhibit these traits have a high “index of invasiveness” (number of invasive species/number of rare/
threatened species) (ibid). Small seed mass helps plants to disperse over long distances, without the aid of 
mutualists. It also helps them to compete against other plants because of the sheer number of seeds which 
germinate (ibid). Short juvenile periods and intervals between seed crops further increase a plant’s 
competitiveness as it reaches the reproductive stage earlier than its competitors and can proliferate more 
extensively (ibid). This is especially important in disturbed habitats,  which are the kind of habitats most 
susceptible to invasion (ibid). 
 Rejmánek and Richardson used this very simple framework to identify species of pines which 
pose particular threats to ecosystems.  For example, they identified P.  radiata,  P. contorta, P. halepensis, P. 
patula,  P. pinaster as the five most invasive species of pine and also identified 14 species of pine which do 
not pose a threat to invasion. Richardson & Rejmánek’s work is not a one-off case study. Their framework 
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can be generalized to cover many gymnosperms and even some angiosperms. For example, the framework 
can be used to make predictions about other conifers and some woody angiosperms (Rejmánek and 
Richardson 2004).  They state that “conifers are probably unequalled in their capacity to improve the 
robustness of predictions in plant invasion ecology” (p. 327), because of the simple framework which has 
been shown to yield successful predictions. Rejmánek and Richardson conclude that the dispersal of pine 
seeds from plantations into adjoining natural or seminatural habitats is a major threat, especially in the 
Southern Hemisphere.  They also identify forests in Sweden as a potential danger zone, as it is susceptible 
to invasion by Pinus contorta, a North American pine. Another interesting point which they mention, is 
their surprise that a recent global assessment of criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management 
did not mention the invasiveness of many conifer species. It seems that based on their predictions measures 
should be taken to ensure that conifer invasions do not occur. 
 It seems that this project is respected in the scientific community, as it is widely cited and to my 
knowledge, there is no criticism of the methodology or conclusions of the studies.  In fact, it is considered 
by some to be the most successful example of prediction in invasion biology (Lake,  2004). However,  many 
of the scientists who argue for larger-scale conceptual frameworks in invasion biology, have described 
these kinds of predictive frameworks as too limited. For example, Milbau et al. (2009) state that it is not 
enough to explore mechanisms of plant invasions at a particular scale,  but that generalizations should be 
made across different scales. Moles et al. (2012) think of local studies as idiosyncratic, state that even 
though they produce “seemingly clear results, the larger picture is one of idiosyncrasy and 
inconsistency” (p. 117). 
 Yet this point should be seen as a problem for invasion biology in general,  rather than a criticism 
of a study within invasion biology. The same authors who put forth these criticisms also state that invasions 
are extremely heterogeneous (ibid), and acknowledge that invasions are very complex processes, which can 
be studied in many (at least 7) different dimensions (Milbau et al 2009). Moreover, potential invaders are 
extremely heterogeneous, so it is impossible to extrapolate traits across taxa.  For example, it is meaningless 
to talk of small seed mass in the case of animal invaders. In fact, when studies have attempted to abstract 
these differences between organisms, the resulting generalizations have been criticized as 
“trivial” (Richardson & Rejmánek 2004). 
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 In other words, the criticism of these types of projects is not that they are not generalizable, but 
that they are not generalizable enough. Yet I think that pushing beyond mid-level generalizations is not a 
useful move in invasion biology. I picked Richardson & Rejmánek’s work as an example, because it is one 
of the few documented cases which yielded successful predictions. In contrast, the large-scale frameworks 
cover more taxa, yet they have not resulted in precise and successful predictions. 
8.  Conclusion 
 Invasion biology can be characterized as a field with two different aims. The first is to understand 
and explain the fundamental nature of invasions and the second is to predict particular cases of invasion. 
The recent trend in invasion biology is the attempt to satisfy both aims, by creating unifying frameworks 
for invasion.  The aim of this paper has been to raise some concerns about the feasibility of such a project. 
As invasions are extremely heterogeneous, for a framework to be truly unifying it cannot be based on 
factors which cause invasion. In order to unify invasions a framework must classify invasions in a different 
way, such as the invasion process. The problem then is that predictions must focus on causes, hence a 
unifying framework must give up the aim of prediction. 
 The point here is not to minimize the significance of unifying frameworks, as they are essential for 
providing explanations for invasions, both in terms of particular invasions and of the the nature of 
biological invasion as a whole. Instead, my aim is to show that these frameworks cannot accomplish both 
aims of invasion biology. The aim of prediction must be left to those integrative frameworks which aim for 
low to mid-level generalizations. In short, there can be a unified theory of invasion biology, but it will not 
be predictive.
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7. Case Study 
Analysis of Target Systems in Invasion Biology
1. Introduction
 The extent of the turmoil in the field of invasion biology is such that it has generated a host of 
meta-analyses, ranging from methods and results (Davidson et al 2011) to basic concepts and definitions 
(Humair et al 2014). In the latter case, a group of scientists conducted a study on 26 academic experts, 
asking them to define key terms in invasion biology, such as ‘native species’,  ‘invasive species’, ‘alien 
species’, and to evaluate the effect of invasions on ecosystems. The experts came from two groups, 
invasion biologists and landscape experts. The results of the study were very interesting as there was very 
little consensus on any of the questions, but more importantly, there was as much variation within the group 
of invasion biologists as there was between the groups. 
 Results like these should provide some perspective for the issues discussed in the previous chapter. 
If invasion biologists cannot even agree on when an organism has invaded a community, then how will they 
be able to agree on the best way to study invasions? These results also give some indication for why some 
invasion biologists have put aside the study of actual invasions, and are spending their time trying to 
provide a coherent conceptual framework for invasion biology. 
 I am in complete agreement with these invasion biologists, that their field can benefit from an 
investigation into its theoretical and conceptual framework. In fact, I think that these scientists are actually 
engaged in a form of target system analysis. The most obviously theoretical of these papers is the one by 
Gurevitch and colleagues (Gurevitch et al,  2011). They define conceptual frameworks as theoretical entities 
which “encompass the assumptions, laws and ideas that underlie the construction of a broad concept”, 
whose main point is to generate new hypotheses,  evaluate existing ones and lead to the development of 
models and experiments. At the same time, they identify a number of reasons which they think explain the 
lack of consensus in the discipline. 
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 For example, they argue that different approaches to the study of invasions often means that 
scientists end up studying ‘different phenomena’, by which they mean that invasiveness of organisms and 
invasibility of communities have important differences. These differences lead to difficulties integrating the 
two existing frameworks. Gurevitch et al. also have an astute diagnosis about the problem of 
generalizability.  They state that “One of the challenges to creating useful frameworks for invasion is the 
tension between generality and specificity: overly general efforts risk explaining nothing very well, while 
overly specific contributions risk explaining only a limited range of cases.” (p. 408). 
 I think that in both cases of integration and generalizability, they have hit the nail on the head. It is 
precisely because of the differences in conceptualization of phenomena that integration is difficult, while it 
also the case that there is a tradeoff between generality and explanatory power in invasion research. 
However, I also think that it is possible to give a much more specific diagnosis of these two problems, and 
to provide some indications of how they can be overcome. In this chapter, I will examine the issues of 
integration and generalizability in turn, through an analysis of various target systems of invasion studies. I 
will show that on the one hand, integration is not as difficult as Gurevtich and colleagues imply, but that on 
the other hand full generalizability is beyond the scope of most invasion biology. 
2.  Integration
 Integration is considered a valuable goal for science. In recent years there has been a lot of focus 
on integration, both in philosophy and scientific practice. In philosophy, it is often seen as a more attractive 
alternative to unification accounts of scientific explanation,  as it retains the  inter-disciplinary and 
collaborative aspect of unification without being reductionist (Brigandt, 2013b; O’Malley, 2013). In 
science, it is sometimes understood as a successful methodological paradigm, with initiatives such as 
‘integrative biology’ acquiring journals, departments and disciplinary status (O’Malley, 2013). 
 There are many ways to define integration and to practice integrative science. In the previous 
chapter, I made use of Plutynski’s account of the characteristics of integration,  which included localized 
problem solving and collaboration (Plutynski, 2013). Other philosophers of science different ways of 
categorizing the types of integration. For example, O’Malley distinguishes between data integration, 
methodological integration and explanatory integration (O’Malley, 2013). The first type of integration 
refers to the creation of common data sets used by different groups of scientists. In contrast, methodological 
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integration “involves directing a range of methods at a particular biological phenomenon or research 
problem in order to achieve multiple perspectives on how a system works or what the dimensions of the 
problem are” (ibid 552). Explanatory integration is the synthesis of ‘previously unconnected theories’ and 
the application of explanatory models to new disciplines. In a paper on integration in the plant sciences, 
Leonelli distinguishes between inter-level integration, which aim to “aims to acquire an interdisciplinary 
understanding of organisms as complex wholes”, cross-species integration, which is the integration of data 
from different species and translational integration,  which combines data from within and outside 
academia, and which aims at improving human health (Leonelli, 2013). 
 Many of these types of integration are present in invasion biology. For example, in the previous 
chapter I gave the example of the studies on pine invasions, and how they exemplify many of Plutynski’s 
characteristics. They are also examples of cross-species integration, in Leonelli’s sense. The synthetic 
framework provided by Gurevitch et al. (Gurevitch et al, 2011) is an example of explanatory integration,  as 
it aims to integrate invasion biology with general ecology and evolution. It can also be understood as an 
example of methodological integration,  as it combines a number of different methods for studying the 
problem of invasion. 
 However, producing successful integration in invasion biology is not as straightforward as it may 
seem. On the one hand the 1982 SCOPE publication explicitly called for integration between the two 
existing conceptual frameworks, as the third question asked how the results from the competition and 
community invasibility frameworks could be combined,  in order to better predict and manage invasions. 
On the other hand, the general consensus is that there has not been sufficient integration in the field 
(Blackburn et al., 2011; Hayes & Barry,  2007; Williamson, 1999). In addition, there is no clear consensus 
about the type of integration which invasion biologists should aim for. The SCOPE publication seems to 
call for data integration, which may also leave room for methodological integration, while some invasion 
biologists seem to think that nothing short of explanatory integration is sufficient (Blackburn et al., 2011; 
Hayes & Barry, 2007; Williamson, 1999). 
 The main point of this section is to argue that target system analysis can help to disentangle the 
issues concerning integration,  in two important ways. First, it can help us understand if integration is 
possible, and second, it can help to determine which type of integration is useful. For the remainder of the 
section I will examine both of these issues in turn, using successful examples of integration from invasion 
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biology. Throughout my analysis, I will be using O’Malley’s distinction between data integration, 
methodological integration and explanatory integration (O’Malley, 2013). 
3.1 When is Integration Possible?
 Invasion biology is a heterogeneous field which has at least two distinct conceptual frameworks. 
In the previous chapter,  I showed how the history of invasion research has led to the creation of two sub-
fields, individual-level research which focuses on the traits which make an organism a good invader and 
community-level research, which focuses on the traits which make a community able to resist invasion. 
These two conceptual frameworks have distinct histories, theoretical frameworks and methodologies, as 
they use different types of experiments and models. Given this diversity, it is not surprising that the 
integration outlined by SCOPE has been difficult to achieve. 
 The main barrier to integration is that the two frameworks seem to be operating at very different 
levels. This means that the two frameworks have different partitions, as individual-level partitions have 
organisms as their main units, while community-level partitions have entire communities or ecosystems as 
their main units. At first glance, this implies that methodological and explanatory integration will be 
extremely difficult to achieve, if not impossible. These two types of integration go beyond the simple 
combination of data, and require a common ground of methods and explanation. However, as I showed in 
the previous chapter,  the models and experiments of the two approaches differ significantly.  Moreover,  it 
can also be argued that the two frameworks are actually studying different problems, as one focuses on 
invaders and the other on invasibility. 
 I will leave aside the question of data integration for the moment. Operating at different levels 
does not preclude data integration in principle. In fact, this type of integration became quite common in 
invasion research, following the SCOPE publication. However, it is this type of integration which was not 
considered sufficient by the researchers, mentioned in the previous section. I will argue in section 3.3 that 
the kind of data integration achieved was not particularly useful for invasion biology.  Instead, I will tackle 
the problem of more whole-scale integration head on.  A closer look at the target systems of the two 
conceptual frameworks, reveals that methodological and explanatory integration is in fact possible, as both 
frameworks can be reinterpreted as operating on the same level. 
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 It is community-level research, which should undergo the most radical reinterpretation. The 
poster-child of community-level research was biodiversity. This is because biodiversity is thought to be a 
emergent property of communities (Goldstein, 1999), which is not reducible to interactions between its 
constituent parts. Following Elton, it was thought that biodiversity was negatively correlated with 
invasibility, as low diversity communities that could be more easily upset by invaders (Dunstan & Johnson, 
2007). This claim was based on the idea of the “balance of nature”, where communities exist in a state of 
equilibrium until they are disturbed (ibid). Communities which were highly diverse were also thought to be 
more complex, in the sense that they had many more ecological interactions. Thus, a disturbance would 
upset a lower percentage of interactions in a highly diverse community, whereas the same disturbance in a 
non-diverse community would constitute a much more extensive disruption (ibid).  
 The main problem with this claim is simply that it is not empirically supported. While there are 
examples of highly diverse communities which have resisted invasion (Kennedy et al.,  2002), there are 
many studies which reveal a positive relationship between biodiversity and invasion (Levine & D'Antonio, 
1999). In response to these empirical results, some researchers have focused on ‘species richness’ a more 
deflationary interpretation of biodiversity.1 While there are many conflicting notions of biodiversity and its 
measurement, species richness is thought to be a much more straightforward notion to define and measure 
(Maclaurin & Sterelny, 2008). Unfortunately, in the case of invasions, the empirical problem remains, as 
there is no evidence that species-diverse communities are better at resisting invasions (Dunstan & Johnson, 
2007). 
 These empirical results led some researchers to look at the relationship between diversity and 
invasibility more closely. This gave rise to the theory of resource fluctuation as the actual cause of 
invasibility (Davis et al., 2000; Dunstan & Johnson, 2007). The theory states that at least in plant 
communities, a community becomes susceptible to invasion when it has an increase in the amount of 
unused resources (Davis et al.,  2000). It is based on the idea that the intensity of competition is inversely 
correlated with the amount of unused resources, simply because there are more resources to go around 
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1 There is an important debate in philosophy of biology concerning the term ‘biodiversity’ and how it should be interpreted. For some, 
species richness is not a viable substitute for biodiversity, as biodiversity is more than just species richness {Maclaurin:2008ww}. 
However, an examination of this debate is beyond the scope of this chapter. I will assume, for the sake of the argument that species 
richness is a viable alternative, for the purpose of determining the invasibility of a community. This is because species richness faces 
the same problems as biodiversity in terms of explaining invasibility. 
(ibid). Thus an invader will be more successful if it does not have to compete so intensely with the resident 
community. 
 Interestingly, the theory of fluctuating resources can explain why some highly diverse 
communities can resist invasion and why some cannot. In some cases, highly diverse communities also 
utilize a large percentage of their resources and there is little fluctuation, hence those communities are 
resistant to invasion. However,  this can also happen in low-diversity communities.  At the same time, 
communities which have high resource fluctuation will be more susceptible for invasion irrespective of 
their level of diversity (ibid). 
 The interesting point for target system analysis, is that unlike biodiversity, fluctuation of resources 
is not an irreducible property of communities. Of course, it is a property of communities, as we can 
measure the amount of resources in a community at any given time. However, the resources themselves not 
emergent properties of communities but parts of those communities. For example, the amount of nitrogen 
in a system can be thought of as a property of a community,  but it can also be understood as a part of that 
community. The upshot of this is that at least in the case of resource-fluctuation, community-level invasion 
research does not have communities as units in its partitions. 
 Before I examine the partitions of resource-fluctuation target systems, I will address a potential 
worry of this picture of community-level research. It can be argued (though it has not, to my knowledge) 
that resource-fluctuation should not be considered a case of true community-level research, as it does not 
have communities as its main units. There are two counterarguments which can be offered. The first is that 
there is no reason to think that community-level research must have community-size units. It is sufficient 
that research focus on properties of communities, for their research to fall into that camp, without 
stipulating that the properties themselves are emergent properties of communities. As I argued above, the 
amounts of resources in a system are properties of that community, even though they are not emergent. The 
second counterargument is that there are no viable emergent properties of communities which explain 
invasibility. The main other factor in community-level research is disturbance,  as it is often the case that 
invasions occur a disturbance event. Yet disturbance cannot be understood as an emergent property of a 
community, either. Therefore it seems that the theory of fluctuating resources remains the most viable 
option for community-level research. 
144
 I will now turn to an example of a study which examines fluctuating resources, in order to 
illustrate the types of partition which the theory uses. In their paper “Mechanisms of invasions: can the 
recipient community influence invasion rates?” Dunstan and Johnson (2007) use two individual-based 
models to determine the relationship between resource fluctuation and invasibility. In the interest of brevity, 
I will focus only on the first model, which aimed to determine whether resource variability or species 
richness had a greater effect on invasion resistance. The model contained a number of individual agents, 
organized in groups of species.  Each individual consumed r from the total pool of resources K. In addition, 
each individual had a birth rate (bi) and a death rate (di), which are the probabilities of the agent producing 
a single offspring or dying. Finally, individuals from different species varied in terms resource consumption 
(ri) the amount of resources they needed in order to survive. 
 Dunstan and Johnson ran the model over two different scenarios. In the first, the mortality (death 
rate) of each individual was independent of resource consumption, while in the second, it was inversely 
related to the resource consumption of the species. In other words, increasing the amount of the resource in 
the second scenario reduced the probability of mortality.  In both scenarios, the original set up included 
individuals from 20 different ‘native’ species and a K = 1000. These individuals interacted for 2000 
iterations utilizing resources and establishing a particular population structure through competition for 
these resources. At this point the number of species was uncontrolled and varied from 2 to 20. Then, an 
‘invader’  was introduced and the model was left to run to 2500 iterations. In the meantime, the variability 
of the free resources was calculated as as the variance in unconsumed resources between 1000 and 2000 
iterations. 
 The models produced some interesting results. In the first scenario, where mortality was 
independent of resource utilization species richness varied negatively with invasion success (see Figure 1
(A)). This result is consistent with the standard view that rich communities are less susceptible to invasion. 
However, the second scenario showed the opposite result, i.e. A positive correlation between species 
richness and invasion success (see Figure 7.1(A)). According to the authors, this should not be surprising, 
as resources are the underlying causes of these different results. This is because in species-rich 
communities there are by definition, more species, yet each species consumes fewer resources (K =1000 for 
all cases). This means that the death of an individual in a species-rich system releases fewer resources than 
it would in a species-poor system, hence each death results in a smaller increase in available resources. In 
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addition, when mortality is independent, for the same death rate,  fewer resources are freed in species-rich 
systems than in species-poor systems. Hence there are fewer available resources for invaders in a species-
rich system. This is also the case when mortality is dependent on resource utilization. However, in this case, 
there is a feedback effect in the system, so that the overall death rate for species-rich systems is higher than 
for species-poor systems.  Therefore,  every death actually frees more resources which the invaders can 
utilize. 
 Interestingly, the results also showed that the variability of resources was always positively 
correlated with invasion success (see Figure 7.1(B)). This can be explained by the fact that when resource 
availability is stable in an ecosystem, then the native organisms are usually well-adapted  to that 
environment (and/or phenotypically plastic), hence they can utilize the available resources efficiently. This 
means that when a new organism invades it simply cannot get a foothold in the ecosystem. This result 
should not be surprising, given that approximately only 1% of all invasion s are successful (Weidenhamer 
& Callaway, 2010). On the other hand, if resources fluctuate, then at times when resources are high, 
invaders will be able to utilize all excess and become established in the ecosystem.  
Figure 7.1. Correlation between invasion success and (A)  species richness  (B) resource variability
 There are a number of target systems which this model can represent. According to the authors, the 
model is particularly suited to the investigation of seaweed communities. This is due to the the fact that 
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many species-rich seaweed communities have been susceptible to invasion, yet all of these communities are 
also characterized by resource fluctuation, due to seasonal oceanic and tidal effects. While the authors 
themselves do not apply the model to any particular community, they make a number of suggestions which 
show how they think a target system should be specified so that it can be represented by the model. 
 Specifying the partition of a target for this model is quite easy, as the model is an individual-based 
model, hence individual organisms must feature as units. In this sense, the model is a departure from 
traditional community-level invasion research, as the partition does not individuate communities as units. 
Properties of these organisms such as births, deaths, biomass and metabolic rate will be used to calculate 
the average birth rate, death rate, resource consumption and growth rate for each species. These, in turn will 
be used to determine the various competitive strategies for each species. 
 Yet this model retains some aspects of community-level research, which is typically absent from 
individual-level research. The first is the importance of resources,  as units which are relevant causal factors. 
In other words, this partition individuates resources such as nitrogen, phosphorus and light,  and these 
resources are not omitted in the abstraction. They are represented in the individual-based model as 
‘resource units’, which are consumed by the organisms, yet they also vary. The reason why they are more 
important than in traditional competition models, is that they also interact with the organism agents, as they 
would in a predation model. 
 The second is the importance of space as a limiting factor. In community-level research, this is 
usually represented as a dimension of the organism’s niche, as two organisms cannot occupy exactly the 
same space. As seaweeds are relatively immobile, each organism needs a minimum amount of space to 
become established and grow. In the individual-based model, space is represented by the patches, as each 
organism can occupy only one patch. In contrast, space is typically not individuated in traditional 
competition models, as the carrying capacity acts as a proxy for space.  
 Dunstan and Johnson consider their research as part of the community-level tradition, as they 
think that the most important factor which determines an invasion is the fluctuation of resources, which is a 
property of communities. Yet its partition is very similar to the partitions traditionally associated with the 
individual-level tradition. The remaining difference between this model and traditional individual-level 
models is the inclusion of resources and space. However, this is a difference of abstraction, not partitioning, 
as the target of this model includes resources, which are usually omitted.  
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 In fact, the Dunstan and Johnson’s model is an example of methodological integration between the 
two frameworks. It incorporates aspects of both traditions, as the the model is essentially an individual-
level model, yet with the addition of causal factors from community-level research. It is also considered to 
be an example of a successful merger between the two frameworks by other invasion biologists 
(Richardson & Pyšek, 2006).2 It also aims to achieve a new perspective on how systems of invasion work, 
and explores new dimensions of the problem of invasion. 
 The point of this discussion is to show that analyzing the target systems of two different 
conceptual frameworks can help us determine if integration is possible,  whether it will be valuable, and 
how to achieve it. In this example, given that the integrative model is already in existence,  the analysis 
serves as an explanation for why the integration was achieved. The analysis showed that the the partitions 
of the two frameworks are not very different (provided that the community-level framework was 
reinterpreted in the appropriate way). It also showed how the integration was achieved, by locating the 
issue at the level of abstraction instead of partitioning. 
 Finally, the analysis highlighted the fact that the integration was relatively uncomplicated, as it 
was achieved by changes in the level of abstraction rather than partitioning. Individual-based models are 
structured so that adding factors is relatively simple. This does not mean that integration of two frameworks 
with different partitions is impossible to achieve. However, it is often much more complicated. Hence, in 
this case target analysis showed not only that integration was possible,  but also that it would would 
relatively simple to accomplish. 
 Yet there are cases where integration turns out not to be as simple or as useful. In the next section I 
will give another example of integration in invasion biology and use target system analysis to show extent 
and limitations of this type of integration. 
3.2 When is Integration Useful? 
 In my discussion of the history of invasion biology (chapter 6), I mentioned that many of the 
original attempts to integrate the two frameworks of invasion biology have been largely unsuccessful.  In 
particular, I mentioned the theory of seed plant invasiveness, which attempted to pair up particular traits of 
plants with particular environments in which they are likely to invade.  The idea is that while particular 
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2 See also chapter 6 pp. xx
traits make organisms better competitors,  most invasions fail,  hence some communities are less able to 
compete with individuals with those traits (Facon et al., 2006). For example,  small seed size is a factor 
which leads plants to become more widely dispersed and because of this wide dispersal, they are more 
likely to be adapted to a wider range of conditions (Richardson & Pyšek, 2006). The idea is to find 
environments which are particularly susceptible to plants with that trait, so as to better predict invasions. 
This would be an example of data integration, as it would combine data from individual-level and 
community-level invasion research. 
 There are numerous other pairings which could be made. For instance, the aquatic cattail Typha 
angustifolia, which I mentioned in chapter 5 managed to invade Indian Creek because it was allelopathic. 
As toxins are much more easily distributed in small aquatic environments such as creeks or lakes, another 
pair of individual and community traits could be allelopathy small aquatic environments. 
 The list of available pairing between traits of individuals and communities is long. For  each 
particular organism, we can identify an environment which has been susceptible to invasion by that 
particular organism. However, one problem with this method is that these results are not generalizable 
beyond each particular instance. That is, identifying a combination of a trait with a particular environment 
as the joint causes of a particular invasion will not automatically be more applicable to a larger number of 
systems. If anything, it will probably be even be less applicable, as there will be fewer systems that have 
both characteristics. In other words, combining potential causes of invasion may lead to a decrease in the 
instances of false positive predictions of future invasions,  as it will rule out cases where a particular trait 
does not promote invasiveness because it is not in the right sort of environment, or cases where a particular 
community is not susceptible to invasion because the invader does not have the right sorts of traits. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that such a combination will increase the instances of true predictions of 
future invasions. Invasions will probably continue to occur in environments that we had not even thought of 
as susceptible to invasion and by organisms that we had not envisaged as invaders.  Moreover, there are 
probably a great many combinations of traits and environments that will result in invasions, which again, 
we have not even imagined. 
 The underlying problem with this method is not that the integration itself is impossible, but that it 
is not clear how it is useful. All of these cases are examples of data integration,  as they combine results 
from individual-level and community-level research in order to explain (and predict!) invasions. However, 
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the integration is limited to data integration, and there is no methodological or explanatory integration. That 
is,  the combination of traits and environments does not involve a range of methods in order to achieve 
multiple perspectives on how a system works, nor does it create new explanatory models. 
 I will illustrate this point by revisiting the example of Typha angustifolia from chapter 5. In  my 
analysis of the target system of the experiment, I showed that Jarchow and Cook were firmly situated 
within the individual-level framework. The partition individuated organisms as units, with allelopathy as 
the trait which caused the invasion of Indian Creek. Of course, they were not aiming for any sort of 
integration, as they did not include any community-level characteristics. Yet the question is, what would the 
integration of community-level characteristics add to the explanation of the invasion? Jarchow and Cook 
successfully showed, with their experiment,  that Typha angustifolia succeeded in invading Indian Creek, 
because it was allelopathic (Jarchow & Cook, 2009).  The explanation of this particular invasion is 
complete. The only potential gain from including community-level characteristics would be the 
generalization of this particular result to other domains. However, as I argued above, the generalizability of 
these types of results is severely limited. Therefore, it seems that while data integration is possible, it is not 
always useful. 
 This characterization of the problem mirrors the arguments of the invasion biologists, mentioned 
in section 2, who are calling for greater integration of the field. In the case of invasion biology, data 
integration is not sufficient for better predictions of invasions, nor does it add much to existing explanations 
of particular invasions.  Yet the important point for my purposes is that target system analysis offers a way 
to diagnose the problem. In this particular case, data integration does not involve any radical changes in the 
target systems of existing models. But this shows that the existing framework and resulting target systems 
are apt for the purposes of explaining particular invasions.  Merely integrating data will not provide a better 
explanation, hence it merely complicates the procedure without providing any additional benefits.  Still, as I 
showed in the previous section, target system analysis also shows that other forms of integration are 
possible and can often be very useful. 
 In the end, the most important goal for invasion is prediction. While integration is one part of the 
puzzle for achieving successful predictions of invasion, another part is generalizability. In the next section I 
will show how target system analysis can help explain why it is so difficult to generalize results and 
explanations of invasion. 
150
4. Generalizability 
 The analysis of the targets in invasion biology can also help to untangle the other puzzle of 
invasion biology, namely why it is so difficult to generalize the results of invasion studies. More 
specifically, while it is possible to make grand generalizations in invasion biology,  these tend to be 
generalizations that are rather trivial,  and thus not particularly useful for explaining or predicting invasions. 
For example, a factor which correlates very strongly with invasions of both plants and animals is 
facilitation by humans. However, humans facilitate invasions in many ways. They physically introduce 
organisms to new environments (consciously or unconsciously) (Levine & D'Antonio, 1999), they disturb 
environments directly or indirectly (Facon et al.,  2006), they prey on organisms and so on. While all of 
these activities facilitate invasions, they do so in different ways, which have very different effects on 
ecosystems.  In fact, there are important differences even within these types of facilitation. Hydraulic 
fracturing (fracking) and human-induced wildfires are both examples of extreme disturbance, yet the effects 
that they have are very different. In order to be useful, an explanation of an invasion must be more specific, 
by including the mechanisms of the invasion. However, doing this immediately sacrifices the generality of 
the explanation, as the mechanisms of invasions differ greatly across different cases. 
 While this may seem like an insurmountable problem, analyzing the target systems of invasion can 
be very informative. First, it gives us a precise way of explaining when generalizability fails and why it is 
the case. Second,  it can reveal the extent to which a result from an invasion study can be generalized. In the 
previous chapter I gave an overview of the field of invasion biology and highlighted the problem of 
generalizability.  Here, I will show how target system analysis helps to resolve the issue, by bringing to the 
forefront the conflict between causal heterogeneity and generalizability which characterizes biological 
invasions. 
 One of the most important tools in the target analysis toolbox, is the identification of difference-
makers. In the case of invasions, a difference-maker is a causal factor, present in the domain which makes a 
difference (or in some cases the difference) between the success and the failure of the invasion. In the 
invasion of Indian Creek by Typha angustifolia (chapter 5),  I showed that the difference maker was 
allelopathy, the exudation of toxins from the roots of the plant.  In the pine studies by Rejmánek & 
Richardson (Rejmánek & Richardson, 1996; Richardson & Rejmánek, 2004), small seed mass is the 
difference-maker in invasions that involve pines. Other factors which have been shown to be difference-
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makers in particular plant invasions include phenotypic plasticity (Daehler, 2003; Geng et al., 2006), plant-
soil feedback (Callaway et al.,  2004; Klironomos, 2002), disturbance through fire (Buckley, Bolker, & 
Rees, 2007), disturbance through climate change (Hayes & Barry, 2007), biological inertia (Joost, 2003), 
small seed size, (Richardson & Rejmánek, 2004), propagule pressure (Van Kleunen, Dawson, Schlaepfer, 
Jeschke, & Fischer, 2010). 
 These difference-makers are a very diverse group. Some of them are particular traits, yet they are 
very different types of traits. For example, small seed mass and allelopathy are traits that affect competitive 
ability at very different stages of the invasion process. In addition, a trait which is a difference-maker in one 
case, might not be a difference-maker in another. Thus, while small seed mass is a difference-maker in 
pines, it was not a difference-maker in the T. angustifolia    invasion, even though T. Angustifolia does have 
small seed mass and produces a large number of seeds.3 Other difference-makers are relations between 
organisms, such as plant-soil feedback. This is a particularly interesting example, as there can be different 
kinds of feedback which affect invasiveness in different ways. That is,  soil microorganisms which fix 
nitrogen and thus increase a normally limiting factor for plant growth can coexist symbiotically with other 
microorganisms which are harmful to the plants. 
 As I argued in the previous chapter, in order to be apt and to provide the setup for a successful 
explanation, the target system of an invasion study must identify the difference makers of that invasion 
event.  On the other hand, a general explanation or framework for invasion must be able to account for most 
if not all of the particular instances of invasion. It should be easy to see that a general explanation cannot 
focus on some difference-makers and leave out others, as it would only be an explanation of some subset of 
invasions. Nor can an explanation be truly general or unificatory if it identifies each and every difference-
maker separately. 
 Of course, another option available is to to to dispense with difference-makers and causal relations 
entirely and unify invasions in another way. This is exactly the strategy employed by Blackburn et al. with 
their reconceptualization of invasions as processes (Blackburn et al., 2011) (see chapter 6). However, there 
are good reasons for wanting at least some explanations which take causes into account. We still need to 
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3 We can assert this with confidence, because we know that T. Angustifolia is much more invasive than other members of its genus, 
with which it shares the traits of small seed mass, fast growth rate etc. 
identify the causes of particular invasions, even if the results do not generalize. In addition, as I argued in 
chapter 6, causes are necessary for the successful prediction of invasions.4 
 The third option is to find find a way to group together the difference-makers in broader 
categories,  which still retain their causal power. I will argue that while this is possible, it can only be 
achieved within certain limits, that of mid-level generalizations. It is impossible, given the heterogeneity of 
the difference-makers to generalize beyond that while retaining the causal character of an explanation. I 
will illustrate with the example of the pine studies by Rejmánek & Richardson (1996, 2004) mentioned in 
the previous chapter. These studies are generally considered to be successful, in that they have generated 
important predictions, and they are also modestly general, as the results have been generalized to other 
conifers and some woody angiosperms. In order to show why these results cannot be generalized further, I 
will first show how they managed to achieve even this level of generalizability. I will do this, once again, 
by looking more closely at their target systems. 
 The partitions in Rejmánek & Richardson’s studies are all individual-level partitions. That is,  they 
individuate organisms (pines) as units, and the difference-makers are identified from the properties of these 
units. Rejmánek & Richardson did not know beforehand, which of these many factors were difference-
makers, hence they made a shortlist of 10 potential difference makers, and then conducted a discriminant 
analysis on those to reveal three: small seed mass, short juvenile period and a short interval between seed 
crops. These three traits together, explain why some pines are invasive and others are not. Rejmánek & 
Richardson hypothesized that the reason why these simple factors are difference-makers in invasions, is 
that pines have quite simple ‘regeneration requirements’(Richardson & Rejmánek, 2004). They are 
gymnosperms, do not rely on other organisms for their dispersal, and invest little into each seed. Given this 
reproductive strategy,  the species with these three traits are the most successful when it comes to invading 
new areas. 
 Rejmánek & Richardson hypothesized that these results could be applied to other conifers and 
some woody angiosperms.  The reason for this, in the case of conifers is that they have some important 
similarities with pines (which are also conifers). The most important of these is that they are gymnosperms, 
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4  It is interesting to note that in other disciplines explanation is commonly tied in with causes, while predictions can be generated 
without reference to causes. This has also become part of many accounts of scientific explanation. For example, a standard 
counterexample to Hempel’s account, the ‘barometer and the storm’ concerns a situation where the drop in the barometer predicts the 
storm’s coming, but it does not explain the storm. Hence, it is a case where prediction is ‘easier’ than explanation. Nonetheless, this is 
not the case for invasion biology as the systems in which invasions occur are extremely complex and not similar enough to each other, 
hence even when an explanation is successful, it does not give us good grounds for prediction. 
and therefore do not rely on mutualisms in the way that angiosperms do. Of the various conifers, cypresses 
(Cupressaceae) were found to be the most invasive, while within the family, those species which had the 
difference-makers were the most invasive. This is because still being conifers, the strategy that works well 
for pines works well for cypresses too.  However, it is important to note, that there were more exceptions 
within the cypresses than there were within the pines.  That is, there were some cypresses which were not 
invasive despite having the three difference makers. This shows that the generalizability of the results is 
already starting to be limited, as there may be a different set of difference makers which are the best 
predictors of invasions for cypresses. 
 The situation becomes more complex in the case of angiosperms. First of all, they differ from 
gymnosperms in an important way, as they rely on other organisms to reproduce and disperse their seeds. In 
fact, the results were much less robust for the angiosperms than they were for the pines or even the 
cypresses. Nonetheless,  some patterns emerged, namely that woody angiosperms (trees and shrubs) tend to 
be much less invasive than conifers (esp. pines) and that the rarest of these species have none of the 
difference-makers.  Still,  these results are much less robust than the results for the pines. Again, this shows 
that the generalizability of the results is limited to small groups of organisms. 
 The explanation for this limitation is that the difference-makers for invasion, are only difference-
makers within a certain context. In this case,  the context is the general reproductive apparatus and strategy. 
These three causes (small seed-mass, short juvenile period and short interval between seed crops) are only 
difference-makers given reproductive organs which produce these kinds of seeds frequently, and within a 
reproductive strategy which allocates few resources to the production of each seed. If a plant had the same 
characteristics within a different reproductive strategy, then the same factors would not make it more likely 
to invade. This does not mean that they would not confer other advantages to the plant,  just not advantages 
for invading. 
 The general point is that the factors which are difference-makers in one group of organisms or 
species are often completely absent in others.  This means that it is very unlikely that the knowledge of the 
difference-maker in one species will help us determine anything about behavior of a species which does not 
have that trait. This is the main reason why plant invasions and animal invasions are so different. Yet even 
within smaller taxa, identifying a known difference-maker in another species, does not mean that it will be 
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a difference-maker in that species. Whether or not a factor counts as a difference maker depends, in part, on 
the context within the organism itself, its other traits, strategies and interactions with other organisms. 
 The upshot of this discussion is to show the reasons for which the generalizability of results is 
limited, in the case of invasion biology. Moreover, these reasons are good reasons, and scientists will not 
gain much from trying to ‘overcome’ these limits. Invading organisms and invaded communities are so 
heterogeneous, that focusing on the cause of a particular invasion will not give us the tools for a general 
explanation of invasions, or general theories for predicting invasions. However, target system analysis can 
help us determine which organisms are sufficiently similar to each other, so that we can know when the 
identification of a factor is difference-maker. 
5. Conclusion
 The main of this chapter was to show that the nature of integration and generalizability in invasion 
biology can be elucidated by target system analysis. Some invasion biologists have already started 
conducting a form of target analysis, by re-examining the conceptual frameworks of invasion biology and 
looking for ways that they can be improved. However, a target analysis which is both scientifically 
informed and philosophically grounded can be more informative. In this case, it showed that it is possible 
to integrate the two main conceptual frameworks of invasion biology, provided that they are re-
conceptualized to some extent. In addition it showed that if a study in invasion biology focuses on the 
causes of the invasion, the results can only be extended to mid-level generalizations. 
 These results are important both for invasion biology but also for the role of target analysis. The 
argument in this chapter highlights just how useful and informative target system analysis can be. An 
important point to keep in mind is that if target systems were not considered to be real parts of the world, 
the type of investigation presented in this chapter would be beyond the scope of target system analysis. It is 
only because of the clear distinction between models and targets which comes from my view of targets as 
real parts of the world that target system analysis can reach its full potential, informing scientific practice. 
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8. Conclusion
 The protagonist of this dissertation is the humble and generally overlooked target system. 
Unanalyzed, a target system is simply a vague term referring to whatever it is that a model models, a 
shorthand which philosophers of science use to denote the uninteresting aspect of model-world relations. I 
hope to have shown through this dissertation,  that target systems can offer much more to philosophers and 
scientists alike. They are the final piece in the puzzle of model world relations, as their analysis reveals part 
of the relationship between models and the world. Target system analysis comes in two parts, the first being 
the specification of target systems, which is comprised of four parts: identifying the domain of study and 
the phenomenon of interest, partitioning the domain and abstracting to reveal the difference makers of that 
phenomenon. The key to understanding the importance of target systems is to realize that they are real parts 
of the world, which are therefore easily distinguishable from the models which represent them. In other 
words, they are not intermediaries between models and the world, but literally are parts of the world. 
 This view of target systems as real parts of the world,  seemed (at first) to be at odds with  my 
account of partitioning and abstraction. Defining both partitioning and abstraction for target systems 
involved some complexity and required investigation of other areas in philosophy of science.  In the case of 
partitioning, this was the debate on natural kinds. Different views of natural kinds have different 
implications for the metaphysical status of partitions, yet I hope to have shown that many moderate views 
are compatible with an understanding of target systems as real parts of the world. In the case of abstraction, 
the issue was that common views of the notion of abstraction run together the concepts of omission, de-
concretization and generalization. I hoped to have shown that the core notion for abstraction is omission 
and that omission alone does not change the ontological nature of target systems. 
 The second aspect of target system analysis is the theory of target system evaluation. The main 
difficulty in providing a theory of target system evaluation is that,  target systems are real parts of the world, 
hence they are not good or bad in themselves, but must be evaluated with respect to a particular scientific 
purpose (often a model of the phenomenon of interest). Hence I devised a theory of evaluation based on 
aptness, which is itself a relativistic notion, tied to a function or goal. This led to another difficulty, namely 
the provision of a theory which was sufficiently pragmatic to accommodate the importance of context for 
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the choice of partitions, but also sufficiently strict provide a criterion for abstractions which cuts across 
contextual factors. Thus was born a theory which combined aspects of van Fraassen’s account of the 
pragmatics of explanation and Strevens’s kairetic account of causal explanation.  
 An integral part of this dissertation were the ecological models which I used extensively to explain 
the various intricacies of target system analysis. This reliance on ecological examples was not entirely 
accidental.  Ecology is a fascinating discipline. Its content is captivating, as it deals with extremely complex 
systems, comprising of numerous parts, properties and a multitude of interactions between them. In 
addition, ecology is a microcosm of science in general,  both in terms of the numerous methods ecologists 
used to study phenomena, to the problems associated with each one. In fact, it was ideally suited to the 
investigation of the role of target systems, as it furnished my investigation with examples suited to each of 
the issues associated with target systems. 
 Yet the importance of target systems need not be limited to models in ecology. It is possible that 
other fields might also benefit from rigorous target system analysis and evaluation. To some, this may seem 
unnecessary, especially in disciplines where there are well-established norms governing model selection 
and where these models are generally regarded to be successful. In fact, this can lead to a more general 
argument against the importance of target systems. The argument rests on the idea that scientists have been 
using models to explain phenomena in the world for a very long time, with sufficient success.  Moreover, 
the successful practice of modeling already includes what I am calling target systems and target system 
analysis. This gives rise to a second, stronger criticism, which focuses on the philosophical aspect of 
modeling. The idea is that philosophers have provided a number of sophisticated accounts of model-world 
relations, which adequately explain how models relate to the world and can account for any difficulties 
which arise in the application of models to real-world systems. Proponents of this criticism would argue 
that accounts of model-world relations are complete and that the inclusion of target systems simply 
introduces additional complications to the picture. 
 The response to the first criticism is to agree that the practice of modeling already includes many 
aspects of target systems. Scientists identify domains and phenomena, categorize these domains into units 
and make judgments about which units are relevant. It is also true that scientists think of these activities as 
aspects of modeling. As I showed in the introduction, with the example of the Vancouver Island marmots, 
scientists often spend a significant amount of time and effort doing this preliminary work before they run 
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their models. I actually think that this is actually an advantage of my account. One of the reasons why it is 
important to give a philosophical account of target systems and their analysis is precisely because these 
activities are part of scientific practice. In other words,  target system analysis is an aspect of science which 
philosophers have not paid enough attention to. 
 Ultimately, the point of this dissertation is to highlight the importance of this particular aspect of 
science. I think that distinguishing this aspect of science from other parts of modeling has important 
advantages, yet the importance lies in the particular scientific practice itself,  not the name we give it.  In 
other words, what matters is that the process of identifying a domain and a phenomenon, partitioning and 
abstraction are given the requisite attention from scientists and philosophers. If it does not really matter if 
we do not call this aspect of science target system specification and analysis, but simply think of it as a part 
of modeling. 
 However, proponents of the second, stronger criticism might not be satisfied with this answer. The 
point of this criticism is that my account simply complicates things, as existing philosophical accounts of 
modeling adequately describe the scientific practice of modeling. Here,  the worry is that talking about 
target systems does not add anything of real value to the existing picture. 
 There are a number of responses to this criticism, yet I will focus on two. First,  I suspect that the 
criticism rests on a misunderstanding of why target systems are important and useful. Target systems are 
not a ontologically distinct entity, as they are parts of the world,  which means that the inclusion of target 
systems does not add anything new in the metaphysical sense. That is,  even with target systems in the 
picture, there are only two types of entities, systems in the world and models of those systems. Again, this 
is an advantage of my view. Critics would be right in arguing that the introduction of a new kind of entity 
would complicate matters without adding any benefits to existing accounts of model-world relations. In 
fact, my argument against other conceptions of target systems as fictions or as models is based on this 
point. 
 However, the importance of target systems stems from the epistemic benefits that they have for 
conducting and understanding science. Specifying, analyzing and evaluating target systems are all ways of 
making these aspects of science more explicit, so that (i) we achieve a better understanding of the parts, 
properties and mechanisms of a real-world system in which a phenomenon manifests and (ii) we achieve a 
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better understanding of how the model we are using represents the system in the world. In other words, 
understanding target systems gives us a better grasp of how a phenomenon should be modeled. 
 This leads to the second counterargument, namely that existing accounts of model-world relations 
are strengthened by the inclusion of target system specification and evaluation. Even though some of these 
accounts make some reference to aspects of target system specification, there are important gaps which can 
be filled. I will illustrate by focusing on the case of partitioning. Existing accounts of model world relations 
sometimes make implicit reference to partitioning, as in many cases particular models or scientific 
disciplines require a certain type of partition. For example, Weisberg’s account of model-world relations is 
based on the notion of similarity between models and targets (Weisberg, 2013). Determining the extent to 
which a model is similar to a target is achieved through identifying common mechanisms and attributes 
between the model and the target. 
 However, these mechanisms and attributes presuppose a particular partition of the system from 
which the target is specified. That is, in order to be able to identify aspects of a system as mechanisms or 
attributes, we must partition the system. Thus, partitioning is implicit in the view of similarity yet not 
explicitly addressed. Yet, there are cases where explicit analysis of partitions is necessary and can help the 
similarity account of model-world relations. The problem is that each domain can be partitioned in many 
ways,  and the model itself might not always fully determine which is the most useful partition. For 
example, if we are using an individual-based model in ecology, we can include a particular factor as an 
agent or as a property of other agents. In a model of plant competition, resources such as nitrogen and 
phosphorus could be simply regarded as part of the general resource pool, or they could be actual agents (or 
patches). These two alternatives correspond to different partitions of the system, yet the model itself does 
not dictate which is more useful. The particular choice could lead to differences in the predictions of the 
model which can only be understood and solved if we pay close attention to the partition we are using. 
 In addition, sometimes models contain features which do not have analogues in real-world 
systems. I am referring to examples such as the growth rate of the Vancouver Island marmots, which is not 
similar to any part of the world or to any property of individual marmots. Hence, in order to assess the 
similarity of the model to key features of the marmot population there are a number of other steps which 
need to be taken, that is, identifying the factors from which the growth rate is calculated. Paying explicit 
attention to these features, by determining that they are relevant for the scientific purpose and including 
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them in the target system is epistemically valuable as it can give us a better picture of the phenomenon 
taking place in the system. 
 The upshot of this point is that existing accounts of model world relations are not complete. While 
some of them include some of the aspects of target-system specification, they do not include all of them. 
My account provides the final piece in the picture of model-world relations, as it explains the nature of 
target systems and their relationship to systems in the world. While this might not seem to be especially 
problematic, there are cases where a model’s results are not successful, yet the problem lies with the target 
system. Examples of cases like these were presented in chapters 6 and 7 in my discussion of models in 
invasion biology.  
 I will now address a different issue, which demonstrates another way in which target systems are 
important. There are some clarifications which need to be made, so that some of the advantages of my 
theory of aptness are made more palpable. These are distinctions between aspects of aptness as a theory of 
target system evaluation, which need to be reiterated and highlighted in order to dispel confusion about the 
nature and importance of target systems. I will focus on two clarifications: (i) the difference between 
maximally and sufficiently apt targets and (ii) the difference between aptness at a local and global scale. 
These can also be seen as further evidence of the importance of epistemic issues and benefits in the 
discussion of target systems. 
 The first distinction is between maximally and sufficiently apt targets. A maximally apt target 
system is the best possible target system for a particular scientific purpose. This means that the target has 
the most useful partition and contains only the difference makers for the phenomenon and no other factors. 
In most, if not all cases, scientists and philosophers are not in a position to determine the maximally apt 
target for a particular scientific purpose. Instead they try to identify a target which is sufficiently apt for the 
purpose. But how can they determine if their target is sufficiently apt without being able to identify the 
maximally apt target for each scientific purpose? The answer is that the maximally apt target for a 
particular purpose is best understood as a regulative ideal, something which we can strive for, even though 
our epistemic limitations will not allow us to fully determine it. Trying to understand what a maximally apt 
target would look like can help us understand the way in which target systems are apt, that is, by having 
useful partitions which individuate potential difference-makers and which omit everything which is not a 
difference-maker. 
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 An implication of this point is that it shows that there is a fact of the matter about the aptness of a 
target given a particular purpose. This is important because it shows that target system analysis is not 
overly relativistic. The fact that in practice we are often unable to determine the maximally apt target for 
each scientific purpose does not mean that there is no such thing as a maximally apt target. This in turn 
means that the standard of target system evaluation is objective, even if scientists' actual judgements about 
the aptness of particular target systems are limited by what they know at the time. This can be demonstrated 
by the comparison of two target systems.  If we have two targets which differ in terms of partition and/or 
abstractions there is a fact of the matter about which is closer to the maximally apt target. In some cases we 
will be able to determine this, yet in others we will not. There might also be cases where we are completely 
mistaken in our evaluation and the favored target system is actually less apt. The important point is that it is 
our epistemic limitations as human scientists and philosophers which keep us from being able to make the 
correct judgement. 
 This leads to the second distinction between local and global conceptions of aptness. Strictly 
speaking,  this is not a distinction between two concepts, but a scale with local and global at the two 
extremes. On the local end of the spectrum a target is considered apt for a very specific scientific purpose, 
entirely determined by a single model applied to a single system. Here I am referring to mathematical or 
computational models such as the logistic growth model which was applied to the population of Vancouver 
Island Marmots. In this case, the context is given entirely by the model, and the target is apt if it picks out 
the pest partition and set of abstractions for that model. In some sense, this is the easiest way to determine 
the aptness of a target,  as it is relatively easy to determine the context for usefulness and relevance, when 
that context is determined just by the model. However, in many other cases,  the determination of context is 
much harder, as it is broader than what is given by model itself.  For instance,  a scientist might specify a 
target system with a family of models, rather than a particular model, in mind. This means that the 
‘scientific purpose’ which provides the context for evaluating aptness will be more broad. In these cases the 
context is determined by analyzing the concepts, methods and norms of a discipline or sub-discipline. 
 At the most broad level, we can think of the aptness of target systems in science as a whole. That 
is,  as science progresses and we learn more about the systems from which targets are specified, we are able 
to make more general judgements about the aptness of target systems. For example, the invention of 
microscopes and telescopes make it the case that partitions of systems into units that are smaller or larger 
161
than can be distinguished by human senses can still be useful. On a less general level,  as biologists now 
know that soil biota affect plant growth, it is possible to make relatively general claims about the aptness of 
a group of target systems: soil biota are difference-makers. Moreover, these general or global evaluations of 
aptness have an interesting relationship with the more local evaluations of aptness. In some cases, the 
general evaluations are used to determine the context for the local evaluations. In other cases, examination 
at the local level reveals an exception to the general level, and leads to a re-evaluation of the general notion 
of aptness. The point is that all of these evaluations are possible and important, as they are what helps us 
get a better understanding of the real-world systems and phenomena that are the subjects of scientific 
inquiry. 
 This point should not be taken to undermine the relative objectivity of target system evaluation. 
That is,  the fact that the context itself can change should not be taken to imply that target system evaluation 
becomes overly relativistic. In other words,  I am not claiming that the objective standard of aptness 
changes as science progresses. What counts as a maximally apt target for a particular purpose is fact of the 
matter and does not change.  Of course, context is related to the scientific purpose for which the target 
system is being used. Yet this simply means that no target system is good or bad in itself,  but apt for a 
certain purpose. Once the purpose is determined then context does not affect the standard of aptness, what 
counts as a maximally apt target system. 
 At the same time however, I do not wish to imply that contextual and pragmatic factors are not 
important. Even though the standard of target system evaluation is objective, as there is a fact of the matter 
about what is the maximally apt target for a particular scientific purpose, contextual and pragmatic factors 
affect our judgements of aptness. Each scientific purpose is associated with a certain type of technology, 
computational power, availability of data etc. All of these contextual factors affect our epistemic ability to 
determine whether a particular target is sufficiently apt. Thus, determining the context is an essential aspect 
for helping us get better at making judgements about the aptness of particular target systems, which is also 
an extremely important aspect of scientific practice, one which often needs philosophical examination in 
order to be better understood. In this type of philosophical analysis,  it is not sufficient to simply state that 
context determines evaluation. It is possible to provide a much deeper and informative analysis,  by showing 
the ways in which context determines the standard and method of evaluation.  I hope to have shown that it is 
possible to achieve this at various levels of specificity and generality. 
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 This concludes the final clarifications of my view of target systems, which I hope has shed some 
more light on their importance for scientists and philosophers alike. Still,  there is a lot more work to be 
done, so that target system analysis reaches its full potential.  This involves extending the investigation of 
target systems beyond ecological modeling, in two directions: beyond modeling and beyond ecology. The 
main area of interest in the dimension going beyond modeling, is experimentation. It is quite common in 
philosophy of science to distinguish between modeling and experimentation as two radically different 
aspects of science. This distinction has sparked a debate concerning the relative virtues of modeling versus 
experimentation. However, there has been a recent shift in focus, as some authors have started looking for 
commonalities between modeling and experimentation so that the two aspects of science can become 
integrated. I think that paying attention to the specification of target systems can help with this integration, 
as experiments also have targets. Just like a modeler,  a successful experimenter must choose a particular 
framework in which to work and identify the factors relevant to the phenomenon being studied. Target 
systems and their evaluation can therefore help in the creation of successful experiments but also provide a 
common framework for understanding natural phenomena, whether they are studied through models or 
experiments.
 An area of particular interest for experimentation is plant science. Invasion biology provides ample 
evidence that plants are special, as they are influenced and limited by different combinations of factors than 
other organisms, most importantly light, CO2, nitrogen, phosphorus and soil biota (Klironomos,  2002). 
This means that they respond differently to density and overcrowding (Yoda,  1963) and behave differently 
as competitors and invaders (Jarchow & Cook, 2009). At the same time, Another interesting distinction is 
often made between different types of experiments (laboratory, field and natural), and their relative merits 
(Diamond,  1983).  According to Diamond, there is a tradeoff between realism and manipulability (control 
of variables), where lab experiments offer full control but are highly unrealistic, natural experiments are the 
opposite and field experiments are situated between the two extremes. Thus, each of these methods has 
virtues, weaknesses and limitations of scope, that vary with the subject of the experiment and the type of 
question being asked. I understand this investigation as a preliminary target analysis, which should be 
deepened and extended.  Specifying an appropriate target system for a particular phenomenon will help 
determine which type(s) of experiment is best suited to it. This kind of analysis has an important advantage. 
The method of starting with the target system (instead of the type of experiment) is less prone to choose an 
163
inappropriate framework, because of a desired value (for example, desiring an experiment that is realistic, 
even though it is extremely difficult to design a natural experiment). 
 Finally, another way to extend target system analysis is towards a different discipline,  social 
science. Social scientists use models to investigate phenomena in the world, thus target systems are also 
present in social science. Being clear and precise about the targets of models and experiments in social 
science can support and reinforce investigations. There are two issues which can be illuminated by the 
investigation of target systems in the social sciences. The first is the ongoing debate concerning the optimal 
level at which societies and social phenomena should be studied, namely at the level of the individual or the 
group. I think that target system analysis can help illuminate the issue, by providing a principled way to 
distinguish between the types of questions which are best suited to individualism and those best suited to 
holism. The second issue is that of generalizability.  Social scientists face the same problems as biologists 
when it comes to the scope and generalizability of their results. This is particularly important for the social 
sciences, as there is a recent debate concerning the nature and explanatory power of case studies in the 
social sciences (Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010; George & Bennett, 2005; Morgan & Morrison, 1999). As in 
the case of invasion biology, target systems can aid in the identification of the optimal level of generality 
which allows for both explanation and prediction.
 Whichever direction target system analysis takes, one thing is certain. Target systems are 
important and ignoring their role in scientific practice will prevent a number of scientific and philosophical 
investigations from reaching their full potential.
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